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INTRODUCTION

A. Introductory Remarks
The United States Supreme Court took a slight breather from
patent-law issues in 2008. After issuing three patent-law decisions in
1
2007 (including KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.), the Court
1. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007); see also MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007).
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issued just one patent-law decision in 2008—Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
2
LG Electronics, Inc.
Despite the Supreme Court’s slower pace, however, the Court’s
influence loomed large in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 2008. In a number of cases, the Federal Circuit
continued to work through the implications of the Supreme Court’s
recent precedents, most notably KSR and the Supreme Court’s
3
2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. The Federal
Circuit’s continued efforts to apply these cases in different
technological and competitive settings may be setting the stage for
further elaboration from the Supreme Court on the standard for
obviousness and the availability of injunctive relief in patent
infringement cases.
The Federal Circuit also, in two en banc decisions, preemptively
reevaluated some of its own precedents, considering how they
measured up against older (but still binding) Supreme Court case
4
5
law. In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit considered its 35 U.S.C. § 101
patentable-subject-matter jurisprudence against previous Supreme
6
7
Court decisions such as Diamond v. Diehr and Gottschalk v. Benson.
8
And in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the Federal Circuit went
back even further in the annals of Supreme Court jurisprudence and
revised its own design patent case law in light of the Supreme Court’s
9
1871 decision in Gorham Co. v. White.
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
In 2008, the Federal Circuit continued to assess and apply the
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
which rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test in favor of a more
flexible approach for determining whether a patent claim is
10
obvious. Using the TSM test, a patent claim was proved obvious if
1.

2. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008); see infra Section I.B
(discussing the Court’s decision in Quanta).
3. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).
4. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
5. 545 F.3d at 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
6. 450 U.S. 185, 209 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1 (1981).
7. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 673 (1972).
8. 543 F.3d at 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
9. 81 U.S. 511 (1871); see Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1664 (analyzing the Court’s decision in Gorham). For a more detailed
discussion of Egyptian Goddess, see infra Section 1.A.4.
10. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).
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“‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’
can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the
11
knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.” In rejecting
the Federal Circuit’s strict application of the TSM test, the Supreme
12
Court noted that its decision in Graham v. John Deere Co. provided for
a more expansive and flexible approach to the obviousness
13
question.
Although the Supreme Court did not set forth a particular test in
KSR, it did offer some guiding principles, such as caution in granting
patents “based on the combination of elements found in the prior
art” from known methods where the combination yields no more
14
than predictable results. The Federal Circuit in 2008 applied this
15
principle in Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., finding a “textbook
case” of obviousness because the asserted claims involved a
16
combination of prior art teachings to yield predictable results. The
court applied the same principle to reach a similar conclusion in
17
Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd.
In addition, several of the Federal Circuit’s cases in 2008 dealt with
the ramifications of underlying district court findings that applied the
TSM test or KSR in the immediate wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision. In these cases, the court offered additional applications of
the directives of KSR, such as, “‘if a technique has been used to
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using
the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or
18
The court also, for example, clarified the post-KSR
her skill.’”
standard for determining obviousness in the context of particular
19
fields of patents, such as those regarding chemical compounds.

11. Id. at 407, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (citation omitted).
12. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
13. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
14. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
15. 520 F.3d 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
16. Id. at 1344, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
17. 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding the combination of prior art made
the patent obvious).
18. Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 544 F.3d 1310, 1315, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1623, 1627 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1396).
19. See Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1452, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]his court consults the counsel of KSR that
‘any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the
manner claimed.’” (quoting KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1397)).
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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
The Federal Circuit also continued in 2008 to delineate the
requirements for obtaining injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v.
20
MercExchange, L.L.C., but left unanswered several questions raised by
the 2006 decision. The court expressly left open the question of
whether there remained any presumption of irreparable injury upon
21
a finding of patent infringement. Reviewing the facts of each case
presented in detail, the Federal Circuit did not reverse in any of the
multiple appeals from the denial of a permanent injunction based on
22
the district court’s analysis of the eBay factors, and even confirmed
that it is within a district court’s discretion in appropriate cases to
dissolve an injunction granted pre-eBay on the basis that the
23
The
injunction is no longer equitable in light of that decision.
Federal Circuit did reverse the grant of one permanent injunction,
however, where the damages awarded to the plaintiff already
included payment of a “market entry fee” that was equivalent to an
24
The court also clarified that the eBay
ongoing royalty payment.
decision does not preclude the award of an injunction where the
plaintiff does not practice the asserted patents, but that the
25
remaining facts of each particular case must be taken into account.
2.

Diamond v. Diehr and Gottschalk v. Benson
The Federal Circuit in 2008 revisited two Supreme Court cases
26
from over a quarter century ago in its en banc decision in In re Bilski,
clarifying the test for determining what constitutes a patentable
process under § 101 and rejecting the court’s own tests set forth in
3.

20. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).
21. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.1, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1090, 1098 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d
683, 702, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1657 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that eBay did
not resolve the issue).
22. Under the factors set forth in eBay,
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
23. Amado, 517 F.3d at 1359–62, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094–97 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
24. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1653 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (commenting that the patentee’s right to receive
royalty payments negates the claim of irreparable injury by the patent infringement).
25. Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
26. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. and In re
28
Alappat. In In re Bilski, the court harkened back to the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Diamond v. Diehr and Gottschalk v. Benson, which
“enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is
tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application
of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle
29
itself.”
Applying
that
test,
known
as
the
“machine-or-transformation” test, a process is patent-eligible under
§ 101 if it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or it transforms
30
an article into a different state or thing.
The Federal Circuit’s decision left many questions open to future
cases. The court, for example, did not set limits of how machine
implementation of a process may affect patent-eligibility and did not
specify “whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a
31
process claim to a particular machine.” The implications of the
Federal Circuit’s decision on patent applicants and patent holders
will emerge in the courts—including perhaps the Supreme Court—in
2009 and beyond.
Gorham Co. v. White
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the Federal Circuit changed
32
the standard for determining when a design patent is infringed. In
a unanimous en banc decision, the Federal Circuit aided design
patent plaintiffs by abandoning the Federal Circuit’s requirement
that plaintiffs show the “point of novelty” prong; instead, the Federal
Circuit held that design patent plaintiffs need to meet only the
33
“ordinary observer” test, first established by the Supreme Court in
34
1871 in Gorham Co. v. White.
A design patent covers the ornamental, rather than the useful,
aspects of a product. The “ordinary observer” test from Gorham
defines infringement of design patents in terms of whether “in the
eye of an ordinary observer . . . two designs are substantially the
same,” thereby deceiving the observer and “inducing him to purchase
4.

27. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
28. 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
29. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
30. Id. at 955, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
31. Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
32. 543 F.3d 665, 678, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(rejecting the point of novelty test after much discussion and analysis of earlier case
law).
33. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
34. 81 U.S. 511 (1871).
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35

one supposing it to be the other.” The “ordinary observer” test thus
establishes a standard for design patent infringement similar to the
“likelihood of confusion” standard for trademark-infringement
36
cases.
Over time, however, the Federal Circuit added an additional “point
of novelty” requirement. A design patent plaintiff now had to prove
not only substantial similarity under Gorham’s “ordinary observer”
test, but also that the accused device contained “substantially the
same points of novelty that distinguished the patented design from
37
the prior art.” The “point of novelty” test was intended to prevent a
finding of infringement simply because two products generally
looked similar, even though the accused device did not contain the
novel design feature or features that allowed the patentee to obtain
38
The “point of novelty” test, however, made proving
the patent.
infringement difficult in many cases because a design patent may
have many points of novelty and a defendant could avoid
39
infringement simply by omitting one of them.
In Egyptian Goddess, the Federal Circuit returned to Gorham,
unanimously ruling that the “ordinary observer” is the sole test to
40
determine design patent infringement.
The Federal Circuit,
however, tried to prevent findings of infringement based solely on
similarity without reference to the novelty that justified the patent:
the court required that that the ordinary observer in the Gorham test
41
be someone with knowledge of the prior art. The Federal Circuit
said that such familiarity with the prior art will allow a meaningful
42
comparison of the accused devices with the patented claim. Such an
approach, said the court, maintains the “focus on those aspects of a
43
design which render the design different from prior art designs,”
35. Id. at 528.
36. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 682, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671 (noting that
an ordinary consumer would not be confused by the similarities between the two
products).
37. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113,
1118, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
38. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 97, 109 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (inserting a novelty requirement into previous
infringement tests).
39. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667
(acknowledging the difficulty that the more points of novelty an item possesses, the
easier it is for another producer to infringe the patent).
40. Id. at 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
41. Id. at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
42. Id. at 674, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
43. Id. at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (quoting Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v.
Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925, 1928 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).
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while at the same time avoiding “the risk of assigning exaggerated
importance to small differences between the claimed and accused
designs relating to an insignificant feature simply because that
44
feature can be characterized as a point of novelty.”
B. The U.S. Supreme Court: Quanta Decision
In June 2008, the Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
45
Electronics, Inc. issued a unanimous decision that sought to clarify the
46
Specifically, the Court held that the
law of patent exhaustion.
“authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent
exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder
47
from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article.”
The doctrine of patent exhaustion, or the “first-sale doctrine,”
provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates
48
(“exhausts”) all patent rights to that item. That is, if a patentee sells
a patented article to a purchaser, the purchaser has the rights like
any owner of personal property over that particular article—the right
to use it, repair it, modify it, discard it, or resell it—unrestricted by
49
A subsequent downstream
any patent rights of the patentee.
purchaser of the item, likewise, obtains the same rights to control its
50
disposition.
Before Quanta, the Federal Circuit had limited the
patent-exhaustion doctrine in two significant ways. In Mallinckrodt,
51
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the Federal Circuit had held that exhaustion
would be triggered—and a patentee’s infringement action barred—
52
only if the patentee’s sale of the patented item was unconditional.
Thus, under the so-called “conditional-sales doctrine,” patentees
could, to avoid exhaustion, condition sales of patented articles on the
purchaser agreeing to conditions, such as field-of-use or single-use
53
restrictions. If the purchaser failed to follow those conditions, the
patentee could enforce the conditions through a patent infringement

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 677, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667–68.
128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008).
Id. at 2113, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
Id. at 2122, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id. at 2115, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS:
BLACK-LETTER LAW AND
COMMENTARY § 31.6 (2007).
50. Id.
51. 976 F.2d 700, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
52. Id. at 706, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
53. See id. at 709, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (holding that prohibiting a
purchaser from reusing a patented medical device was enforceable under patent
law).
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54

action (not just through an action under state contract law). Also,
the Federal Circuit had previously held that a patentee’s sale of an
item would exhaust the patentee’s rights only as to a patent’s
apparatus claims; the patentee would retain all rights under its
55
method claims.
In Quanta, LG Electronics, Inc. (“LGE”) entered into a broad
56
cross-license agreement with Intel, Inc.
LGE licensed to Intel a
57
large portfolio of patents covering aspects of computer systems. The
license agreement authorized Intel to “make, use, sell (directly or
indirectly), offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of” Intel
58
products that practice the LGE patents.
The license agreement
explicitly stated that it did not extend a license to any third party to
59
combine licensed products with unlicensed products. In a separate
master agreement, LGE also required Intel to inform its purchasers
that Intel’s license from LGE did not authorize the purchasers to
combine the licensed Intel products with unlicensed non-Intel
60
products.
Quanta Computer, Inc. purchased chips and chipsets from Intel
and—despite Intel’s warning that Quanta had no license from LGE
to combine Intel and non-Intel products—combined them with other
components to make computers that infringed LGE’s system and
61
method patents.
LGE sued Quanta for infringement of its
62
apparatus and method patents. Quanta raised a patent-exhaustion
defense. The district court and the Federal Circuit rejected the
63
defense. The Federal Circuit held that the exhaustion defense did
not apply to method claims and that, in any event, LGE’s license was
limited and did not authorize the sale of Intel products for use with
64
non-Intel products.
On review via writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in a
unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas.
The Supreme Court
54. Id., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
55. See Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924, 223
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1675 (2008) (“The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held [below] that the doctrine does not
apply to method patents at all . . . .”).
56. 128 S. Ct. at 2113, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
57. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
58. Id. at 2114, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
59. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
60. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676–77.
61. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676–77.
62. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676–77.
63. Id. at 2114–15, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
64. Id. at 2115, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
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considered three questions: (1) whether the patent-exhaustion
doctrine applied to method patents; (2) to what extent a product
must embody a patent to trigger exhaustion; and (3) what constitutes
65
an authorized first sale sufficient to trigger exhaustion.
The Court quickly dispensed with the first question, holding that
66
method claims are exhaustible. The Court stated that it had long
held that the exhaustion doctrine applies not only to product
67
claims.
Moreover, and perhaps more central to the Court’s
thinking, Justice Thomas pointed out that “[e]liminating exhaustion
for method patents would seriously undermine the exhaustion
doctrine” because patent drafters could shield items from exhaustion
68
by redrafting apparatus claims as method claims.
The Court then considered “the extent to which a product must
69
embody a patent in order to trigger exhaustion.” The Court relied
70
heavily on the test it articulated in United States v. Univis Lens Co., a
71
1942 decision that, the Court said, “governs this case.” In Univis, the
Court held that the sale of a product that does not fully practice the
patent at issue can still trigger patent exhaustion if its “only
reasonable and intended use was to practice the patent and [it]
72
‘embodie[s] essential features of [the] patented invention.’” The
Court determined that the Intel chips and chipsets met this standard
and triggered the exhaustion doctrine because they “all but
73
completely practice the patent.” Although the chips and chipsets
were not capable, by themselves, of infringing LGE’s patent claims,
they nonetheless “substantially embodie[d] the patent because the
only step necessary to practice the patent is the application of
74
common processes or the addition of standard parts.” Everything
inventive about each patent was embodied in the Intel chips and
chipsets; infringement required only a “common and noninventive”
75
final step.
65. Id. at 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
66. See id. at 2117, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678–79 (“Nothing in this Court’s
approach to patent exhaustion supports LGE’s argument that method patents
cannot be exhausted.”).
67. See id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
316 U.S. 241, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,
309 U.S. 436, 44 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 614 (1940)).
68. See id. at 2117–18, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
69. Id. at 2118, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
70. 316 U.S. 241, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 404 (1942).
71. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2119, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
72. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (third alteration in original) (citing Univis,
316 U.S. at 249–51, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 407).
73. Id. at 2120, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
74. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
75. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
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Finally, the Court considered whether Intel’s sale of products to
76
The Court noted that
Quanta exhausted LGE’s patent rights.
exhaustion is triggered only by a sale authorized by the patent holder,
77
but the Court found that Intel’s sales to Quanta were authorized.
Notwithstanding Intel’s obligation under the master agreement that
it notify purchasers that they did not have a license to combine
licensed Intel products with unlicensed non-Intel products, the Court
found it dispositive that nothing in the license agreement restricted
Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who
78
intended to combine them with non-Intel parts. The Court said that
the license agreement did not condition Intel’s authority to sell its
products on whether Intel gave, or Quanta complied with, the notice
79
required under the master agreement. In short, “[n]o conditions
limited Intel’s authority to sell products substantially embodying the
80
patents.”
The Court did remark in a footnote that, although the
patent-exhaustion doctrine prevented LGE from asserting its patent
rights against Quanta, “the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta
81
does not necessarily limit LGE’s other contract rights.” The Court
“express[ed] no opinion on whether contract damages might be
available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent
82
damages.”
Some commentators have suggested that, in the wake of Quanta, a
patentee may try to retain patent-law remedies by imposing, in license
agreements with manufacturers, conditions on the manufacturers’
83
authority to sell patented items. The patentee could then argue that
sales in violation of those conditions were unauthorized and that
84
patent exhaustion would not restrict the patentee’s remedies.
Quanta did not directly address the continued viability of the
Federal Circuit’s conditional-sales doctrine, which, as noted above,
allows patentees to enforce, through the patent laws, conditions on
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 2121, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id. at 2121–22, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id. at 2122, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
Id. at 2122 n.7, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 n.7 (emphasis added).
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 n.7.
See David J. Cavanaugh & Owen K. Allen, High Court Sees a Lot More Exhaustion,
LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2008, at 14–15 (noting that, in the wake of Quanta, “patent law
now provides less certain protection for patentees' efforts to control products after
they are sold,” and advising patentees that they would be well advised to take care to
ensure that “downstream rights are preserved to the fullest extent” in future
licensing agreements).
84. See id.
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direct purchasers’ use of patented items. Although the Solicitor
General had broadly asked the Supreme Court to reject the Federal
85
Circuit’s conditional-sales precedent, the Supreme Court did not
directly address the issue or even mention the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Mallinckrodt, instead focusing on Intel’s status as a licensee
whose sales of the patented item were unrestricted by LGE’s license
agreement.
C. The Executive Branch: The Rules Promulgated by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office
In 2008, the most significant development, with regard to United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO” or “PTO”) rules,
86
concerned rules published by the USPTO on August 21, 2007.
These rules would have made a number of controversial revisions
relating to patent prosecution. Two key aspects of the revised rules
involved limitations on the number of continuation applications and
87
the number of claims in an application. In particular, the revised
rules provided that an applicant seeking to file more than two
continuation or continuation-in-part applications, or more than one
request for continued examination, must present a showing as to why
an amendment, argument, or evidence sought to be entered could
88
not have been previously submitted. The revised rules also required
an applicant to file an examination support document covering all of
the claims in any application containing more than five independent
89
claims or twenty-five total claims.
On October 31, 2007, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia preliminarily enjoined the USPTO from
90
putting its new patent prosecution rules into effect. On April 1,
2008, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and voided the USPTO’s final rules (“Final Rules”) in the two
consolidated cases, Tafas v. Dudas and SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
91
Dudas.
The court determined that the rules were “‘not in
85. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
18–24, 26–30, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2009) (No. 06-937).
86. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2008). For background
information on the rules adopted in 2007, see generally 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug.
21, 2007).
87. 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716–44 (Aug. 21, 2007).
88. Id. at 46,719–20.
89. Id. at 46,721–22.
90. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548 (E.D. Va.
2007).
91. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623 (E.D. Va.
2008).
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accordance with law’ and ‘in excess of [the] statutory jurisdiction
92
Contrary to the USPTO’s
[and] authority’” of the USPTO.
arguments, Senior Judge Cacheris found that the Final Rules were
substantive in nature and thus beyond the rulemaking power of the
93
USPTO. While the USPTO argued that the rules fell within their
rulemaking authority and were procedural in nature, the court found
that the Final Rules were not procedural rules and did not relate only
94
to application processing. Instead, the Final Rules were found to be
“substantive rules that change existing law and alter the rights of
applicants such as [GlaxoSmithKline] and Tafas under the Patent
95
Act.” The rules “constitute a drastic departure from the terms of the
96
This case was
Patent Act as they are presently understood.”
appealed to the Federal Circuit, and oral arguments were heard on
97
December 5, 2008.
98
Unrelated USPTO rules became effective on September 15, 2008.
These rules clarified that “[r]egistration as a patent practitioner does
not itself entitle an individual to practice before the Office in
99
trademark matters.” The rules also stated that, as before, any party
presenting any paper to the USPTO is certifying that the statements
made in such paper, to the best of the party’s knowledge, are true,
and that such paper is not being submitted frivolously or for any
100
improper purpose. The new rules extended this certification to all
101
papers presented to a hearing officer in a disciplinary proceeding.
Furthermore, while violations of this section may “jeopardize the
probative value of the paper,” under the new rules, they no longer
threaten the validity of an entire application or of any issued patents
102
The old rule (37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b)(1))
or registered trademarks.
stated that with the presentation of any paper to the USPTO, the
party presenting such paper was certifying that, to the best of the
party’s knowledge, all statements made therein were true, and that
92. Id. at 811, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006)).
93. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
94. Id. at 813, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629.
95. Id. at 814, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629.
96. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629.
97. Digital Recording of Oral Argument, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 2008-1352 (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/20081352.mp3.
98. Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,650 (Aug. 14, 2008) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 41).
99. Id. at 47,670 (revising 37 C.F.R. § 11.14(a) (2008)).
100. Id. at 47,652.
101. Id. at 47,653.
102. Id.
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violations of the rule “may jeopardize the validity of the application
or document, or the validity or enforceability of any patent,
103
The
trademark registration, or certificate resulting therefrom.”
new rule (37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(1)) states that violations of this rule
104
“may jeopardize the probative value of the paper.” The new rules
also govern the conduct of investigations and disciplinary
105
proceedings before the USPTO.
The rules establish the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the USPTO and establish explicit grounds
106
for discipline.
On June 10, 2008, the USPTO published new rules regarding the
107
These rules, which were
formatting and content of appeal briefs.
set to take effect on December 10, 2008, were delayed pending review
108
by the Office of Management and Budget.
D. The Legislative Branch: The Patent Reform Act of 2007
and the Patent Reform Act of 2008
At the beginning of 2008, congressional patent reform appeared
imminent. On September 7, 2007, the House of Representatives
easily passed House Bill 1908, the Patent Reform Act of 2007, with a
109
vote of 220 (ayes) to 175 (nays). A somewhat similar reform bill in
the Senate, Senate Bill 1145, had already passed the Senate’s
110
At the end of 2007,
Committee on the Judiciary on July 19, 2007.
Senator Patrick Leahy, the sponsor of Senate Bill 1145, encouraged
the House and Senate to reach a compromise in early 2008 with “the
goal of favorable Senate action as early as the floor schedule permits”
111
on a patent reform package. On January 24, 2008, Senate Bill 1145
112
was placed on the Senate’s legislative calendar.
The possibility of passing Senate Bill 1145 disappeared in 2008,
however, after facing considerable opposition. Opponents of the
113
114
bill’s provisions included the USPTO, the Bush Administration,
103. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b)(1) (2008).
104. 73 Fed. Reg. at 47,653.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 73 Fed. Reg. 32,938 (June 10, 2008).
108. 73 Fed. Reg. 74,972–01 (Dec. 10, 2008).
109. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
110. S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
111. 153 CONG. REC. S15898, S15899 (Dec. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
112. S. 1145.
113. Donna Young, FDA, Congress To Jointly Form Follow-on Biologics Proposal,
BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 11, 2008. This article reported on the media statement
made by Jon Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property at the
USPTO, on Feb. 5, 2008. Id. In his statement, Mr. Dudas claimed that the reform
package “undermines innovation, particularly in the damages provision” and would
be damaging to the biotech industry, universities, and small inventors. Id.
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116

major labor unions (such as the AFL-CIO), universities, and
representatives from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
117
industries, among others. At the end of 2008, Congress ultimately
proved unable to institute patent reform.
114. Letter from Carlos M. Gutierrez, Sec’y of Commerce, to Patrick Leahy, U.S.
Senator (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/
110/S1145Apr0308.pdf.
In the letter, Mr. Gutierrez expressed the Bush
Administration’s position on patent reform efforts. The Administration expressed
strong opposition to changes in the doctrine of inequitable conduct that would
lessen the penalties for such actions without enactment of applicant quality
submissions designed to improve application quality. Id. at 1. In addition, the
Administration stated its “overriding concern” regarding Congress’s revisions to the
damages statutes, in particular, decreasing the discretion granted to judges in
awarding damages. Id. at 2; see also Letter from Nathaniel F. Wienecke, Assistant
Sec’y of Legislation and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator
(Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/
110/S1145020408.pdf (detailing opposition to damages provisions in S. 1145, as
reported on January 24, 2008, as well as other areas of concern).
115. See Letter from Bldg. & Constr. Trade Dep’t et al. to U.S. Senator (Feb. 6,
2008), available at http://www.popa.org/pdf/misc/reform1-06feb2008.pdf (voicing
opposition of labor unions to provisions on damages, post-grant opposition
proceedings, and mandatory publication of applications).
116. See, e.g., Letter from Abbot et al. to John Cornyn, U.S. Senator (Jan. 24, 2008)
[hereinafter Abbot letter], available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/
patent_docs/files/cornyn_letter.pdf (stating the opinions of Texas employers and
U.S. patent holders opposing damages, post-grant opposition, and venue provisions,
among others); Letter from Lee T. Todd, Jr., President, Univ. of Kentucky, et al. to
Mitch McConnell & Jim Bunning, U.S. Senators (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Todd
letter],
available
at
http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/
mcconnellbunning_letter.pdf (expressing various parties’ opinions against damages,
post-grant opposition, venue, and applicant quality provisions).
117. See, e.g., Cornyn letter, supra note 116; Todd letter, supra note 116; see also
Letter from Adroit Med. et al. to Lamar Alexander & Bob Corker, U.S. Senators (Jan.
29,
2008),
available
at
http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/
files/alexandercorker_letter.pdf (noting concern with damages provisions and
post-grant opposition procedures of S. 1145); Letter from AstraZeneca Pharm. LP et
al. to Arlen Specter & Robert P. Casey, Jr., U.S. Senators, (Jan. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/spectercasey_letter.pdf
(protesting proposed provisions relating to damages, post-grant opposition,
inequitable conduct, and applicant quality submissions); Letter from Night
Operations Sys. et al. to Henry Reid & John Ensign, U.S. Senators (Jan. 23, 2008),
available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/reidensign_
letter.pdf (arguing against damages, post-grant opposition, and venue provisions,
among others); Letter from Abbott et al. to Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator (Jan.
22, 2008), available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/
hutchinson_letter.pdf (disagreeing with damages, post-grant opposition, and
inequitable conduct provisions); Letter from AbTech Indus., Inc. et al. to John
McCain & Jon Kyl, U.S. Senators (Jan. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/mccainkyl_letter.pdf
(same); Letter from Amaix et al. to Wayne Allard, U.S. Senator (Dec. 18, 2007),
available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/files/allard_letter.pdf
(same); Letter from The Coca-Cola Co. et al. to Saxby Chambliss & Johnny Isakson,
U.S. Senators (Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/
DEVICE
patent_docs/files/chamblissisakson_letter.pdf
(same);
MEDICAL
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007 WILL STIFLE
INNOVATION
IN
MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY
(2007),
available
at
http://www.medicaldevices.org/public/documents/MDMAPatentReform.pdf
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Congress has been actively proposing patent reform legislation
118
since at least 2005. The reform efforts are designed to institute the
most substantial change in the patent laws since the passage of the
119
Patent Act in 1952. For example, the goals of reform stated during
the 2008 introduction of Senate Bill 1145 were lofty:
(i) to improve patent quality and the patent application process;
(ii) to improve and clarify several aspects of patent litigation,
including the creation of a less expensive, more expeditious
administrative alternative to litigating patent validity issues; and
(iii) to make the United States’ patent system, where it is useful to
do so, more consistent with patent systems throughout the rest of
120
the industrialized world.

To accomplish these goals, the Patent Reform Act of 2007, as
proposed in the Senate in 2008 and passed by the House in 2007,
provided for the United States to convert from a first-to-invent system
to a first-to-file system, thereby harmonizing the U.S. patent system
121
with the rest of the patent systems in the world. In addition, both
the Senate and House reform bills would have created an
administrative system for challenging patents more quickly and
122
cheaply after their issuance (a “post-grant opposition” proceeding).
The proposed reform also affected the calculation of reasonable
123
House Bill 1908 required that the royalty be
royalty damages.
(expressing concern over apportionment of damages, post-grant opposition
proceedings, PTO rule-making authority, and inequitable conduct provisions).
118. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
119. See S. REP. NO. 110-259, pt. 1, at 4 (2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The
time has come for Congress to reconsider the 50 year old patent statute and how it is
currently being applied.”). As Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy noted shortly
after entry of S. 1145 in 2008,
The last time the patent system was significantly changed, the structure of
DNA had not been discovered; gasoline was around 27 cents a gallon; and we
had not yet sent a man to the moon. . . . [W]e are living in the Information
Age, and the products and processes that are being patented are changing as
quickly as the times themselves.
Orrin Hatch & Patrick Leahy, Editorial, Meaningful Patent Reform, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2008, at A19; see also 1952 Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
120. S. REP. NO. 110-259, pt. 1, at 5.
121. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2008).
122. H.R. 1908 § 6; S. 1145 § 5. H.R. 1908 and S. 1145 proposed different postgrant opposition procedures. The House bill had a first window review period
during which the patent would not be entitled to a presumption of validity and the
burden of proof would be that of preponderance of the evidence rather than clear
and convincing evidence. H.R. 1908 § 6(f)(1). The Senate bill proposed two
windows. S. 1145 § 5(c)(1). A patent would not be entitled to a presumption of
validity in the first window and the standard of proof would be preponderance of the
evidence. Id. For the second window, the presumption of validity would exist and
invalidity would require proof by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
123. H.R. 1908 § 5(a)(3); S. 1145 § 4(a).
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calculated by apportionment or the entire market value rule; only as
a last resort could the fact finder use the familiar Georgia Pacific Corp.
124
v. United States Plywood Corp. factors used to calculate a reasonable
125
royalty.
In Senate Bill 1145, as introduced in 2008, reasonable
royalties were to be calculated using the entire market value rule, an
established market royalty, or if neither of those provisions were
126
appropriate, through an apportionment method.
A variety of other changes rounded out the reform packages of the
Patent Act of 2007, including modification of the current law relating
127
128
129
to the best mode requirement, inequitable conduct, and venue,
as well as the creation of additional disclosure obligations for patent
130
applicants in an effort to increase the quality of patents.
Patent reform has generated a number of divergent views on the
best ways to improve the current patent-law system. The most
recognized competing factions are technology industries, such as
software and semiconductor developers, and the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries.
In very general terms, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries typically favor reform that strengthens the rights of the
patent holder. According to researchers, these industries tend to
have only a few patents that cover key inventions, and innovation is
131
extremely expensive compared to the cost of copying. As a result,
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies seek to protect their
patent rights by discouraging infringement and minimizing
132
mechanisms for challenging their patents. The biotechnology and
pharmaceutical sector has therefore primarily opposed efforts by
124. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
125. H.R. 1908 § 5(a)(3); see also Ga.-Pac. Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 238 (listing fourteen factors taken from leading cases which can be used to
help determine the amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent license).
126. S. 1145 § 4(a).
127. H.R. 1908 § 13.
128. H.R. 1908 § 12(b); S. 1145 § 12.
129. H.R. 1908 § 11(a); S. 1145 § 8(a).
130. H.R. 1908 §12 (a); S. 1145 § 11.
131. See Wendy Schact, Patent Reform: Issues in the Biomedical and Software Industries,
27 BIOTECH. L. REP. 153, 156 (2008) (noting that patents could be important to the
pharmaceutical industry due the ease in which such products can be replicated).
132. See supra note 117 (listing letters from pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies to members of Congress advocating for the protection of their patent
rights in proposed legislation); Donna Young, Analysts Say Patent Reform Will Harm
Biotech, Add Costs, BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 15, 2008.
Biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies also favor lessening the penalty associated with
inequitable conduct given the time and expense associated with litigating such
claims; congressional attempts to merely codify existing inequitable conduct law have
met with resistance from these groups. Id.
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Congress to reduce damage awards, which act to deter
133
In addition, post-grant opposition proceedings are
infringement.
viewed unfavorably by the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industry given that the goal of such proceedings is to make
invalidation of patents faster and less burdensome to patent
134
challengers.
The high-tech industry, on the other hand, faces different
problems. For this sector, companies tend to have a large number of
135
patents that cover relatively minor changes to existing technologies.
The products sold by such companies are the result of a number of
136
prior patented inventions.
As a result, technology companies are
concerned with facing damages for infringement that are based on
the sale of the total product rather than the contribution to that
product made by the (typically small and relatively insignificant)
137
To combat the
infringing inventive portion of the product.
problems of “overcompensation” for infringement, technology
companies favor apportionment of damages and other methods of
138
In
cabining the potential damages awards in infringement suits.
addition, because of the speed at which inventions in the high-tech
industry become obsolete, technology companies also favor rapid,
streamlined systems for invalidating patents, such as administrative
139
post-grant opposition proceedings with lower burdens of proof.
Despite the contentiousness of patent reform, there is continued
interest in 2009 for the reforms proposed by House Bill 1908 and

133. Young, supra note 132.
134. Id.
135. See Schact, supra note 131, at 158 (reporting that new products in software
development can embody numerous patentable inventions).
136. Id. at 159.
137. See Coalition for Patent Fairness Thinks Patent Reform Is Near,
http://patentbaristas.com/archives/2008/04/02/coalition-for-patent-fairness-thinkspatent-reform-is-near/ (Apr. 2, 2008) (noting that high-tech companies would like to
see a lessening of nuisance suits against their companies); see also Grant Gross,
Microsoft Asserts Patents, Wants Weaker System, PC WORLD, May 7, 2007,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/131984/microsoft_asserts_patents_wants_weaker_s
ystem.html (reporting that Microsoft has argued against the ease in which patent
holders can sue infringers resulting in the shut down of product lines which contain
a
small
part
of
patented
equipment
or
code),
available
at
http://www.pcworld.com/article/131984/microsoft_asserts_patents_wants_weaker_s
ystem.html; Coalition for Patent Fairness,, http://www.patentfairness.org/
learn/what/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (proposing that damage awards based on
common sense standards should be part of comprehensive patent reform
legislation).
138. See Gross, supra note 137 (discussing how proposed patent reform legislation,
supported by Microsoft, would limit damages based on the number of patents within
a product).
139. Id.
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140

Along with Senate Bill 1145, a revised reform
Senate Bill 1145.
bill—the Patent Reform Act of 2008 (Senate Bill 3600)—was
introduced to the Senate in the fall of 2008 for consideration in
141
2009. Like the Patent Reform Act of 2007, the Patent Reform Act
142
of 2008 proposes changes to damages law and creates a post-grant
143
144
Elimination of the first-to-invent system and
review proceeding.
even the “on-sale” and “public use” provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 are
145
146
proposed. Other revisions in Senate Bill 3600 would affect venue,
147
148
inequitable conduct, and applicant submission standards.
II. DECISIONS RELATING TO JURISDICTION AND ASSERTABILITY
OF CLAIMS
A. Justiciability
1.

Standing
Before a federal court may decide the merits of a case, a plaintiff
149
must first establish that he or she has standing to sue. A patentee’s
standing to sue for patent infringement is derived from the Patent
150
Act, which states that “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action
151
for infringement of his patent.”
140. Obama Supports Patent Reform But Bill May Face Delays, DRUG INDUS. DAILY, Nov.
13, 2008, http://www.fdanews.com/newsletter/article?issueId=12140&articleId=
112187.
141. S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008); 154 CONG. REC. S9982 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (introducing S. 3600 in 2008 “to allow Senators and
interested parties the time to consider these alternatives as we prepare for the patent
reform debate in the next Congress.”)
142. S. 3600 § 4(a). The damages provision in S. 3600 focuses on strengthening
the “gatekeeper” role of the court. 154 CONG. REC. S9983 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
While the damages section of S. 3600 codifies the principle that all relevant factors
should be considered in reaching a reasonable royalty (S. 3600 § 4(a)), the
legislation also provides that certain methods of calculating reasonable royalties,
such as standardized measures of damages (“rules of thumb”) and royalties paid on
comparable patents, should only be considered in limited circumstances. Id.
143. S. 3600 § 5.
144. S. 3600 § 2(a).
145. S. 3600 § 2(b).
146. S. 3600 § 8.
147. S. 3600 § 11.
148. S. 3600 § 10.
149. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (explaining that standing
ensures both the party and the dispute are properly before the court and surveying
Article III and prudential standing requirements).
150. 1952 Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); see also Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo
Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1376, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(determining that appellees had standing to sue as licensees of six U.S. patents).
151. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
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In Akazawa v. Link New Technology International, Inc., the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a party purporting to own
153
patent rights transferred by way of intestacy has standing to sue.
Any assignment of a patent or an interest in a patent must be in
154
writing.
The inventor of the patent at issue in Akazawa, however,
155
The inventor’s heirs
died intestate without a written will.
subsequently assigned their interest in the patent to a third party,
156
who then assigned all rights to Akira.
When Akira later brought
suit against Link New Technology, Link moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the initial intestate transfer was not a
157
valid assignment of patent rights. Link reasoned—and the district
court agreed—that because no valid assignment had occurred
ownership of the patent remained vested in the estate and Akira had
158
no standing to sue.
Akira appealed, and the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s
159
decision.
The court observed that 35 U.S.C. § 261 is not the only
160
A change of
method for transferring ownership of a patent.
161
Accordingly,
ownership may also be dictated by operation of law.
when a patent owner dies, the jurisdiction’s law of intestacy will
162
determine who then owns the patent.
Moreover, because state law typically governs patent ownership
rather than federal patent law, ownership of the patent at issue
163
required interpretation of Japanese intestacy law.
The Federal
Circuit accordingly remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions to interpret Japanese law to determine whether Akira
164
had standing to bring suit.
The Federal Circuit also had occasion in 2008 to address the
reoccurring issue of a patent co-owner’s standing to bring suit where
the co-owner has failed to join all other owners of the patent. In
165
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., Lucent brought suit against
Gateway, Dell, and Microsoft for infringement of patents relating to
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

520 F.3d 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1355, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1355, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.
Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281.
Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
Id. at 1357–58, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
543 F.3d 710, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Lucent had developed the patents while
MP3 sound encoding.
party to a joint development agreement with a German company,
167
Lucent, however, had failed to join
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft.
168
Fraunhofer to the suit.
After the jury found the defendants liable for infringement, the
court set aside the verdict and granted the defendants judgment as a
169
matter of law. The court found that, as a matter of law, Fraunhofer
was a co-owner of one of the patents-in-suit as a result of the joint
170
Because a patent co-owner must join all
development agreement.
other owners in order to sue for patent infringement, Lucent lacked
standing to assert claims related to this patent against the
171
defendants.
Lucent appealed, arguing in part that the joint development
agreement impermissibly attempted to assign joint ownership to only
172
some of the claims. Because a patentee may only assign title to an
173
entire patent, such a partial assignment would be impermissible.
The Federal Circuit rejected Lucent’s interpretation of the joint
174
development agreement and affirmed the district court’s ruling.
The court noted that while “patent rights cannot be split between
claims,” an inventor of less than all of the claims in a patent is
175
nevertheless a co-owner of all claims in the patent. Because Lucent
had chosen to file its patent applications in a manner that
contradicted Lucent’s interpretation of the development agreement,
Fraunhofer was a co-owner of the patent at issue notwithstanding the
176
terms of that agreement.
Accordingly, Lucent lacked standing to
177
assert the patent absent the presence of Fraunhofer.
A patentee’s failure to join all co-owners may not always be an error
of its own making. In DDB Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced
178
Media, L.P., a co-inventor of the patent at issue developed the
invention while covered by an employment agreement with
179
Schlumberger Technology Corporation (“Schlumberger”).
This
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 713, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
Id. at 714–15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483–84.
Id. at 721, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
Id. at 712, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
Id. at 716, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
Id. at 720, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
Id. at 722, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
Id. at 721, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
Id. at 722, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
517 F.3d 1284, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1286, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944.
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employment agreement purported to “grant and assign” to
Schlumberger all rights to inventions falling within the scope of
180
inventor’s employment. The invention at issue, however, related to
the computer simulation of sporting events while Schlumberger was
181
involved in oil wells.
When the patent owner, DDB Technologies,
L.L.C., later sought to enforce the patent against MLB Advanced
Media, L.P. (“MLBAM”), MLBAM acquired from Schlumberger all
rights and interests that it might have in the patent along with a
182
retroactive license. MLBAM moved to dismiss the action, claiming
that DDB had failed to join its purported co-owner, Schlumberger,
for the portion of its claim covering the period leading up to the
lawsuit and that DDB was legally precluded from suing its purported
183
co-owner, MLBAM, for ongoing infringement.
After finding that
the co-inventor’s rights to the patent had been automatically divested
at the time of invention by the employment agreement, the district
184
court granted MLBAM’s motion.
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed in part in a
decision that touched on a number of issues relating to an employer’s
ownership of a device invented during an employee’s time of
185
employment.
First, Judges Dyk and Clevenger, who made up the
majority, determined that interpretation of a contract provision
purporting to automatically assign a patent was a matter of federal,
186
rather than state, law.
Second, the court differentiated between
those employment contracts that automatically grant all rights to
187
future inventions and employment contracts that merely oblige the
188
inventor to grant rights in the future. Third, the court determined
that whether the patent at issue fell within the scope of the
189
employment agreement was a matter of state law. Finally, the court
applied Federal Circuit law in concluding that the plaintiff should be
180. Id. at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947.
181. Id. at 1287, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
182. Id. at 1288, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
183. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945.
184. Id. at 1288–89, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945–46.
185. Id. at 1289–94, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946–50.
186. Id. at 1289–90, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946–47.
187. Id. at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947; see also, e.g., FilmTec Corp. v.
Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (finding that, in the contract at issue, the inventor agreed to grant, and did
expressly grant, all rights in future inventions).
188. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947; see also,
e.g., Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1581, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1513, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that where the contract provided that “all rights
. . . ‘will be assigned’ by [inventor] to [client],” the contract merely obliged the
inventor to grant rights in the future).
189. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947.
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permitted additional discovery on the issue of whether the patents
190
The court
fell within the scope of the employment agreement.
191
therefore remanded for further discovery on this issue.
In dissent, Judge Newman differed with the majority on a number
192
of substantive and procedural issues. According to Judge Newman,
the majority had engaged in “grievous overreaching . . . contrary to
law and precedent” in finding that federal law controlled the
interpretation of the contract merely because standing was
193
Judge Newman argued that “[s]tate statutory and
involved.
common law have long been recognized as governing the ownership
194
of patent property.”
Accordingly, Judge Newman wrote, “There is
no authority for preempting state law, no authority for eliminating
state law principles of property ownership, no authority for divesting
state authority to determine rights and obligations set by employment
contract, no authority for rejecting the extensive state precedent of
195
law and procedure governing these issues.”
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority’s holding that DDB
196
Judge Newman stated that
could not forcibly join Schlumberger.
not only does the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19
197
permitting involuntary joinder make no exception for patent cases,
but that it has long been established that involuntary joinder may be
198
used in an infringement action.
Finally, Judge Newman was critical of the majority on the issue of
whether the employment contract applied as a matter for
199
“jurisdictional discovery.”
Treating this issue as jurisdictional,
according to Judge Newman, directly contradicted the Supreme
200
Court’s recent admonition in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. that the

190. Id. at 1292, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
191. Id. at 1293–94, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949–50.
192. Id. at 1294, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950 (Newman, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1296, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
194. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
195. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
196. Id. at 1297–98, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53.
197. Id. at 1297, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2)
(“If a person has not been joined as required, the court must order that the person
be made a party. A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made either a
defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.”).
198. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1297–98, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269
U.S. 459, 468–69 (1926); Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 205, 223 (1874).
199. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1298, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (Newman,
J., dissenting).
200. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
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Federal Circuit should stop treating threshold facts as jurisdictional
201
unless directed otherwise by Congress.
Standing issues may also arise when the plaintiff is a licensee,
202
rather than the patent owner.
In order to have constitutional
standing to bring an infringement action, the plaintiff must either be
203
“To be an exclusive
the patent owner or an exclusive licensee.
licensee for standing purposes, a party must have received not only
the right to practice the invention within a given territory, but also
the patentee’s express or implied promise that others shall be
204
excluded from practicing the invention within that territory.”
205
In Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s denial of leave to amend to add a licensee, MEI, as
206
a co-plaintiff to Mars’s patent infringement complaint.
Mars
claimed that MEI had an exclusive license to practice the patents-in207
suit in the United States and therefore had standing to sue. Mars,
however, had also granted a second subsidiary a license to practice
208
the patents-in-suit anywhere in the world. Accordingly, MEI could
not possibly have had an implied, de facto exclusive license and
209
therefore could not be joined as a co-plaintiff in the suit.
The Federal Circuit also determined that the history of licenses to
the patents-at-issue raised additional standing issues. For a portion of
the time period for which Mars sought damages, Mars had
210
transferred to MEI title to the patent.
The plaintiff in an
infringement action, however, “must be the person or persons in
whom the legal title to the patent resided at the time of the
201. DDB Techs., L.L.C., 517 F.3d at 1298–99, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (observing that when a
court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction because a threshold fact has not been
established the result is an unrefined disposition that should not have a precedential
effect).
202. See, e.g., Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1341, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that exclusive license, the exclusive right
to license, and the right to sublicense are important aspects of exclusionary rights);
Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 976, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933,
1937 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (observing that without joinder of patentee, a licensee
normally does not have standing to sue).
203. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1367, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1076, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 653 (2008).
204. Id. at 1368, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
205. Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
206. Id. at 1374, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
207. Id. at 1367–68, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083–84.
208. Id. at 1368, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
209. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
210. Because neither Mars nor MEI challenged the district court’s determination
that MEI lacked standing for this period, the Federal Circuit did not address the
issue on appeal. Id. at 1372 n.4, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086 n.4.
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211

Although Mars lacked title for a portion of the
infringement.”
relevant period, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed an earlier decision
that a patentee who has transferred legal title to another during the
time of infringement can under some circumstances cure the
resulting jurisdictional defect by reacquiring title to the patent before
212
Here, Mars and MEI had executed an agreement
final judgment.
213
that the district court interpreted as transferring title back to Mars.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. Applying New York contract law, the
court determined that MEI only purported to transfer back to Mars
214
“the right to sue for past infringement.” Under established Federal
Circuit precedent, however, such an attempted assignment does not
215
convey either title or standing in an infringement action.
Accordingly, Mars itself lacked standing for the period in which it
216
had transferred ownership to MEI.
2.

Mootness
The exercise of federal judicial power pursuant to Article III of the
United States Constitution requires the existence of an ongoing case
217
“[F]ederal courts are without power to decide
or controversy.
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
218
them.”
219
In Samsung Electronics Co. v. Rambus, Inc., the Federal Circuit had
an opportunity to address the effect an offer for full relief has on a
220
court’s power to entertain a claim for attorney fees.
Samsung
sought a declaratory judgment “that the patents at issue were invalid,
221
unenforceable, and not infringed.”
After losing a procedural
motion, Rambus filed covenants not to sue, dropped its
counterclaims, and offered to pay Samsung’s attorney fees in order to
avoid having the court publish adverse findings from an earlier,
222
related case. Samsung refused this offer for full relief and persisted
211. Id. at 1370, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084 (quoting Crown Die & Tool Co. v.
Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923)).
212. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084–85.
213. Id. at 1363–64, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079–80.
214. Id. at 1371–72, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
215. Id. at 1371, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086 (citing Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.,
499 F.3d 1332, 1342, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
216. Id. at 1372, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
217. Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see also Liner v. Jafco,
Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (noting the Court’s lack of jurisdiction to review
moot cases).
218. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
219. 523 F.3d 1374, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1604 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
220. Id. at 1376, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
221. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
222. Id. at 1377, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605–06.
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with its motion for attorney fees, which the trial court denied.
Although the court denied the only relief Samsung sought, it
nevertheless found the case exceptional and issued the unpublished
224
spoliation findings from the previous litigation.
The Federal Circuit vacated this order and remanded with
225
instructions to dismiss the case. According to the court, “An offer
226
for full relief moots a claim for attorney fees.” The court explained
that exceptionality is not a separate sanction, but rather is a
227
Accordingly,
precondition for the imposition of attorney fees.
“[a]fter Rambus offered the entire amount of attorney fees in
228
dispute, the case became moot.”
Because there was no longer an
active controversy, the district court’s writing constituted an
impermissible advisory opinion that the Federal Circuit was required
229
to vacate.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over “all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
230
United States.”
Although broad, this grant does not relieve the
federal courts from the obligation to ensure that subject matter
231
jurisdiction exists in any particular case.
232
In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., the Supreme
Court established a two-part test for determining whether federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a patent case pursuant to
233
Under this test, a court must ask whether a
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
well-pleaded complaint establishes either that: (1) “federal patent
law creates the cause of action”; or (2) “the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the
234
well-pleaded claims.”
223. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
224. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
225. Id. at 1376, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
226. Id. at 1379, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
227. Id. at 1379–80, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
228. Id. at 1380, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
229. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503–16
(2006) (distinguishing between the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts and
the essential elements of a federal claim for relief and ultimately holding that, if
Congress did not make a statutory limitation jurisdictional, the courts should not
treat it as such).
231. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (2006).
232. 486 U.S. 800, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (1988).
233. Id. at 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113.
234. Id., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113.
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The answer to the question of whether a court has subject matter
235
In ExcelStor
jurisdiction over a patent dispute will often be clear.
236
Technology, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH, the plaintiff brought an
action in federal district court claiming fraud and breach of contract
237
in relation to a patent licensing agreement. Although these claims
arose under state law of contract and fraud, the plaintiff argued that
the federal court’s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction was triggered
238
by the plaintiff’s citation to the “patent exhaustion” doctrine. The
district court disagreed and dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, stating that patent exhaustion is a defense
to patent infringement and not a cause of action sufficient to confer
239
On appeal, the Federal Circuit
federal jurisdiction over the case.
applied the Christianson two-part test for determining whether
jurisdiction exists under § 1338 and affirmed, stating that ExcelStor’s
claims did not “arise under” the patent laws but merely invoked a
240
defense to a hypothetical claim of patent infringement.
A court, however, may sometimes find itself facing a close question
of whether a certain threshold fact is (1) an element of the claim that
must be established on the merits, or (2) a jurisdictional limitation
241
on the court’s power to hear the controversy. Recently, in Arbaugh,
the Supreme Court provided guidance for determining whether a
threshold fact represents a jurisdictional limitation or whether it is
simply an element of the claim: “[W]hen Congress does not rank a
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat
242
the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”
The Federal Circuit first had opportunity to apply Arbaugh in
243
244
2008. In Litecubes, L.L.C. v. Northern Lights Products, Inc., the court
235. See, e.g., Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 24–25 (1913) (stating
that the plaintiff “obviously . . . sued upon the patent law,” while also observing that
“the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon, and
therefore does determine whether he will bring a ‘suit arising under’ the patent or
other law of the United States by his declaration or bill”); Pixton v. B&B Plastics, Inc.,
291 F.3d 1324, 1327, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (vacating the
trial court’s order of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over an action
for patent infringement).
236. 541 F.3d 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
237. Id. at 1375, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
238. Id. at 1375–76, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061–62.
239. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
240. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
241. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (“Whether a
disputed matter concerns jurisdiction or the merits (or occasionally both) is
sometimes a close question.” (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358,
361 (2d Cir. 2000)).
242. Id. at 515–16.
243. Cf. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. United States, 469 F.3d 968, 972–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (finding Arbaugh inapplicable).
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addressed whether failure to prove that allegedly infringing activity
took place in the United States divests the federal courts of subject
245
The
matter jurisdiction over a patent infringement action.
Canadian
defendant
in
Litecubes,
GlowProducts.com
(“GlowProducts”), imported novelty items from Chinese
manufacturers for sale in North America, including the United
246
States.
The suit proceeded to trial, at which point the jury found
247
GlowProducts liable for willful infringement.
GlowProducts subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
its acts of infringement had occurred outside the United States and
248
that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The
district court accepted GlowProducts’ characterization of the issue as
jurisdictional, but denied the motion on the ground that sufficient
evidence supported the finding that GlowProducts had imported the
249
products into the United States.
The Federal Circuit subsequently affirmed the denial of the motion
to dismiss, but on different grounds than those that the district court
250
Noting that “[t]here is no absolute rule
found persuasive.
prohibiting the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes,” the Federal
Circuit explained that “[w]hether Congress did extend any particular
statute to reach extraterritorial activity is simply a question of
251
statutory interpretation.”
Under the rule laid out by the Arbaugh
Court, however, only those facts clearly identified by Congress as
creating a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope count as
252
Congress had not so identified the location
jurisdictional.
253
Accordingly, the location of an
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 271.
allegedly infringing act is properly considered an element of the
claim for patent infringement rather than a prerequisite for subject
254
matter jurisdiction.
244. 523 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1753 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
245. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755.
246. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
247. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
248. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756. For GlowProducts to be liable for
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006), it had to have been shown to have
either imported into the United States or made, used, offered for sale, or sold
LiteCube’s invention in the United States. Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1757.
249. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756–57.
250. Id. at 1366, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762.
251. Id. at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
252. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516–17 (2006).
253. Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
254. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759–60. Although Arbaugh provided a bright
line answer to this issue, the Federal Circuit nevertheless engaged in an extensive
discussion of “whether there is something unique about a limitation that determines
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C. Declaratory Judgments
1.

The Federal Circuit’s declaratory judgment precedents post-MedImmune
In 2008, the Federal Circuit issued several decisions applying the
guidance set forth by the Supreme Court in MedImmune, Inc. v.
255
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court rejected the
Genentech, Inc.
256
Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension of suit” test and “set
forth the correct standard for jurisdiction over a declaratory
257
In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a
judgment action.”
declaratory judgment, “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
[must] show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
258
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” “In short, ‘all the
259
circumstances’ must show a controversy.”
260
In Micron Technology, Inc. v. MOSAID Technologies, Inc., the Federal
Circuit applied this “all the circumstances” test and reversed the
district court’s grant of MOSAID’s motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over Micron’s declaratory judgment
261
action. Micron, a manufacturer of dynamic random access memory
(“DRAM”), and its three largest competitors accounted for more than
262
seventy-five percent of worldwide DRAM sales. Several years before
Micron filed its declaratory judgment complaint, MOSAID, who
owned several patents in the DRAM field, sent Micron a number of
warning letters strongly encouraging Micron to take a license to these
263
patents.
When neither Micron nor its competitors took MOSAID
up on its offer, MOSAID brought separate suits against two of
Micron’s three major DRAM competitors and became involved in a
264
declaratory judgment action with the third. All three cases settled
when the DRAM manufacturers entered into licensing agreements

the extraterritorial scope of a statute.” Id. at 1363–66, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760–
62. The court concluded there is not. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
255. 549 U.S. 118, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007).
256. Id. at 132 n.11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 n.11.
257. Micron Tech., Inc. v. MOSAID Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229 (establishing a standard for declaratory judgment).
258. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229; see also Micron,
518 F.3d at 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (confirming the standard established
in MedImmune requiring that “all the circumstances” show a controversy).
259. Micron, 518 F.3d at 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
260. Id. at 897, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
261. Id. at 899, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
262. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
263. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
264. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
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265

MOSAID subsequently announced during an
with MOSAID.
analyst conference call “its intent to return to court again soon on
these patents promising to be ‘unrelenting in the assertion of [its]
266
patent portfolio.’”
Micron, the only remaining major DRAM manufacturer left for
MOSAID to target, thereafter filed a declaratory judgment action
267
seeking a declaration of non-infringement. The district court, in an
order issued prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune,
268
found no reasonable apprehension of suit and dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the standard laid out in
MedImmune and determined there was in fact an actual controversy
between the parties: MOSAID had threatened Micron, had sued
each of the other leading DRAM chip manufacturers, and had
recently made public statements that it intended to continue an
269
aggressive litigation strategy.
270
In Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., the Federal Circuit resolved a
271
Prior to
question it determined was left open in MedImmune.
MedImmune, the Federal Circuit applied a two-prong test to determine
272
the existence of declaratory judgment authority. Under this test:
There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the
patentee which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of
the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement
suit, and (2) present activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff
which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken by
the declaratory judgment plaintiff with the intent to conduct such
273
activity.

Rather than viewing MedImmune as rejecting entirely this two-prong
approach, the Cat Tech court found that only the first prong—
whether there is a reasonable apprehension of suit—had been
274
overruled. The second prong, “whether there has been meaningful
preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity,” continues to
265. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039.
266. Id. at 900, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
267. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
268. Id. at 900, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
269. Id. at 901, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
270. 528 F.3d 871, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
271. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065.
272. Id. at 879, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v.
Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
273. Teva Pharms., 395 F.3d at 1332, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093. But see id. at
1339–42, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1088, 1099–101 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Federal Circuit had never before required this test to be satisfied in order for there
to be a justiciable case or controversy).
274. Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 879–80, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070–71.
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be an “important element” in determining whether jurisdiction exists
275
to issue a declaratory judgment. The Cat Tech court confirmed that
MedImmune requires a court to consider the “totality of
circumstances,” but concluded that “[i]f a declaratory judgment
plaintiff has not taken significant, concrete steps to conduct
infringing activity, the dispute is neither ‘immediate’ nor ‘real’ and
276
the requirements for justiciability have not been met.”
The court accordingly asked “whether there had been ‘meaningful
277
and
preparation’ to conduct potentially infringing activity,”
278
concluded there had been.
First, Tubemaster had taken all possible steps towards
manufacturing the devices at issue, generating AutoCAD drawings for
each device to the point that the devices were ready for production
279
once a customer order was received.
Accordingly, the
280
constitutional requirement of “immediacy” was met.
Second, the court noted that whether a patent dispute is “real” “is
often related to the extent to which the technology in question is
‘substantially fixed’ as opposed to ‘fluid and indeterminate’ at the
281
Because Tubemaster had taken
time declaratory relief is sought.”
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity to the point
that it did not expect to make “substantial modifications” to its
designs after the beginning of production, the court found the reality
282
requirement satisfied.
Cat Tech nevertheless argued that because Tubemaster had not yet
disclosed or advertised the products to potential customers, no actual
283
controversy yet existed. The Federal Circuit disagreed. Although a
lack of such activity may indicate a lack of “immediacy,” the court
stated that MedImmune commands that all the circumstances be
284
considered when making a justiciability determination. Pursuant to
this command, “[w]here, as here, there is cogent evidence that a
275. Id. at 880, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
276. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
277. Id. at 879, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (citing DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62 F.3d 1397, 1401, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718, 1721 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736,
6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
278. Id. at 881–83, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072–73.
279. Because every order required further customization, Tubemaster could go no
further with its preparation. Id. at 881–82, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
280. Cat Tech, 538 F.3d at 882, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072–73.
281. Id. at 882, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
282. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
283. Id. at 883, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
284. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (2007)).
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declaratory plaintiff has made meaningful preparation to conduct
potentially infringing activity, a showing that the plaintiff has
prepared draft sales literature or otherwise disclosed its products to
285
The
potential customers is not an indispensable prerequisite.”
court therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of declaratory
286
judgment.
2.

Mootness and FDA-listed drugs covered by multiple patents
The Federal Circuit further clarified in Caraco Pharmaceutical
287
Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories, Inc. that the issues of standing,
ripeness, and mootness would guide its application of the all-the288
circumstances test in the pharmaceutical context. In Caraco, Forest
Labs, the manufacturer of the brand name drug Lexapro, brought
suit against generic drug manufacturer Caraco for infringement of
one of two patents covering Lexapro after Caraco filed an
abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) for Food and Drug
289
Administration (“FDA”) approval of a generic version of the drug.
Caraco subsequently sued Forest for a declaratory judgment that the
second patent covering Lexapro was either unenforceable or not
290
infringed. In response, Forest granted to Caraco a covenant not to
sue for infringement of the second patent at issue, but refused to
concede that the patent was invalid or not infringed by Caraco’s
291
proposed drug. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground
that because there was a covenant not to sue “there’s not going to be
292
any loss, there’s no threat of lawsuit.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied the all-the-circumstances
test and found an actual controversy existed between Caraco and
293
Although the covenant not to sue eliminated any
Forest.
reasonable apprehension of suit on the patent, it did not render
Caraco’s declaratory judgment action moot because such an
agreement did not remove the regulatory barriers preventing Caraco
294
from marketing its generic version of Lexapro.

285. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
286. Id. at 874, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
287. 527 F.3d 1278, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
288. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289.
289. Id. at 1288, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.
290. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.
291. Id. at 1289, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
292. Id. at 1289, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (quoting Transcript of Hearing on
Motion to Dismiss at 31, Caraco, 527 F.3d 1278, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (No. 20071404) (emphasis added)).
293. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
294. Id. at 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
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295

Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, “which governs the [FDA]’s . . .
296
approval of new and generic drugs,” Caraco could only begin to
market its generic version of Lexapro after either (1) the patents
covering the drug expired or (2) all the patents covering Lexapro
297
were found either invalid or not infringed by the ANDA.
Accordingly, Forest’s covenant not to sue did not eliminate the
controversy between the parties and the action therefore presented
298
an ongoing Article III case or controversy.
Indeed, if courts
permitted brand name drug manufacturers to moot claims of patent
invalidity through covenants not to sue, a manufacturer could, in
certain circumstances, prevent its competitors from entering the
299
market until after the potentially invalid patents expired.
The Federal Circuit further clarified Caraco in Janssen
300
Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., a case which the Federal Circuit
301
Like the defendant in
acknowledged presented similar facts.
Caraco, the plaintiff in Janssen brought suit against a generic
manufacturer, Apotex, for infringement of one of three patents
302
Apotex subsequently
covering a brand name drug, Risperdal.
sought a declaratory judgment that the remaining two patents
303
covering Risperdal were either invalid or not infringed.
Unlike in
Caraco, however, Apotex stipulated that the patent on which Janssen
295. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc)
(2006), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)).
296. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
297. If Caraco had been the first manufacturer to file an ANDA related to
Lexapro, it could have begun to market its drug if it successfully defended against
Forest’s pending patent infringement suit. Id. at 1287, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the first ANDA filer alleging invalidity or
noninfringement of the patents covering a drug will obtain a 180-day period of
exclusivity if the allegations prove true. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2006). Another
manufacturer, however, had both filed an ANDA before Caraco and lost the
resulting patent infringement suit, resulting in an injunction barring the
manufacturer from marketing its Lexapro bioequivalent. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1286–
87, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–94. Accordingly, the provisions of the HatchWaxman Act prevented Caraco from marketing its drug unless it obtained a court
judgment of invalidity or noninfringement. Id. at 1287, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1295.
298. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
299. Id. at 1284–85, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292–93.
300. 540 F.3d 1353, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
301. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085 (“We agree with the parties that if
Apotex had not stipulated to the validity of the ‘663 patent, then Caraco would have
been controlling.”); id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085 (“The key difference
between Caraco and this case is that the harm that gave rise to the jurisdiction over
the declaratory judgment claim in Caraco ceased to exist once Apotex stipulated to
the validity, in-fringement, and enforceability of the ‘663 patent.”).
302. Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
303. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
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304

sued was valid and enforceable. Janssen moved the court to dismiss
Apotex’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court
305
306
granted the motion. The Federal Circuit affirmed. According to
the Federal Circuit, Apotex’s admission that one of the three patents
covering Risperdal was valid was sufficient to differentiate the case
307
Because Apotex, unlike Caraco, “stipulated to the
from Caraco.
validity, infringement, and enforceability of [one] patent . . . . Apotex
cannot claim that at the time of the district court’s dismissal it was
being excluded from selling a noninfringing product by an invalid
308
patent.”
Even if Apotex succeeded on its declaratory judgment
claims, it would still be unable to obtain FDA approval until after the
309
remaining patent expired.
3.

Sufficient injury
Although MedImmune eliminated the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable
apprehension of suit” requirement for establishing declaratory
judgment jurisdiction, it did not change the court’s “long-standing
rule that the existence of a patent is not sufficient to establish
310
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”
In Prasco, LLC v. Medicis
311
Pharmaceutical Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a
declaratory judgment action brought by Prasco against a competitor
who had previously brought an infringement suit against it based on
312
Relying on both Cat Tech and Caraco, the
an unrelated patent.
court emphasized that whether an Article III controversy exists
cannot be determined through the application of a bright-line rule,
but instead requires an analysis of particular facts of the case,
including an inquiry into standing, ripeness, and a lack of
313
mootness.
The court proceeded to provide three examples of ways a patentee
can cause an injury sufficient to establish a justiciable controversy: by
(1) “creating a reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit”;
(2) “demanding the right to royalty payments”; or (3) “creating a

304. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
305. Id. at 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083–84.
306. Id. at 1363–64, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88.
307. Id. at 1360–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085–86.
308. Id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085–86.
309. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
310. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1675, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
311. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
312. Id. at 1333, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
313. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
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barrier to the regulatory approval of a product that is necessary for
314
marketing.”
In Prasco, the patentee had taken no actions at all related to the
315
product at issue. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s conclusion that Prasco failed to allege “a controversy of
sufficient ‘immediacy and reality’ to create a justiciable
316
controversy.”
D. Appellate Jurisdiction and Reviewability of Judgments
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over any appeal from
a final decision of a federal district court if the district court’s
jurisdiction was based either in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C.
317
§ 1338.
Inherent in the court’s appellate role is the traditional power to
318
issue a writ of mandamus in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit therefore has jurisdiction to hear and decide a
petition for a writ of mandamus in any case that falls within the
319
purview of § 1338.
The remedy of mandamus, however, “is available only in
extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or
320
usurpation of judicial power.” Accordingly, a party seeking the writ
“bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of attaining
the relief desired and that the right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear
321
and indisputable.’” Because no other means of attaining the relief
desired must be available, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that it
may deny the writ even if the request raises an issue that would
322
otherwise qualify as reversible error on direct appeal.
314. Id. at 1339, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680–81.
315. Id. at 1340, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
316. Id. at 1338, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
317.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court
of the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole
or in part, on section 1338 of this title . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
318. In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1351, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997, 2001
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
319. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001 (quoting In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 973,
228 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 450, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
320. In re Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 516 F.3d 1003, 1004, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1843, 1843–44 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re Calmar, Inc., 854 F.2d 461, 464,
7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
321. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (citation omitted) (quoting Allied Chem.
Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980)).
322. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (citing In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733,
737, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 784, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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323

In In re Roche Molecular Systems Inc., Roche filed a petition with the
Federal Circuit seeking a writ of mandamus directing the district
324
Roche argued the writ was
court to enter judgment in its favor.
warranted because the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for
325
infringement of the patent at issue.
Such an allegation, however,
326
clearly can be, and often is, addressed on appeal. Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit denied the petition, finding that Roche had failed to
show that the relief it sought could not be obtained after entry of
327
final judgment. Judge Newman dissented, arguing that the writ was
warranted because “the posture of the dispute is significantly
changed” by the purported error below and to continue the litigation
328
under this purported error “is as inappropriate as it is unnecessary.”
Of course, an entry of final judgment does not always ensure the
Federal Circuit can address an issue raised on appeal. For example, a
party wishing to appeal a decision of the district court must file a
notice of appeal within the period specified by the Federal Rules of
329
Appellate Procedure. Failure to file a document properly styled as
a “notice of appeal,” however, will not always be fatal to a party’s
330
appeal. For example, in International Rectifiers Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,
the appellant failed to timely file a properly styled notice of appeal,
filing instead a motion to stay the permanent injunction pending
331
appeal. The Federal Circuit took the appeal, but first addressed the
332
threshold question of whether it had appellate jurisdiction. Relying
333
on Smith v. Barry, the Federal Circuit looked to whether the
document filed provided the notice required by Rule 3 of the Federal

323. Id. at 1003, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
324. Id. at 1004, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
325. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
326. See, e.g., Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac
Solutions, P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(addressing on appeal the alleged infringer’s allegation that patentees lacked
standing because the inventor failed to properly execute a required license). But see
Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, No. 2:06-CV-440, 2008 WL 4491894, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept.
10, 2008) (granting permission to appeal an order that denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss for lack of standing where the district court certified the order for
permissive appeal on the ground that an immediate appeal “may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation”).
327. In re Roche, 516 F.3d at 1004–05, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
328. Id. at 1009, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (Newman, J., dissenting).
329. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (“In a civil case, except as provided in Rules
4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(4), and 4(c), the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed
with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is
entered.”).
330. 515 F.3d 1354, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
331. Id. at 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
332. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
333. 502 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1992).
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Because the appellant’s document
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(a) specified the party or parties taking the appeal, (b) designated
the judgment being appealed, and (c) named the court to which the
appeal was being taken, the court found the document met the
requirements of Rule 3, construed the motion as a notice of appeal,
335
and proceeded to decide the merits of the appeal.
336
In iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered a
matter of first impression: whether a district court’s recitation of the
“no just cause for delay” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b) as to one or more, but not all, claims is sufficient to certify an
337
issue for immediate appeal. The court concluded that it is not.
iLOR had sued Google for infringement of its patent and moved for
a preliminary injunction, and Google had filed counterclaims seeking
a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and
338
The district court ultimately
unenforceability of the patent.
granted Google’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement
339
and denied iLOR’s motion for preliminary injunction. In so doing,
it entered an Order which stated, “[T]his Order is FINAL AND
340
APPEALABLE and THERE IS NO JUST CAUSE FOR DELAY.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s
341
judgment did not dispose of all of Google’s counterclaims.
Accordingly, the question of whether the district court had properly
342
certified the decision for immediate appeal remained. The district
court had not cited Rule 54(b) and had not described any
343
circumstances justifying immediate appeal.
Therefore,
notwithstanding the district court’s use of the “no just reason for
delay” language of Rule 54(b), the Federal Circuit adopted the
“consensus view” that “bare recitation of the ‘no just reason for delay’
standard of Rule 54(b) is not sufficient, by itself, to properly certify
344
an issue for immediate appeal.”

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Int’l Rectifiers Corp., 515 F.3d at 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
550 F.3d 1067, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1071, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
Id. at 1069, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
Id. at 1070, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
Id. at 1072, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
Id. at 1073, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100-01.
Id. at 1072, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
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Likewise, a party may be barred from appealing a judgment by the
345
In Symantec Corp. v.
trial court if the party has prevailed below.
346
Computer Associates International, Inc., the Federal Circuit reiterated
the rule that “a properly filed cross-appeal requires that, upon
acceptance of appellee’s argument, our determination would result
in a reversal or modification of the judgment rather than an
347
affirmance.”
The district court had granted Computer Associates
348
When Symantec
(“CA”) summary judgment of non-infringement.
appealed, CA cross-appealed the trial court’s finding that the
doctrine of laches did not bar the scope of Symantec’s potential
recovery in the event that the court had found CA to have
349
Because acceptance of CA’s argument would have had
infringed.
no effect on the district court’s judgment of non-infringement, the
350
Federal Circuit dismissed the cross-appeal as improper. The court
proceeded to review CA’s mis-styled laches arguments as an
351
alternative ground for sustaining the judgment.
The Federal Circuit may also find its ability to review the final
judgment of the trial court restricted where the dispute, although an
actual case or controversy below, becomes moot by the time of
appeal. Accordingly, “[w]here the controversy between the parties
has ended, the case becomes moot and will be dismissed, ‘however
convenient it might be to have decided the question’ for future
352
cases.’”
For example, in Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Industry
353
the International Trade
Co. v. International Trade Commission,
Commission (“ITC”) had determined that the appellants’ products
infringed two separate patents and that this infringement justified a
general exclusion order barring importation of the products into the
354
United States. The appellants sought Federal Circuit review of the
ITC’s decision, but only as to a subset of the overall claims it had
355
Given that these unappealed
been found to have infringed.
345. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1294,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1457–58 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Bailey v. Dart Container
Corp., 292 F.3d 1360, 1362, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
346. Id. at 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449.
347. Id. at 1294, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457–58.
348. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
349. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
350. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
351. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
352. Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 535
F.3d 1322, 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1595 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)).
353. Id. at 1322, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590.
354. Id. at 1325, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
355. Id. at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
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findings of infringement, standing alone, supported the general
exclusion order, the court asked the parties to prepare responses on
356
After considering the oral arguments, the
the issue of mootness.
357
Federal Circuit concluded that a live controversy still existed.
Because the patents-in-suit bore different dates of expiration and the
finding of infringement challenged on appeal involved a laterexpiring patent, a reversal of the ITC’s decision would allow the
358
appellants to begin importing their products at an earlier date.
359
Accordingly, this portion of the appeal was not moot.
Even if a judgment is final and the resulting appeal is timely filed
and still presents a live controversy, the court may nevertheless be
unable to address the substantive issues on appeal. In Jang v. Boston
360
Scientific Corp., the trial court adopted a consent judgment proposed
by the parties after a claim construction order adverse to the plaintiff
361
As part of the stipulated judgment, the parties
had been issued.
agreed the plaintiff could not prove infringement under the claim
construction adopted by the court, but preserved the plaintiff’s right
362
to appeal the court’s construction. On appeal, the Federal Circuit
found itself unable to address the substantive issues presented by the
363
parties.
Although the court was willing and able to review
“stipulated judgments based on claim construction when the
judgments were entered with the express purpose of obtaining
appellate review of the claim construction,” any such judgment “must
satisfy the same standards of appellate jurisdiction as any other
364
judgment entered by the district court.”
Accordingly, a stipulated
judgment must allow the court “to ascertain the basis for the
365
judgment challenged on appeal.”
The consent judgment at issue in Jang suffered from ambiguities
366
that prevented it from meeting this standard. First, the parties had
failed to identify which of the multiple claim construction rulings
356. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595.
357. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
358. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
359. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596.
360. 532 F.3d 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
361. Id. at 1332–33, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
362. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
363. Id. at 1335–36, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
364. Id. at 1334, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462 (citing United States v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276,
85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791, 1794 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ventana Med. Sys. Inc. v.
Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1177, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1363, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919, 1925 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
365. Id. at 1334–35, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
366. Id. at 1335–36, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
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367

affected the issue of infringement. Without such an identification,
the Federal Circuit concluded, the court risked issuing an advisory
opinion that did not actually address the infringement controversy
368
Second, the parties failed to provide any
between the parties.
369
factual context for the claim construction issues presented.
Because “a remand for clarification is appropriate where a judgment
370
is ambiguous,” the Federal Circuit remanded to the district court
371
for further clarification of these issues.
E. Personal Jurisdiction
Even if the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case, the court may not exercise this power over a particular party
unless two criteria are met: (1) “jurisdiction must exist under the
forum state’s long-arm statute”; and (2) “the assertion of personal
jurisdiction must be consistent with the limitations of the due process
372
clause.” The first inquiry is controlled by the law of the forum while
373
the second inquiry is guided by federal law.
374
In Medical Solutions, Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC, the Federal
Circuit was required to decide whether activities at a trade show
375
constituted a “use” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) such that personal
jurisdiction would be proper under the District of Columbia’s long376
arm statute. The court explained that whether a patented item had
been “used” is a highly case-specific inquiry, but that “[t]he ordinary
377
meaning of ‘use’” is “to put into action or service.”
After noting
that a number of trial courts had held that “‘the mere demonstration
or display of an accused product, even in an obviously commercial
atmosphere’ is not an act of infringement for purposes of section

367. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
368. Id. at 1336–37, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463–64.
369. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
370. Id. at 1335, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
371. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
372. Med. Solutions, Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC, 541 F.3d 1136, 1139,
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Trintec Indus. Inc. v. Pedre
Promotional Prods., Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1279 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1589 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
373. Id. at 1139, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
374. Id. at 1136, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
375. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
376. Med. Solutions, 541 F.3d at 1139, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
377. Id. at 1141, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (quoting NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763, 1789 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
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378

271(a),” the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the display
and demonstration of aspects of the accused item did not amount to
379
a “use” under § 271. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was lacking,
380
and the trial court had properly dismissed the suit.
The Federal Circuit also found personal jurisdiction lacking in
381
In that case,
Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co., Ltd.
Avocent, an Alabama developer of computer hardware devices, filed a
declaratory judgment action against Aten International, a Taiwanese
382
The parties did not
corporation with a California subsidiary.
dispute that Aten International’s products were available for sale in
383
Alabama.
Relying on that fact, Avocent contended that Aten
384
International should be subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction, finding that Avocent’s reliance on the
availability of Aten International products in Alabama failed to
establish that Aten International either “‘purposefully directed its
activities at residents of the forum’” or that Avocent’s suit “‘ar[ose]
out of or relate[d] to those activities,’” as required to satisfy the
385
specific personal jurisdiction standard.
The Federal Circuit did find sufficient contacts to support the
exercise of specific jurisdiction over the defendants in Campbell Pet Co.
386
v. Miale.
In Campbell, the California defendants attended a
convention in Seattle, Washington, where they demonstrated their
patented products, offered them for sale, and succeeded in taking
two orders from out-of-state residents during the course of the
387
While at the convention, the defendants confronted
convention.
several of the plaintiff’s employees at the plaintiff’s booth and
388
accused them of infringing the defendants’ patents.
Shortly
thereafter, Campbell filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington seeking a declaratory judgment of

378. Id. at 1140, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278 (quoting Fluid Mgmt. Ltd. v.
H.E.R.O. Indus., Ltd., No. 95-5604, 1997 WL 112839, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 1997)).
379. Id. at 1141, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
380. Id. at 1142, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279.
381. 552 F.3d 1324, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
382. Id. at 1327, 89 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 1482.
383. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1482.
384. Id. at 133789 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1490.
385. Id. at 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1492 (quoting Breckenridge
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.3d. 1356, 1363, 78
U.S.P.Q.2d 1581, 1585 (Fed. 2006).
386. 542 F.3d 879, 881, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
387. Id. at 881–82, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
388. Id. at 882, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
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389

The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that
non-infringement.
neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction existed over the
390
defendants.
In order for an exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with
the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution, three factors
must be satisfied: “(1) the non-resident defendant purposely do
some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state, (2) the
cause of action arise from or be connected with that transaction, and
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state not offend
391
Applying
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
this analysis, the district court determined that, although the
defendants had transacted business in the state, in light of the
defendants’ conduct at the trade show, the claim of noninfringement was not sufficiently related to the transactions within
392
the state. Because the defendants’ actions were “akin to submitting
cease and desist letters,” an exercise of personal jurisdiction would
393
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
394
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.
Although under
Federal Circuit precedent, a “patentee’s act of sending letters to
another state claiming infringement and threatening litigation is not
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in that state,” the Federal
Circuit held that the situation presented in Campbell involved
395
sufficient additional conduct to support the exercise of jurisdiction.
Specifically, the court found that defendants had done more than
serve a verbal notice akin to a cease and desist letter: they attempted
to have Campbell removed from the convention and had informed
Campbell’s customers that Campbell’s products infringed the
396
defendants’ patents.
F.

Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel

A party may also be barred from litigating a controversy where
397
either claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies.
“Under the
doctrine of claim preclusion, ‘a judgment on the merits in a prior suit
bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on
389. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
390. Id. at 882–83, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254–55.
391. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
392. Id. at 883, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
393. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
394. Id. at 889, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
395. Id. at 885–86, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
396. Id. at 886, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
397. See generally 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402, at 9 (2d ed. 2008).
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398

Issue preclusion, on the other hand,
the same cause of action.’”
“bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to
399
the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties.” Both
400
of these terms fall within the ambit of the doctrine of res judicata.
When a party raises claim preclusion as a bar to subsequent
litigation, the Federal Circuit will review the district court’s
determination under the law of the regional circuit in which the
401
402
district court sits.
In Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., the Federal
Circuit applied the Ninth Circuit’s standard for claim preclusion in
403
the context of a patent infringement suit.
Under Ninth Circuit
precedent, claim preclusion applies where: “(1) the same parties, or
their privies, were involved in the prior litigation, (2) the prior
litigation involved the same claim or cause of action as the later suit,
and (3) the prior litigation was terminated by a final judgment on the
404
merits.” In Acumed, the parties contested only the second of these
three prongs—whether the prior litigation involved “the same claim
405
or cause of action.”
In a previous lawsuit between the parties in which Stryker had been
found to have infringed Acumed’s patent, Acumed learned during
the discovery phase of the litigation that Stryker had another
406
Stryker,
potentially infringing product currently in development.
407
however, had not yet begun to market or sell the product. After the
408
close of fact discovery, Stryker began to market this second product.
The court offered to allow Acumed to add an additional
infringement claim to cover this new product, but warned Acumed
that doing so would necessitate postponing the entire trial for up to
409
Acumed chose not to incur this delay and declined the
one year.
410
court’s invitation.
398. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 525 F.3d 1319, 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1950, 1952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
327 n.5 (1979)).
399. WRIGHT ET AL., supra, note 397 (citing Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g
& Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535–536, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1978)).
400. Acumed, 525 F.3d at 1323 n.2, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952 n.2.
401. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952 (citing Media Techs. Licensing,
LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366, 1369, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
402. 525 F.3d 1319, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950.
403. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1952.
404. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1971)).
405. Acumed, 525 F.3d at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
406. Id. at 1322, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
407. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
408. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
409. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
410. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
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Two weeks after the first trial ended with a final judgment of
infringement, Acumed initiated a second suit alleging Stryker’s newly
411
The district court
developed product also infringed the patent.
presiding over this second case dismissed the action on the ground
that this new claim was precluded by the prior judgment. According
to the district court, the Federal Circuit’s patent-law-specific
“essentially-the-same test” for claim preclusion only applies where a
412
claim could not have been litigated in a prior action.
The court
therefore applied general principles of claim preclusion in reaching
413
its decision.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected this reading of its claim
preclusion test and proceeded to explain the proper manner by
414
which the preclusive effect of a previous suit is to be analyzed. In a
patent infringement suit, the answer to whether two claims for patent
infringement are identical for purposes of claim preclusion is an
issue particular to patent law and therefore properly analyzed under
415
Federal Circuit law. “In applying the doctrine of claim preclusion,
[the Federal Circuit] is guided by the Restatement (Second) of
416
Judgments,” which instructs a court to look to the transactional
417
Interpreting Foster v. Hallco
facts from which a claim arises.
418
419
Manufacturing Co. and Hallco Manufacturing Co. v. Foster, the court
explained that “claim preclusion does not apply unless the accused
device in the action before the court is ‘essentially the same’ as the
420
accused device in a prior action.” “Accused devices are ‘essentially
the same’ where the differences between them are not ‘colorable’ or
421
are ‘unrelated to the limitations in the claim of the patent.’”
Furthermore, the court rejected the limitation the district court
attempted to impose on the scope of this test, stating that “we find
nothing in Hallco or Foster that suggests that the essentially-the-same
test does not apply where a claim could have been litigated in a prior

411. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
412. Id. at 1325, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
413. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
414. Id. at 1323–25, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–54.
415. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
416. Id. at 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
417. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (defining a claim for
purposes of claim preclusion by the transactional facts from which it arises).
418. 947 F.2d 469, 478, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
419. 256 F.3d 1290, 1294, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
420. Acumed, 525 F.3d at 1324, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
421. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (citing Foster, 947 F.2d at 479–80, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1249; KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d
1522, 1526, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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422

Finding that the defendant had admitted that the two
action.”
accused devices were not “essentially the same,” the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further
423
proceedings.
424
In Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., the Federal Circuit, relying
on Acumed, found the two purportedly infringing devices at issue to
425
be “essentially the same” for purposes of claim preclusion.
The
devices at issue in the different litigation stages in Roche were two
generic drug applications targeted at two different variations of
426
Roche’s brand name drug. During the first phase of the litigation,
the court rejected Apotex’s invalidity and unenforceability
contentions and found that Apotex’s first generic drug infringed
427
When Roche later brought suit against
Roche’s drug patent.
Apotex for infringement based on the second generic drug, Apotex
sought to litigate the validity of the patent a second time, arguing that
the generic drug formulations were sufficiently distinct to prevent
428
Both the district court and the
claim preclusion from applying.
429
Although the drug formulations had
Federal Circuit disagreed.
differences, the Federal Circuit explained that in order for claim
preclusion not to apply, the differences must be related to the claims
430
of the patent at issue. Because the drug formulations failed to meet
this standard, the defendant’s claims that the patent was
unenforceable and invalid were barred by the doctrine of claim
431
preclusion.
The Federal Circuit reiterated this rule in Nasalok Coating Corp. v.
432
433
In explaining
Nylok Corp., a case involving a trademark dispute.
the “essentially the same” requirement, the court described the policy
434
considerations driving this rule as follows.
First, “the plaintiff and
defendant should be treated equally as to res judicata. If the plaintiff
would not be barred from bringing a second infringement suit, the
422. Id. at 1326, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954–55.
423. Id. at 1327, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.
424. 531 F.3d 1372, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
425. Id. at 1379–80, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312–13.
426. Id. at 1375–76, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309–10.
427. Id. at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
428. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
429. Id. at 1380, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
430. Id. at 1379, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
431. Id. at 1381, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313–14.
432. 522 F.3d 1320, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed Cir. 2008); see David M. Kelly
& Stephanie H. Bald, 2008 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
947, 966 (2009).
433. Id. at 1322, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
434. Id. at 1327, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
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defendant also should not be precluded from challenging patent
435
Second, “[a]t the time of an
validity in the second suit.”
infringement suit, it will be difficult to anticipate the new products
436
and future disputes that may later arise between the two parties.”
Claim preclusion may also apply where parties to a controversy
437
When such a
previously chose to settle a dispute by contract.
settlement agreement involves patent issues, the Federal Circuit will
438
have appellate jurisdiction.
When reviewing a settlement
agreement, the Federal Circuit does not apply its own law but instead
439
applies state contract law to interpret the settlement agreement.
440
In Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc., the
parties previously entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a
441
patent dispute.
This settlement agreement contained a provision
that, on its face, provided for release of liability and immunity from
442
When Howmedica later brought suit
future suit to both parties.
against Wright for infringement of a patent not at issue in the prior
443
suit, Wright raised the settlement agreement as a defense.
According to Wright, the language of the settlement agreement was
sufficiently broad to collaterally estop Howmedica from bringing any
patent infringement suit against Wright that was ripe at the time the
444
settlement agreement was executed. The Federal Circuit, applying
state contract law, determined that the parties only intended the
release provision to apply to matters actually in dispute at the time of
445
the contract. Although the present matter was “ripe” at the time of
the agreement and clearly fell within the text of the agreement, New
Jersey contract law permits a court to consider extrinsic evidence
446
Accordingly, both the
when interpreting a contract provision.
district court and the Federal Circuit proceeded to examine the
435. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
436. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
437. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 287, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1891, 1896 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that where parties reach a settlement
agreement and the court dismisses the dispute with prejudice, the judgment is final
for purposes of res judicata).
438. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit where the trial court’s jurisdiction was based
in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).
439. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Med. Tech. Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1347,
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
440. Id. at 1337, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
441. Id. at 1341–42, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131–32.
442. Id. at 1347–48, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
443. Id. at 1347, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
444. Id. at 1342–43, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
445. Id. at 1350, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
446. Id. at 1348, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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intent of the parties, evidenced by their negotiations and a
contemporaneous settlement agreement covering a patent dispute in
Massachusetts, to conclude that the parties did not intend the
447
As such, Howmedica was not
agreement to bar the present suit.
448
collaterally estopped from initiating the suit.
G. Alternative Dispute Resolution
A court may also decline to exercise jurisdiction where the parties
have contracted to have any dispute resolved by alternative dispute
449
resolution.
Because whether parties to an agreement have
contractually bound themselves to settle a dispute through
arbitration is not an issue unique to patent law, the Federal Circuit
450
will apply the law of the regional circuit to decide the question.
451
In DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., the trial court refused
to dismiss or stay litigation pending arbitration in a patent
452
In DataTreasury, one of Wells Fargo’s
infringement action.
subsidiaries had previously entered into a patent license agreement
453
with WMR e-Pin LLC (“WMR”). The license agreement compelled
arbitration of any dispute or disagreement “between WMR and Wells
454
Fargo” relating to the license.
WMR subsequently assigned four
455
When DataTreasury later brought suit
patents to DataTreasury.
against Wells Fargo for infringement of these patents, Wells Fargo
moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that DataTreasury, as an assignee
of WMR, was bound by the arbitration clause of the licensing
456
agreement. The district court denied the motion, and the Federal
457
Circuit affirmed. Reviewing the issue de novo, the Federal Circuit
applied regional circuit law to determine the scope of the licensing
458
agreement. Because the regional circuit itself would have analyzed
the question of arbitrability under the state law governing the
contract, the court looked to Minnesota law, which governed the
447. Id. at 1349–50, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137–38.
448. Id. at 1350, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
449. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Polish S.S. Co., 346 F.3d 281, 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2003)
(compelling parties to a contract to arbitrate a dispute where the contract
incorporated an arbitration clause).
450. DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1371–72, 86
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
451. Id. at 1368, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
452. Id. at 1371, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
453. Id. at 1370, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
454. Id. at 1370–71, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441–42.
455. Id. at 1371, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
456. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
457. Id. at 1373, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444.
458. Id. at 1371, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
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459

Under Minnesota law, a non-signatory to an arbitration
contract.
agreement can only enforce an arbitration clause in a limited
460
number of circumstances. Because Wells Fargo’s subsidiary, rather
than Wells Fargo, had signed the agreement, and none of the
exceptions to third party enforcement applied, the court determined
461
that neither party could be compelled to submit to arbitration.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of
462
the defendant’s motion to dismiss or stay pending arbitration.
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
In defining the scope of a patented invention, the claims of a
patent are generally given the meaning that they would have to one
463
of “ordinary skill in the art.” In construing claim terms, courts may
consider the claims themselves, the specification, the prosecution
464
history, and extrinsic evidence.
A. Claims
1.

Special claims
Special rules of construction may apply depending on the type of
claim or where in the claim a term appears. For example, in TriMed,
465
Inc. v. Stryker Corp., the Federal Circuit considered whether claim
language contained a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C.
466
§ 112 para. 6. The claim term at issue read “said holes in said plate
providing means for allowing the pin to slide axially therein but
preventing compression across the fracture, and stabilizing said near
467
end of the pin against displacement in the plane of the plate.” The
Federal Circuit first noted that the “[u]se of the word ‘means’ creates
468
The presumption is
a presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 applies.”
overcome if the claim, in addition to reciting functional language,
also “recites sufficient structure for performing the described
459. Id. at 1372, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442–43.
460. See id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443 (explaining that a non-signatory may be
compelled to arbitrate under the theory of (1) incorporation by reference;
(2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel; or
(6) third-party beneficiary).
461. Id. at 1372–73, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443–44.
462. Id. at 1373, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444.
463. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
464. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
465. 514 F.3d 1256, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1787 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
466. Id. at 1259–62, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789–91.
467. Id. at 1259, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788 (emphasis in original omitted).
468. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
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469

Sufficient structure exists if the claim
functions in their entirety.”
“specifies the exact structure that performs the functions in question
without need to resort to other portions of the specification or
470
extrinsic evidence for an adequate understanding of the structure.”
The court identified the function specified in the claim to be
“allowing a pin to slide axially through the pin plate while preventing
compression across the bone fracture, and stabilizing the exposed
471
end of the pin against displacement in the plane of the plate.”
However, because there was a sufficient structure articulated in the
claim—namely, holes—that performed the function, the
presumption was overcome, and it was improper to invoke § 112
472
para. 6.
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Symantec Corp. v. Computer
473
Associates International, Inc. concerned construction of a term in the
474
preamble of the claim. The patent at issue related to methods “of
475
scanning for and detecting computer viruses.” The preamble of the
claim read: “In a system for transferring digital data for storage in a
computer storage medium, a method of screening the data as it is
476
being transferred . . . comprising the steps of: . . . .” The court relied
477
on Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., for
guideposts in determining whether to construe the preamble as a
478
limitation rather than as merely providing context for the claim. In
Catalina, the Federal Circuit had held that a preamble “generally is
not limiting” “[a]bsent clear reliance on the preamble in the
prosecution history” to distinguish the prior art, or unless “it is
479
necessary to provide antecedent basis for the body of the claim.” In
Symantec, the Federal Circuit recognized that the “as it is being
transferred” language had been added to the preamble during
prosecution to overcome the prior art, but the court noted that the
applicant had also concurrently added another term to the body of
480
the claim to overcome the same prior art. Thus, there was no clear

469. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
470. Id. at 1260, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
471. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
472. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
473. 522 F.3d 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
474. Id. at 1288, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
475. Id. at 1286, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
476. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
477. 289 F.3d 801, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
478. Symantec, 522 F.3d at 1288–89, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
479. Id. at 1288, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (citing Catalina, 289 F.3d at 809,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785).
480. Id. at 1289, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
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reliance “on the preamble” language to distinguish the prior art.
The Federal Circuit was likewise not persuaded that the difference in
language between the added preamble language and the added claim
term meant that the preamble language created a distinct
482
limitation. The court concluded that, in the absence of anything in
the specification or prosecution history to indicate a different
meaning, it should be assumed that preamble language is duplicative
483
of, or provides context for, the claim term.
The Federal Circuit separately considered whether the term
“computer system” should be limited to a single computer or should
484
be read to include a network of multiple computers.
Finding no
support in the specification for a narrow construction of the term,
the court construed the term according to its ordinary meaning to
one of skill in the computer art, as demonstrated by a dictionary of
485
computing terms. Notably, the Federal Circuit dismissed testimony
by experts regarding how they would construe the term based on
486
their reading of the specification. Such testimony was “unhelpful”
because it gave only an expert’s understanding of the term and did
not “identify the ‘accepted meaning in the field’ to one skilled in the
487
art.”
Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc.
presented a claim construction issue based on tension between a
488
Jepson claim preamble and the body of the claim. A Jepson claim
has a preamble (starting with the word “in”) and an improvement
clause (starting with the phrase “an improvement comprising” or “the
489
improvement comprising”). The preamble of a Jepson claim limits
490
and defines the scope of the claim.
481. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785).
482. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
483. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
484. Id. at 1290, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
485. Id. at 1290–91, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455–56.
486. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
487. Id. at 1291, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (quoting Sinorgchem Co.,
Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1137 n.3, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1415, 1420 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
488. 540 F.3d 1337, 1344, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
489. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (2008); see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 608.01(m) (2008) (“The preamble of this form of claim is considered to positively
and clearly include all the elements or steps recited therein as a part of the claimed
combination.”); Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 315,
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 766, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that when a Jepson claim is
used the “claimed invention consists of the preamble in combination with the
improvement”).
490. Epson Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1029, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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In construing a Jepson claim directed to an artificial knee
prosthesis, the Federal Circuit considered tension between the
491
preamble and the improvement clause. The preamble of the claim
recited that there could be more than one “condylar element”
meeting a certain “articulation requirement”:
In a knee prosthesis . . . having a femoral component and a tibial
component, . . . the femoral component including at least one
condylar element for confronting and engaging the bearing member
to accomplish articulation of the knee prosthesis throughout a
492
range of flexion . . . .

The body of the claim (the improvement clause) referred to a
singular condylar element that met a certain “geometric
requirement”: “the anterior-posterior surface profile contour along
the condylar element [that has] an essentially constant anterior-posterior
articular radius throughout the articular surface area of the condylar
element which contacts the bearing member during articulation
493
throughout the primary range of flexion . . . .”
The district court construed the claim to require that, in a femoral
component with two condylar elements, both elements needed to
494
meet the geometric requirement. The Federal Circuit agreed with
the district court that the claim term “at least one” should be
construed to encompass one or more condylar elements; however, a
panel majority disagreed that when there are two condylar elements,
495
both must meet the geometric requirement. The majority reasoned
that if that was the intent, the “more natural way of drafting the claim
language . . . would be to require ‘each condylar element,’ rather
496
than ‘the condylar element’” to meet the geometric requirement.
Because Wright offered no evidence that the claim should be
interpreted by anything other than its plain language, the majority
concluded that the claim required only that one condylar element
497
meet the geometric requirement.
Judge Prost dissented, arguing that “the terms ‘at least one
condylar element’ and ‘the condylar element’ are coextensive in
scope”, and thus, the two condylar elements must meet both the
498
articulation and the geometric requirements.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 540 F.3d at 1344, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
Id. at 1340, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (emphasis altered).
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (emphasis altered).
Id. at 1343, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
Id. at 1344–45, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133–34.
Id. at 1344, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133.
Id. at 1347, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
Id. at 1352, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139–40 (Prost, J., dissenting).
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2.

A or an
The indefinite article “a” or “an” is often construed to mean “one
499
500
In Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., the
or more.”
501
The
Federal Circuit considered construction of the term “a.”
patents at issue were systems for cleaning a printing press cylinder
502
using strips of cleaning fabric.
Although the district court had
construed “‘a pre-soaked fabric roll’ to mean ‘a single presoaked
503
fabric roll,’” the Federal Circuit disagreed.
It held that
construction of “a” or “an” to mean “one or more” is the general rule
504
Such
and that “exceptions to this rule are extremely limited.”
exceptions arise only “where the language of the claims themselves,
the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate[s] a
505
Further, the court held that use of the
departure from the rule.”
terms “the” or “said” in subsequent claims to refer back to a claim
term containing “a” or “an” does not change application of the rule,
506
“Because the
but rather “reinvokes that non-singular meaning.”
initial indefinite article (‘a’) carries either a singular or plural
meaning, any later reference to that same claim element merely
507
reflects the same potential plurality.”
508
In contrast, in TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Communications Corp., the
509
The
Federal Circuit construed the term “an” to mean only one.
dispute concerned patented digital video recorder (“DVR”)
technology allowing television users to “time-shift” television signals
by storing data relating to the transmissions on a hard disk in Motion
Picture Expert Group (“MPEG”) format and subsequently
510
transforming the data for replay.
The claim at issue stated:
“wherein said Output Section assembles said video and audio
511
components into an MPEG stream.”
Although the Federal Circuit recognized the general rule that “a”
or “an” should be construed to mean “one or more,” it noted that
499. See, e.g., KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that use of the article “a” is
interpreted to limit a specific element to one only where the patentee manifests a
clear intent to do so).
500. 512 F.3d 1338, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
501. Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
502. Id. at 1340, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.
503. Id. at 1340, 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505, 1507.
504. Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
505. Id. at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
506. Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
507. Id. at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507.
508. 516 F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
509. Id. at 1303–04, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
510. Id. at 1294, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803–04.
511. Id. at 1303, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
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512

proper construction “depend[ed] heavily on the context of its use.”
Relying on earlier and later limitations in the claim, the court
concluded that, taken in context, the disputed claim term “clearly
indicates that two separate components are assembled into a single
stream, not that the video components are assembled into one stream
513
Such a
and the audio components into a second stream.”
514
construction was further supported by the specification.
515
Similarly, in Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., the Federal Circuit
held that the precedent construing the article “a” to mean “one or
516
more” was inapplicable to construction of the term “a spacing.”
The term appeared in claims directed to a method for using loading
517
devices to place catalyst particles into a multi-tube chemical reactor.
The method required “positioning a plurality of discrete plates” to
provide “a spacing” between plates, with the spacing having “a width
not greater than the smallest dimension of a single particle to be
518
loaded into the multi-tube reactor.” Cat Tech argued that the claim
required only one (not all) of the spaces between the plurality of
519
plates to be so narrow.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that “the indefinite article ‘a’
520
has been construed to mean ‘one or more,’” but the court held that
Cat Tech’s proposed construction would render the “a spacing”
521
limitation meaningless for all practical purposes.
Having just one
such “narrow gap between plates would be an exercise in futility
because whole catalyst particles would simply fall into the other,
522
wider gaps between the plates.”
Such an interpretation could not be reconciled with certain
dependent claims, which specified that the spaces were designed to
523
block whole catalyst particles.
Further, the court could find
nothing in the specification to support such a construction and
instead found that Cat Tech had disclaimed such a construction
524
during prosecution of the parent application.

512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
Id. at 1303, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
Id. at 1304, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
528 F.3d 871, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 886, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1976.
Id. at 874–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 875, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 884, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
Id. at 886, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
Id. at 885, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
Id. at 885–86, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075–76.
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3.

Plain and ordinary meaning
The Federal Circuit has with some frequency given claims their
ordinary and customary meaning. For example, in Miken Composites,
525
L.L.C. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., the Federal Circuit adopted the
ordinary and customary meaning in construing the term “insert” to
526
mean “something inserted or intended for insertion.”
The
patentee contended that the limitation was “purely structural” and
did not require any specific action—i.e., it was irrelevant “whether an
insert is placed into a pre-existing frame or whether a frame is built
527
The patentee argued that by requiring insertion, the
around it.”
district court had erred by “importing a process limitation into claims
528
directed to a product.”
The Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s
529
argument and affirmed the district court’s construction. The court
noted that “nothing in the claims or specification indicates, explicitly
or implicitly, that the inventor used the term in a novel way or
530
Although the Federal
intended to impart a novel meaning to it.”
Circuit acknowledged that the ordinary meaning there had
“functional attributes,” the court stated its construction did not read
a process limitation into the claims but was simply a result of the fact
that the claim “recites a structural component . . . with certain
531
understood characteristics.”
In Baldwin, by contrast, the Federal Circuit held that a district court
had gone beyond the ordinary meaning of claim language and had
532
read a process limitation into an apparatus claim. The district court
was presented with a claim term—“reduced air content cleaning
fabric”—that appeared in both method claims and apparatus
533
claims. The district court construed the term only once to mean “a
fabric whose air content has been reduced by some method prior to
534
being wound on a roll.” The Federal Circuit held that the district
535
The apparatus and method claims were “directed
court erred.
toward different classes of patentable subject matter,” and the district
court’s construction had “blurred an important difference” between
525. 515 F.3d 1331, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
526. Id. at 1337, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005)).
527. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869.
528. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869.
529. Id. at 1338, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
530. Id. at 1337, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869.
531. Id. at 1337–38, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
532. 512 F.3d 1338, 1346, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503, 1509 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
533. Id. at 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
534. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
535. Id. at 1346, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
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the two claims. The Federal Circuit held that the apparatus claims
did not require any particular process or method and did not require
537
the air content to be reduced prior to winding. The Federal Circuit
also held that the district court erred by construing the method claim
538
to require that air content be reduced prior to winding on the roll.
“[A]lthough a method claim necessarily recites the steps of the
method in a particular order, as a general rule the claim is not
limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the
539
claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Finding no
support in the claims or specification for requiring air content
reduction prior to winding and no clear disavowal of claim scope in
the prosecution history, the Federal Circuit rejected the district
540
court’s construction and remanded the case to the district court.
541
In DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., the Federal Circuit also applied
542
the plain and ordinary meaning in interpreting claim language.
The patent at issue in DSW was directed to a method for storing and
543
displaying footwear for customer self-selection.
One step of the
method consisted of “selectively positioning a generally vertically
disposed, horizontally movably positionable stack divider” between two
544
stacks containing two styles of footwear.
The district court
construed the term to encompass only methods that contain track
and roller mechanisms connecting display modules to a support base,
545
which other claims expressly described.
The Federal Circuit held that the district court improperly
546
imported the “track and roller” limitation from other claims. The
Federal Circuit held that the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim
term should control unless it was ambiguous or a special definition
547
was apparent from the intrinsic record. The Federal Circuit could
find no express disclaimer in the prosecution history of other
methods of displaying footwear not involving the rolling track
548
mechanism. Although the preferred embodiment disclosed in the
specification included a rolling track mechanism, other embodiments
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.

Id. at 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
Id. at 1345, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.
Id. at 1345–46, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508–10.
537 F.3d 1342, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1347, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
Id. at 1344, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688–89.
Id. at 1345 n.1, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690 n.1.
Id. at 1345–46, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
Id. at 1347, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690–91.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
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included other means to permit the stack dividers to have
549
Thus, the Federal Circuit
horizontally movable positions.
concluded that the district court had improperly imported into the
claim term a limitation not required by the claims, specification, or
550
prosecution history.
551
Likewise, in 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd., the Federal
552
Circuit relied on the plain language of the claims. The patents at
issue in 800 Adept related to a method for routing “1-800” telephone
553
calls to a business’s location closest to the caller. In dispute was the
meaning of the method step that required assigning, for each
potential caller, a telephone number to which that caller’s calls would
be routed—“assigning to the physical location of said potential first
parties a telephone number of a service location of a second party
554
that will receive calls.” The district court construed the “assigning”
limitation to encompass calculations made during the telephone
555
556
call. The Federal Circuit found such a construction to be flawed.
First, the Federal Circuit found that the plain language of the
claims made clear that the assigning step occurred prior to
placement of the call and required that a telephone number of a
557
service location be assigned to each potential caller.
In addition,
the court found nothing in the claims to suggest that assigning could
encompass determining the telephone number of the service
558
location during the telephone call based on a stored algorithm.
The written description supported a construction based on the
559
plain language of the claims.
Furthermore, statements made
during prosecution in distinguishing the invention from a prior art
560
In considering the
reference reinforced such a construction.
prosecution history, the court noted that it did not rely on the
doctrine of prosecution disclaimer, which courts use to limit the
561
scope of a claim term “that would otherwise be read broadly.”

549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.

Id. at 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691.
539 F.3d 1354, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
Id. at 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070–71.
Id. at 1362, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
Id. at 1364, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072–73.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
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Rather, the court used the prosecution history simply to support its
562
construction based on the claim language and written description.
In contrast to the above cases, the Federal Circuit rejected reliance
on the ordinary or customary meaning in construing the claim term
563
“binary code” in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp. The patent at
issue related to a remote-control garage door opening system
comprising of a transmitter (generally integrated into the vehicle)
and a receiver (usually attached to the device that operates the
564
garage door). The claim was directed to a transmitter comprising,
565
inter alia, a “binary code generator.” The district court had broadly
construed “binary code,” based on its ordinary and customary
meaning, to “not [be] limited to[] a representation of a base 2
566
number.” The ordinary meaning of the binary code, according to
the district court, could encompass binary numbers (base 2), trinary
567
Although
numbers (base 3), or even decimal numbers (base 10).
the Federal Circuit recognized that it is unacceptable to import
limitations from the written description into the claims, the appeals
court held that the claims and specification required a more narrow
568
interpretation of “binary code” limited to binary numbers.
The
court recognized that the written description is highly relevant to
claim construction, and the court relied heavily on the specification’s
use of the term “trinary code,” which indicated that “binary code”
could not encompass base 3 numbers or any numbers other than
569
base 2 numbers.
570
Likewise, in Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., the Federal Circuit
limited the scope of the claim term “mechanism for moving said
finger” to the structure disclosed in the patent for performing that
function under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). At issue in that case was the scope
of claims in two patents directed to pin clamps that hold a workpiece
securely in place during welding and other manufacturing
571
processes. Patent owner Welker Bearing asserted that those patents
were infringed by two PHD clamp devices, “Clamp I” and “Clamp
572
II.”
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.

Id. at 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
516 F.3d 1331, 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1333, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
Id. at 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
Id. at 1336, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
Id. at 1335–39, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107–09.
Id. at 1335, 1339, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107, 1109.
550 F.3d 1090, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1092, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290-91.
Id. at 1094, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
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Ruling on PHD’s motion for summary judgment, the district court
construed the claim term “mechanism for moving said finger” as a
means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), and limited
573
Based on that ruling, the
its scope to a “rotating central post.”
district court concluded that PHD’s Clamp II device did not infringe
574
Welker Bearing’s patents.
Reviewing the district court’s claim construction, the Federal
Circuit reviewed prior decisions construing the word “mechanism”
and indicated that whether “mechanism” should be construed under
575
Agreeing with the district court that
§ 112(6) is context specific.
“mechanism for moving said finger” should be construed as a meansplus-function limitation, the Federal Circuit found it significant that
“[n]o adjective endows the claimed ‘mechanism’ with a physical or
576
The Court also found that the remainder
structural component.”
of each claim at issue “provides no structural context for determining
the characteristics of the ‘mechanism’ other than to describe its
577
function.”
Turning to whether the district court identified the correct
structure disclosed in the specification as corresponding to the
claimed function, the Federal Circuit agreed that the patents at issue
578
only identified a single such structure: a rotating central post. The
Court found Welker Bearing’s argument that the doctrine of claim
differentiation compelled a different conclusion unavailing.
With regard to claim differentiation, this court is aware that
claim 1 of the ‘478 patent recites a rotating element, while claim 1
of the ‘254 patent does not. This difference between claims in
different patents does not change the meaning of these meansplus-function limitations. By statute, this court must follow the
directive to construe these limitations according to § 112 ¶ 6.
Because both terms share the same specification with the same
structure corresponding to the claimed function, this court cannot
give these terms any different scope.579

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Welker Bearing’s argument
that the Clamp II device could infringe under the doctrine of
573. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
574. The district court also granted summary judgment of no infringement as to
the Clamp I product on the basis that the record did not show that PHD made, used,
sold, or offered for sale the Clamp I device at any time after the patents had issued.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93. The Federal Circuit affirmed that finding. Id.
at 1095, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
575. Id. at 1096, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
576. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
577. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
578. Id. at 1097, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.
579. Id. at 1098-99, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.
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equivalents, and clarified that Welker Bearing’s argument was one of
structural equivalents, rather than the doctrine of equivalents,
because Clamp II’s structure was well known in the prior art and
580
The Court
could not be classified as after-arising technology.
agreed with the district court that the evidence showed Clamp II’s
structure was not insubstantially different from the claimed rotating
581
central post.
Notably, in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories,
582
Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the district court had properly
583
construed “and” to mean “or.” The lawsuit arose under the HatchWaxman Act after Mylan filed an abbreviated new drug application
584
certifying that Ortho-McNeil’s patent was invalid or not infringed.
The patent claim at issue contained a specified chemical formula
containing several R groups (R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5), wherein “R2,
R3, R4, and R5 are independently hydrogen or lower alkyl and R2
and R3 and/or R4 and R5 together may be a group of formula
585
(II).”
The dispute hinged on construction of the term “and”:
should it be construed to mean “and” (i.e., as conjunctive) so that
both limitations must be met (thereby excluding the accused
product, topiramate), or should it be construed to mean “or” (i.e., as
disjunctive) so that either limitation is sufficient for infringement
586
(thereby implicating topiramate)?
The Federal Circuit determined that, based on the use of “and” in
the claim, “and” meant “or” and joined “mutually exclusive
587
possibilities.” The court looked at the claim term in the context of
other claims and noted that to require a conjunctive meaning would
render several dependent claims meaningless, contrary to a well588
Finally, the court
established claim construction principle.
examined the specification and concluded that it, too, supported a
589
The court concluded that it
construction of “and” to mean “or.”
need not look at extrinsic evidence in construing the claim term
590
because extrinsic evidence is less significant than intrinsic evidence.
While conceding that the primary dictionary definition for “and” is in
580. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
581. Id. at 1100, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
582. 520 F.3d 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
583. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198.
584. Id. at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198.
585. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
586. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
587. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
588. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG,
318 F.3d 1081, 1093, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
589. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199–200.
590. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
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the additive sense, the court noted that dictionaries also use “and” to
591
connote alternatives.
Finally, the Federal Circuit in O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond
592
Innovation Technology Co. held that a court’s determination that a
claim term has its plain and ordinary meaning “may be inadequate
when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance
on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’
593
The court held that when reliance on the ordinary
dispute.”
meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute, it is the court’s duty to
594
construe the term.
The patents at issue in O2 Micro were directed to DC/AC converter
circuits, and the claims contained the phrase “only if said feedback
595
signal is above a predetermined threshold.”
The parties disputed
whether the “only if” limitation applied “at all times without
exception” or whether it applied only during “steady state
596
The district court declined to construe the phrase,
operation.”
597
concluding that it had a well-understood definition. On appeal, the
Federal Circuit held that turning to the ordinary meaning did not
resolve the parties’ dispute because the parties disagreed not about
what the words “only if” meant but about when those words
598
The district court therefore should have construed the
applied.
term “to determine what claim scope is appropriate in the context of
599
the patents-in-suit.”
By failing to resolve the dispute, the district
court improperly left the jury free to consider the parties’ claim
600
construction arguments.
B. Specification
The specification is highly relevant to claim construction and is
often the “single best guide” to determining the meaning of a claim
601
term to one of ordinary skill in the art.
The Federal Circuit
frequently relies on the overall invention disclosed in the

591. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
592. 521 F.3d 1351, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
593. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
594. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
595. Id. at 1354, 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305, 1307 (emphasis added).
596. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
597. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
598. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
599. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
600. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
601. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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specification (and not just specific embodiments) to define the scope
of claim terms.
602
In Netcraft Corp. v. eBay, Inc., the Federal Circuit addressed
Internet billing method patents that included the limitation
“providing a communications link through equipment of the third
603
The district court construed the term to require that the
party.”
604
third party provide customers with Internet access. Finding that the
claims themselves did not expressly require the third party to provide
605
Internet access, the Federal Circuit turned to the specification.
While it appreciated that the use of the phrase “the present
invention” does not automatically limit the meaning of claim terms,
the court held that, in this case, the specification’s repeated use of
“the present invention” in the summary of the invention clearly
referred to the invention as a whole and required the third party to
606
Furthermore, the abstract and disclosed
provide Internet access.
607
embodiments supported that construction of the claim term.
Finding the prosecution history to lack clarity, the Federal Circuit
concluded that it was less helpful than the specification in construing
608
the claim term.
609
In Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
construction of two terms of a patent directed to an apparatus that
limits potentially rapid accidental discharges of hazardous gasses
610
from pressurized storage containers.
Specifically, it construed the
611
terms “flow restrictor” and “capillary.”
The Federal Circuit rejected defendant ATMI’s argument that,
based on the specification, the term “flow restrictor” required
612
The court found that any
“severe” restriction of gas flow.
statements in the specification to that effect pertained only to specific
613
embodiments and not to the full scope of the invention.
Nevertheless, appreciating that the overall objective of the invention
was to prevent a hazardous release of gas, the court concluded that
the term should be construed to require “a structure that serves to
602. 549 F.3d 1394, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
603. Id. at 1396, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,794,221
(filed July 7, 1995)).
604. Id. at 1397, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
605. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
606. Id. at 1398, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
607. Id. at 1398–99, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
608. Id. at 1401–02, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240–41.
609. 543 F.3d 1306, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
610. Id. at 1310, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707–08.
611. Id. at 1322–28, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717–20.
612. Id. at 1323, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
613. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.
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restrict the rate of flow sufficiently to prevent a hazardous
614
situation.”
Similarly, in construing the term “capillary,” the Federal Circuit
rejected ATMI’s argument that the term should be construed to
615
require that the capillaries be uniform.
Again looking to the
specification, it noted that only specific embodiments discussed
616
uniform capillaries and not the invention as a whole. Moreover, it
pointed to the structure of the claims as additional evidence that the
617
term “capillary” did not require uniformity.
618
In Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., the
Federal Circuit relied on the specification to conclude that the term
“remote interface,” read in light of the specification, should be
619
The
construed to exclude consumer-owned personal computers.
claim at issue was directed to an automatic account processing system
for establishing a financial account for applicants located at a
620
“remote interface.”
In construing the claim term, the majority first noted that the plain
and ordinary meaning of “remote interface” is very broad and could,
without reference to the specification, cover consumer-owned
621
personal computers.
The court, however, then turned to the
622
specification, focusing on its use of the term “kiosk.” The preferred
embodiment described a remote interface that was housed in a kiosk
structure, but alternative embodiments were not so limited and the
prosecution history made clear that a remote interface did not have
623
to be housed in a kiosk. The majority, however, concluded that the
specification used the term “kiosk” not only to refer to the housing for
the computer equipment constituting the remote interface, but also,
624
These
at times, to refer to the “entire ‘remote interface’ itself.”
latter uses of “kiosk,” combined with the common meaning of
“kiosk,” suggest that the remote interface is installed in a publicly
625
Additionally, each example and feature of
accessible location.
kiosks described in the specification indicating public accessibility led
the majority to conclude that a skilled artisan would recognize that
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.

Id. at 1324, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
Id. at 1325–26, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719–20.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
Id. at 1326–27, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
527 F.3d 1300, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1311, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
Id. at 1304, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
Id. at 1308, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
Id. at 1308–09, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776–77.
Id. at 1308, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
Id. at 1310, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
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“remote interface” required public accessibility and did not
626
encompass a consumer-owned personal computer.
In his dissent, Judge Linn did not agree with the majority’s reading
of the specification as using “kiosk” in two different senses: “I cannot
subscribe to the majority’s seemingly contradictory analysis that the
627
‘remote interface’ is not limited to a ‘kiosk’ except when it is.” He
stated that the majority had “incongruously equate[d] ‘remote
interface’ with ‘kiosk’ to justify engrafting the ‘publicly-accessible’
628
Such a
characteristic of kiosks onto the ‘remote interface’ term.”
construction, according to Judge Linn, “violates fundamental tenets
629
of claim construction precedent.” He also discerned no disclaimer
of consumer-owned personal computers in the specification, and he
thus concluded that the term “remote interface” should be given its
630
ordinary, broad meaning.
631
In Oatey v. IPS Corp., the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the principle
that claim terms should be construed so as not to exclude
embodiments disclosed in the specification unless there is a clear
632
The
disclaimer in the specification or prosecution history.
patented invention in Oatey was directed to a washing machine outlet
box with two drain ports designed to satisfy new municipal plumbing
codes prohibiting other appliances from sharing the drain port used
633
by washing machines.
The claim recited “[a] washing machine
outlet box comprising a housing including a bottom wall, [and] first
634
The
and second juxtaposed drain ports in said bottom wall.”
district court construed the phrase “first and second juxtaposed drain
ports in said bottom wall” specifically to exclude an embodiment
635
described in figure 3 of the patent. The district court construed the
term to require “two separate physical openings in the bottom wall of
the outlet box, as shown in Figure 2, and not a single opening divided by
636
The Federal
a wall in the attached tailpiece, as shown in Figure 3.”
Circuit held that, because there was no disclaimer of the figure 3

626. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777–78.
627. Id. at 1317, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783 (Linn, J., concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part).
628. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783.
629. Id. at 1318, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
630. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
631. 514 F.3d 1271, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
632. Id. at 1276–77, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794–95.
633. Id. at 1272, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792.
634. Id. at 1275, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,148,850
(filed Apr. 21, 1999)) (emphasis omitted).
635. Id. at 1275–76, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794.
636. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794 (emphasis added).
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structure in the specification or prosecution history, it was improper
637
to exclude it from the scope of the claim.
The Federal Circuit distinguished the Oatey case in its later decision
638
in PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vividant, Inc.
In PSN, the Federal
Circuit considered a patent for a method of fabricating porcelain
639
veneer restorations for teeth. The claim included an element that
640
required a restoration to be “ready for mounting” on a tooth. The
district court construed the term “ready for mounting” narrowly to
mean that all finishing activities prior to mounting on the tooth had
been performed (i.e., the element would not be met if any finishing
641
Finding no guidance in the
step still needed to be performed).
claims themselves and no explicit definition in the specification, the
court relied on implicit guidance in the specification to define the
642
meaning of the term.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court had erred by giving greater weight to the preferred
embodiment (which did not describe finishing steps being
performed after this point in the process) than to the summary of the
643
The court
invention (which did describe later finishing steps).
found the decision in Oatey was inapplicable because the court’s
construction of “ready for mounting” was broader than, and
644
The court
therefore did not exclude, the preferred embodiment.
also noted that “Oatey is not a panacea, requiring all claims to cover
all embodiments” and that “courts must recognize that disclosed
embodiments may be within the scope of other allowed but
645
unasserted claims.”
Although the Federal Circuit has recognized that claims should
generally not be construed so as to read in inoperable embodiments,
646
it clarified that principle in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc.
The
case involved a disputed claim pertaining to coronary stents with a
wall surface having “‘a plurality of slots formed therein, the slots
being disposed substantially parallel to the longitudinal axis of the
647
tubular member.’” The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
construction of the term “slots” to refer to both “complete slots” and
637. Id. at 1277–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795.
638. 525 F.3d 1159, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
639. Id. at 1162, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893.
640. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894.
641. Id. at 1165, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
642. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
643. Id. at 1166, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
644. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
645. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
646. 511 F.3d 1157, 1174, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
647. Id. at 1173, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,739,762
col.11 l.67 to col. 12 l.2 (filed Nov. 3, 1986)).
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648

“half slots.” According to the Federal Circuit, a construction of the
term “slots” to include both “complete slots” and “half slots” was
consistent with the written description, which used the term
649
“complete slots” to distinguish from “half slots.”
In so holding, the court rejected the argument that such a
construction could not be correct since it covers inoperable
650
embodiments.
The court distinguished between a claim
construction that makes all embodiments inoperable—which
“‘should be viewed with extreme skepticism’”—from a construction
651
that might simply cover some inoperable embodiments. The court
further noted that construction of other claim terms prevented the
652
claim from covering any inoperable stents.
C. Prosecution History
In addition to consulting the specification, courts may also rely on
653
the prosecution history in construing claim terms.
In Board of
654
Regents of the University of Texas System v. BENQ America Corp., the
Federal Circuit construed the term “syllabic element”—which
appeared in claims directed to a method of communicating by non655
The Federal
verbal transmission using a touch-tone telephone.
Circuit held that “syllabic element” should be construed narrowly to
656
mean a one-syllable letter group, not, as the patentee contended, a
657
word or part of a word.
The Federal Circuit found little guidance in the claim language
and instead relied on the specification and prosecution history to
658
affirm the construction by the district court.
The Federal Circuit
noted that the specification repeatedly distinguished between a
“word” and a “syllabic element,” demonstrating that the two terms are
659
The prosecution history likewise
not coextensive in scope.
660
Moreover,
distinguished between “syllabic element” and “word.”
648. Id. at 1173–75, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438–40.
649. Id. at 1174, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438–39.
650. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
651. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 (quoting Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v.
Unocal Corp., 275 F.3d 1371, 1376, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2002), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 537 U.S. 802 (2002)).
652. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
653. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
654. 533 F.3d 1362, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
655. Id. at 1364–65, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
656. Id. at 1367–68, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
657. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
658. Id. at 1368–70, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441–43.
659. Id. at 1368, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
660. Id. at 1369–70, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
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the term “syllabic element” was added during prosecution to
overcome an anticipation rejection after the examiner found prior
art showing the use of a word—indicating that the claim was
661
narrowed such that “syllabic element” did not include words.
The scope of a claim term may be narrowed when the applicant
662
In Computer Docking
makes a clear disclaimer during prosecution.
663
Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., the patents at issue related to a portable
664
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
microprocessor.
construction of the terms “portable computer” and “portable
computer microprocessing system” to mean “‘a computer without a
built-in display or keyboard that is capable of being moved or carried
665
about’”—thus, excluding laptop computers.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit relied on the doctrine of
666
The court noted that the applicant had
prosecution disclaimer.
specifically distinguished its invention from a prior art reference
667
disclosing a laptop computer with a built-in display and keyboard.
Although the applicant distinguished its invention in multiple ways,
that did not preclude the court from finding a disavowal when it was
clear and unambiguous: “[A] disavowal, if clear and unambiguous,
668
In addition to the
can lie in a single distinction among many.”
clear disavowal during prosecution, the court relied on the
669
specification, which also supported such a construction.
Likewise, in Solomon Technologies, Inc. v. International Trade
670
Commission, the Federal Circuit found that the “prosecution history
671
could not be clearer in showing a disclaimer” of subject matter.
Here, the court was reviewing the construction of the term “integral
combination of a respective electric motor element and an element
of said transmission unit” in a patent directed to a combination
672
motor and transmission device. The court found that, in response
to an anticipation rejection, the patent applicant had clearly
661. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443.
662. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
663. 519 F.3d 1366, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
664. Id. at 1370, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
665. Id. at 1372–79, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132–36 (emphasis added) (quoting
Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., No. 06-C-32-C, 2006 WL 5999613, at *4
(W.D. Wis. Aug. 16, 2006)).
666. Id. at 1374–75, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
667. Id. at 1375–77, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135–36.
668. Id. at 1377, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
669. Id. at 1378–79, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137.
670. 524 F.3d 1310, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1805 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
671. Id. at 1313, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
672. Id. at 1312–13, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807–08.
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disclaimed devices that use shafts to connect the motor and
673
transmission elements.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit found only a limited disavowal in
674
Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp. In Cohesive, the claims were
directed to a high-performance liquid chromatography apparatus
comprising a chromatographic body containing a “‘multiplicity of
675
Based in part on the prosecution
rigid, solid, porous particles.’”
history, the Federal Circuit construed “rigid” to not exclude
676
The Federal Circuit first recognized that the
polymeric particles.
ordinary meaning of “rigid” does not require that a particle be
677
monomeric and not polymeric.
The Federal Circuit was also
unable to discern a clear and unmistakable disavowal of polymeric
678
particles in the prosecution history. The court agreed that while an
expert declaration submitted by the applicant in response to a prior
art rejection distinguished the particular particles disclosed in the
679
prior art, the declaration did not disavow all polymeric particles.
680
Finally, in Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of the term “sealed
sleeve” to be limited to “heat-sealed sleeve” based, in part, on the
681
prosecution history.
All references to a “sealed sleeve” in the
specification were to a “heat-sealed sleeve,” and when the applicant
had attempted during prosecution to remove the word “heat” from
the specification and thereby broaden the invention’s scope, the PTO
682
examiner rejected the changes as impermissibly adding new matter.
Relying on this history, the Federal Circuit held that the term “sealed
683
sleeve” was properly construed as limited to a “heat-sealed sleeve.”
A broader construction would have caused the claim to have been
684
invalid for lack of support in the initial disclosure.
D. Extrinsic Evidence
Although the Federal Circuit has “emphasized the importance of
intrinsic evidence in claim construction,” extrinsic evidence may also
673. Id. at 1313, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
674. 543 F.3d 1351, 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903, 1908–09 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
675. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,772,874
col.20 ll.20–34 (filed June 11, 1996)).
676. Id. at 1362, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
677. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
678. Id. at 1360–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908–09.
679. Id. at 1361, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908–09.
680. 512 F.3d 1338, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
681. Id. at 1340, 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505, 1507.
682. Id. at 1340–41, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505.
683. Id. at 1344, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507–08.
684. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1508.

816

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:747

685

The Federal Circuit looked at both intrinsic and
be considered.
extrinsic evidence in construing the claim term “pipeline stage” in
686
The
Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc.
patented technology
concerned methods for increasing
687
microprocessor efficiency. The court first looked at the context in
which the term was used in the claims and concluded that other
terms in the claim indicated that “pipeline stage” was used in a
688
temporal, rather than positional, sense.
The court found the
689
specification to be ambiguous as to the meaning of the term, but
that the prosecution history supported the temporal construction of
690
the claim term.
Finally, the court examined extrinsic evidence—a
computer textbook—which the court found “support[ed] the
conclusion that the inventor used ‘the pipeline stage’ in its temporal
sense, consistent with the term’s ordinary meaning in the computer
691
arts.”
Courts also may rely on dictionaries, provided they are not used to
692
693
contradict the intrinsic evidence. In Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp.,
the district court had construed the term “local” as used to describe a
computer device in computer networking systems to mean “a
computer device (e.g., a hard drive) that is directly attached to a
694
single computer’s processor by, for example, the computer’s bus.”
Patent owner Mangosoft argued on appeal that the district court’s
claim construction opinion, which was issued before the Federal
Circuit’s opinion in Phillips v. AWH Corp., had improperly relied on
695
older case law that promoted the use of technical dictionaries. The
696
Federal Circuit was unpersuaded. It noted that Phillips “recognized
that reference to such sources is not prohibited so long as the
ultimate construction given to the claims in question is grounded in
697
the intrinsic evidence.”
The court stated that even though the
685. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
686. 520 F.3d 1367, 1377–80, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232–35 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
687. Id. at 1369, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
688. Id. at 1378, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
689. Id. at 1378–79, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
690. Id. at 1378–80, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233–34.
691. Id. at 1380, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
692. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
693. 525 F.3d 1327, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
694. Id. at 1329, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
695. Id. at 1329–30, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
696. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941–42.
697. Id. at 1330, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318, 75
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330).
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district court had issued its decision before Phillips, its claim
construction was “fully consistent with and supported by the intrinsic
record—as well as the dictionary—and thus fully comports with our
698
precedent.”
699
Similarly, in Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of “partially
hidden from view” to mean “hidden from view to some extent but not
totally hidden from view” as the term was used to describe the top
platform surface in a claim to a wall-mounted diaper changing
700
station. The Federal Circuit first noted that the specification never
used the term “partially hidden from view” to describe the platform
701
top surface and that the term appeared only in the claims. Because
there was nothing in the specification to assist in construing the term,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court was free to look
to extrinsic evidence, provided it did not contradict the meaning
702
discerned from the intrinsic record.
According to the Federal
Circuit, “[w]hen the intrinsic evidence is silent as to the plain
meaning of a term, it is entirely appropriate for the district court to
look to dictionaries or other extrinsic sources for context—to aid in
703
arriving at the plain meaning of a claim term.”
IV. INFRINGEMENT
Section 271(a) of the Patent Act provides that “whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
704
the patent.”
Determining patent infringement entails two steps:
(1) the claims must be construed; and (2) the properly construed
705
claims must be compared to the allegedly infringing device.
This
section addresses the Federal Circuit’s 2008 cases dealing with the
second step.

698. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
699. 527 F.3d 1379, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
700. Id. at 1380–81, 1384, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217, 1219.
701. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
702. Id. at 1382, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
703. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
704. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
705. E.g., Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1573, 41 U.P.S.Q.2d
(BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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A. Literal Infringement
“Generally, a claim is literally infringed if each properly construed
706
claim element reads on the accused product or process.”
In Johns
707
Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp., the Federal Circuit concluded
that, despite a jury verdict of infringement and the district court’s
denial of the accused infringer’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law (“JMOL”), the accused product did not literally meet each of the
708
claim elements.
In Datascope, Johns Hopkins University and a licensee alleged that
Datascope’s ProLumen device infringed patents relating to a catheter
709
Each of the asserted independent claims required
system.
introducing, into a vascular conduit, “a fragmentation catheter
comprised either of a fragmentation member or an expanding distal
end that automatically ‘expands to conform to the shape and
710
diameter of the inner lumen’ of the vascular conduit.”
The term
“expands to conform to the shape and diameter of the inner lumen”
was construed to mean that the fragmentation member or distal end
“expands and adjusts to remain in contact with the inner lumen in
711
The only evidence
three dimensions along its length and width.”
presented by the plaintiffs to show that the ProLumen literally met
the “expands to conform” claim limitation was the testimony of their
712
expert.
The expert concluded that “the S-wire in the ProLumen
device expands and adjusts to remain in contact with the inner lumen
713
in three dimensions along its length and width.”
The Federal Circuit, in a decision written by District Judge Zobel
(sitting by designation), concluded that the expert’s opinion was not
714
supported by the facts. On cross-examination, the expert admitted
that the ProLumen device contacted the inner lumen at only two
715
A video animation relied upon by the expert also showed
points.
only two points of contact, and the Federal Circuit said this was
716
unavoidable “[a]s a matter of geometry.”
The Federal Circuit
therefore concluded that “no reasonable jury could have found that
706. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 160 (4th ed. 2003).
707. 543 F.3d 1342, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
708. Id. at 1349, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
709. Id. at 1343–44, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
710. Id. at 1345, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,766,191
col.8 ll.34–42 (filed Feb. 29, 1996)).
711. Id. at 1346, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
712. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
713. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
714. Id. at 1348, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369–70.
715. Id. at 1347–48, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
716. Id. at 1348, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369–70.
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the ProLumen device literally met th[e] limitation,” and reversed the
717
district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for JMOL.
Judge Newman’s dissent criticized the majority’s willingness to
718
rebalance the evidence.
Without specifically addressing the claim
construction requiring contact “in three dimensions,” Judge Newman
said plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony was sufficient to support the jury
719
verdict. “[I]t is not [the Federal Circuit’s] province to reweigh the
evidence, when there was substantial evidence by which a reasonable
720
jury could have reached its verdict.”
721
In Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed a judgment of no literal infringement reached by the district
722
The patent related to the separation of
court after a bench trial.
723
synchronization signals from video signals.
The patent was
“directed to methods for sync separation . . . that minimize the effect
724
The issue was whether the accused
of noise in the video signal.”
chips produced voltage peaks of synchronization signals that
725
constituted a “clamped sync portion” as required by the claims.
The trial court found that “it simply cannot be said that the [accused]
chips are designed to or do in practice produce a ‘clamped sync
portion’ at the [patented level], even if a few pulses at that level
726
sometimes occur in actual operation.”
On appeal, the plaintiff made two arguments: first, that the trial
court had mistakenly excused the defendant’s infringement as de
minimis (“even if a few pulses at that level sometimes occur in actual
operation”); and second, that the trial court improperly required
727
plaintiff to prove intent to infringe. The Federal Circuit, however,
728
As to the first argument, the
disagreed with both arguments.
Federal Circuit understood the trial court to have found that “the few
pulses that might occur at the [patented] level would not be a
717. Id. at 1349, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
718. See id. at 1349–51, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370–72 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(concluding that there was, in fact, substantial evidence in support of the jury’s
verdict, and that it is not the job of the appellate court to replace the trial court’s
verdict due to its own interpretation of the evidence).
719. Id. at 1350–51, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
720. Id. at 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
721. 545 F.3d 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
722. Id. at 1336, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
723. Id. at 1320, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
724. Id. at 1321, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
725. Id. at 1335–36, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
726. Id. at 1335–36, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (quoting Tech. Licensing Corp.
v. Gennum Corp., No. C 01-04204 RS, 2007 WL 1319528, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 4,
2007)).
727. Id. at 1336, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
728. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
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clamped sync portion within the meaning of the claims because the
hard clamp circuit does not perform the function of clamping or
729
holding the sync tips to that voltage level.” The Federal Circuit said
the district court did not find “that those few pulses actually would
730
infringe very quickly or briefly.”
The plaintiff’s second argument was based on the district court’s
statement that if any pulses happened at the patented level, “it would
731
be ‘a matter of happenstance rather than design.’”
The plaintiff
argued that the court required it to prove intent because of the use of
732
the word “design.”
The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that
that statement did not mean that the trial court equated design with
733
Instead, it “was merely part of the evidence considered by
intent.
the trial court in concluding that the hard clamp circuit does not
734
provide a clamped sync portion.”
735
In Broadcom Corp. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal
Circuit addressed when a product’s compliance with industry
736
standards could be used to prove infringement.
Broadcom
complained to the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) that
Qualcomm had imported chipsets that infringed Broadcom’s
737
patents.
Broadcom accused Qualcomm’s chipsets in wireless
handsets on third-generation wireless networks that use the EV-DO
wireless communication standard developed and promoted by
738
Qualcomm.
Broadcom argued that “under the EV-DO standard,
networks must implement the Idle State Protocol’s Sleep State and
that the Sleep State involves powering down a handset’s wireless
739
receiver”—which allegedly infringed the patent.
The Federal
Circuit, however, disagreed. It concluded that the EV-DO standard
did not require handsets to enter the Sleep State or power down
when in the Sleep State: “[t]he EV-DO standard provides that a
terminal in the Sleep State ‘may shut down part of its subsystems to
conserve power’ and the terminal ‘may shut down processing
740
resources to reduce power consumption.’”
Moreover, the Federal
Circuit continued, the EV-DO standard specified that “the use of the
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.

Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (quoting Videotek, 2007 WL 1319528, at *6).
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
542 F.3d 894, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 899, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
Id. at 896, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
Id. at 898, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292.
Id. at 899, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (emphasis added).
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (emphasis added).
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word ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ indicates that a certain feature is not
741
required by the standard.” The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed
742
The Federal
the Commission’s finding of non-infringement.
Circuit did not consider Broadcom’s argument that Qualcomm’s
promotion of the optional features was sufficient to show inducement
because the Federal Circuit found that Broadcom had not presented
743
that argument to the administrative law judge at the ITC.
744
In Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.,
the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of joint infringement, following up on the court’s
745
previous decision in BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., which
“clarified the proper standard for whether a method claim is directly
746
infringed by the combined actions of multiple parties.” Under BMC
Resources, “where the actions of multiple parties combine to perform
every step of a claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if
one party exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such
that every step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the
747
‘mastermind.’” In Muniauction, the issue was whether the actions of
a bidder and auctioneer in an electronic system for auctioning
financial instruments “may be combined under the law so as to give
748
rise to a finding of direct infringement by the auctioneer.”
The
Federal Circuit found that it was insufficient that the auctioneer
controlled access to its system and instructed bidders on the system’s
749
use. The court held that the auctioneer “neither performed every
step of the claimed methods nor had another party perform steps on
its behalf, and Muniauction [had] identified no legal theory under
which Thomson might be vicariously liable for the actions of the
750
bidders.”
751
In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. PDI Communications Systems, Inc., the
752
district court addressed a defense to infringement: implied license.
Plaintiff Zenith owned a patent on wired remote control devices,
called “pillow speakers,” used to control a television and receive
741. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
742. Id. at 908, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
743. Id. at 900, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–94.
744. 532 F.3d 1318, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
745. 498 F.3d 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
746. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357 (citing BMC Res.,
498 F.3d at 1380, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549).
747. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1380–81,
84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550).
748. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
749. Id. at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358.
750. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358.
751. 522 F.3d 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
752. Id. at 1354, 1360–67, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517, 1521–26.
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television audio in hospital rooms. Zenith then licensed the patent
to three companies that manufactured and distributed the pillow
754
speakers. Defendant PDI marketed a television that was compatible
755
with Zenith’s pillow speakers, and Zenith sued claiming that PDI
directly infringed its patent by testing its televisions with pillow
speakers, and indirectly infringed by supplying televisions and
756
encouraging customers to operate them with pillow speakers. The
district court granted PDI’s motion for summary judgment based on
the licenses between Zenith and the three pillow speaker
757
758
The Federal Circuit affirmed.
In an opinion by
manufacturers.
Judge Schall, the appeals court noted that this case was different than
759
In an ordinary case, the issue is
a typical implied-license case.
whether a license is implied by the mere “sale of nonpatented
760
equipment used to practice a patented invention.”
A court
therefore will, in the typical case, examine whether the unpatented
equipment has noninfringing uses and infer an implied license only
761
if the unpatented equipment has no noninfringing uses.
In this
case, however, the Federal Circuit stated that “the license is not
merely implied by virtue of the sale of pillow speakers by [the three
762
manufacturers].”
Instead, customers purchasing pillow speakers
obtained an implied license to use the pillow speakers “derived from
763
the express licenses between Zenith and those manufacturers.” In this
situation, where the patent owner had expressly authorized the sale
of a device for infringing uses, the traditional inquiry—whether the
764
equipment involved has no noninfringing uses—was irrelevant.
The court next addressed the scope of the implied licenses
obtained by the purchasers of pillow speakers—i.e., whether they
allowed the customers to use the pillow speakers with non-Zenith

753. Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
754. Id. at 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
755. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
756. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
757. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.
758. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
759. See id. at 1360–61, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521–22 (analogizing this case to
Jacobs v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1097, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2004), which was not a typical implied-license case).
760. Id. at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (quoting Met-Coil Sys., Corp. v.
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 474 (Fed. Cir. 1986))
(emphasis added).
761. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521–22.
762. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
763. Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
764. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
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765

televisions such as PDI’s televisions. The Federal Circuit noted that
the express license agreements gave the three manufacturers broad
“authorization to ‘make, have made, use, sell or otherwise dispose
of . . . any pillow speaker unit’” and that “[n]o restrictions are placed
766
on the grants.” The court therefore held that “purchasers of pillow
speakers manufactured by [the three companies] obtain[ed] an
implied license under [the patent] to use the pillow speakers in
combination with any compatible television—not just Zenith
767
televisions,” and the appeals court affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment that the patent was not infringed upon
768
because of the implied license defense.
B. The Doctrine of Equivalents
Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does
not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements
769
of the patented invention.”
Infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents may be limited by a number of related doctrines, such as
770
prosecution history estoppel.
1.

Amendment-based prosecution history estoppel
“The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel prevents a patent
owner from recapturing with the doctrine of equivalents subject
771
matter surrendered to acquire the patent.”
Under amendmentbased prosecution estoppel history, “[a] patentee’s decision to
narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a
general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the
772
This presumption of surrender, however,
amended claim.”

765. See id. at 1361–62, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (discussing whether the
implied licenses allowed the customers to use the pillow speakers with non-Zenith
televisions such as PDI’s televisions).
766. Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
767. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523 (emphasis omitted).
768. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
769. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1866 (1997) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 330 (1950)).
770. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1714 (2002) (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873)).
771. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304, 1312,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718, 1724 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
772. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citing Exhibit Supply Co.
v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136–37, 52 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 275, 277 (1942)).
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according to Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
be rebutted if the patentee shows any of the following:

773

can

[T]hat the alleged equivalent would have been unforeseeable at
the time of the narrowing amendment, that the rationale
underlying the narrowing amendment bore no more than a
tangential relation to the equivalent in question, or that there was
“some other reason” suggesting that the patentee could not
reasonably have been expected to have described the alleged
774
equivalent.

a.

The tangentiality exception

The Federal Circuit addressed the second of these, the
tangentiality exception, in at least three cases during 2008. In Regents
775
of the University of California v. Dakocytomation California, Inc., the
Federal Circuit rejected the trial court’s ruling that prosecution
history estoppel barred the plaintiffs’ allegations of infringement
776
under the doctrine of equivalents.
The patent at issue was
“directed to improved ‘methods for identifying and classifying
777
chromosomes’ in order to detect chromosomal abnormalities.”
The district court held that the patentees had narrowed the scope of
778
The
the “blocking nucleic acid” limitation during prosecution.
district court therefore barred the plaintiffs from asserting that the
defendants’ peptide nucleic acids (“PNAs”) were an equivalent of a
“blocking nucleic acid” and granted summary judgment of non779
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that prosecution history estoppel
did not apply because the “nucleic acid” limitation was not narrowed
during prosecution for a substantial purpose related to
780
patentability.
Alternatively, they argued that the presumption of
surrender was overcome because the rationale for the amendment
781
was only tangentially related to the accused equivalent product.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patentees presumptively
surrendered all equivalents of the “blocking nucleic acid” limitation
773. Festo, 535 U.S. 722.
774. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369,
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 740–41, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714).
775. 517 F.3d 1364, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
776. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
777. Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,447,841
col.1 ll.21–22 (filed Dec. 14, 1990)).
778. Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
779. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
780. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
781. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
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because they had amended the claim to overcome, at least in part,
782
The Federal Circuit held that the
the examiner’s rejections.
presumption of surrender was overcome here “because the
narrowing amendment was only tangential to the accused PNA
783
equivalent.” The court found that the prosecution history showed
that the patentees’ arguments in narrowing the claim focused on the
784
method of blocking, not the type of nucleic acid. Indeed, the court
found that the “nucleic acid” aspect of the claim was “not at issue in
the office action rejecting the claims, the Examiner Interview
Summary Record, or the patentees’ remarks accompanying the
785
amendment.”
The dissenting opinion of Judge Prost disagreed with the majority’s
786
application of the presumption of prosecution history estoppel.
The amendment, Judge Prost stated, had more than a simple
tangential relationship to the equivalent because it “limits the claims
to a method of disabling repetitive sequences by blocking with
787
Judge Prost stated
‘blocking nucleic acids’ (i.e., DNA or RNA).”
that the patentees therefore “surrendered any other means of
disabling repetitive sequences,” but the accused equivalent (PNA)
788
“functions to do exactly that, i.e., to disable repetitive sequences.”
789
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., however, Judge Prost
wrote the opinion for the court rejecting the application of the
tangentiality exception and holding that prosecution history estoppel
790
barred infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The patent
791
at issue related to methods of compressing speech. Plaintiff Lucent
argued on appeal that the district court erred in finding that it had
not rebutted the presumption of surrender through the tangentiality
792
More specifically, Lucent argued that the accused
exception.
equivalent diverged from the claimed invention in that:
[S]teps 1–4 (determining redundancies) are performed once
per frame as opposed to once per pulse. This difference . . . is
unrelated to the rationale for the amendment, which was to
distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art based only on

782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.

Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937–38.
Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940 (Prost, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
525 F.3d 1200, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1217, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014–15.
Id. at 1204, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
Id. at 1217, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
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the performance of step 5 (removing redundancies) during each
pulse-forming iteration as opposed to during each frame-based
793
iteration.

The Federal Circuit again applied Festo’s test for the tangential
exception—“‘whether the reason for the narrowing amendment is
794
peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent’” —but
the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not overcome the
795
presumption of surrender. The court concluded that the patentee
had amended the claims to add “a five-step iterative process for
determining and removing redundancies during the pulse-forming
796
The claimed invention differed from the prior art because
loop.”
the invention determined pitch removal during each pulse-forming
797
iteration.
The alleged equivalent, however, “determine[d] pitch
redundancy outside the iterative process for forming each loop,” and
the court therefore concluded that “the purpose for the amendment
798
is not unrelated [i.e., not tangential] to the alleged equivalent.”
799
Similarly, in International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., the Federal
800
Court held that the tangentiality exception did not apply.
During
the prosecution of its patent related to metal-oxide-semiconductor
field effect transistors (“MOSFETs”), the patentee added an
801
“adjoining” limitation to overcome the examiner’s rejections. The
defendant argued that this amendment limited the claim only to
MOSFETs devices and therefore precluded it from reaching IXYS’s
802
insulated gate bipolar transistors (“IGBTs”).
In response, the patentee argued that prosecution history estoppel
did not apply to the “adjoining” limitation because it broadened the
claim instead of narrowing it, and alternatively, that the tangential
803
exception applied. The Federal Circuit held that the patentee was
partially correct that the “adjoining” amendment was broadening in
804
some respects.
In other respects, however, “[t]his term excludes
structures that might have been covered by the original claim
793. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014.
794. Id. at 1218, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
795. Id. at 1218, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
796. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
797. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
798. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
799. 515 F.3d 1353, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
800. Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
801. Id. at 1358, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
802. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
803. Id. at 1358–59, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
804. Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
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language,” and “[t]he amendment therefore narrowed the scope of
805
the claim.”
As to the tangentiality argument, the Federal Circuit acknowledged
that the examiner rejected the original claim because the
specification did not support all of its limitations and that the
patentee overcame this rejection “by amending the claim to contain
only the structural limitations disclosed in the text of the
806
specification,” a modification that might not have been required.
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the patentee’s decision to
narrow the claim “using the limiting term ‘adjoining,’ whether or not
required to overcome the rejection, cannot be described as only
tangentially related to the equivalency of a structure with a non807
adjoining regions.”
b.

The foreseeability exception
808

Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. involved
both the tangentiality and foreseeability exceptions from Festo. The
patent at issue involved “technology to control airflow surge in
809
auxiliary power units or ‘APUs.’”
Honeywell alleged that
Sundstrand’s APS 3200 infringed claims of three of its patents under
810
the doctrine of equivalents. The district court held that Honeywell
had not overcome the presumption of surrender under either the
tangentiality or foreseeability exceptions and that prosecution history
estoppel therefore precluded application of the doctrine of
811
equivalents.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court.
In its
tangentiality analysis, the Federal Circuit focused on the patentee’s
812
rewriting of dependent claims into independent ones.
According
to the court, by rewriting the dependent claims (which contained an
“IGV limitation”) as independent claims, the patentee “‘effectively
813
add[ed] the [IGV] limitation to the claimed invention.’” The court
805. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
806. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911–12.
807. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
808. 523 F.3d 1304, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
809. Id. at 1307, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
810. Id. at 1310, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
811. Id. at 1311, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723.
812. See id. at 1316, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727 (emphasizing the need to assess
“‘the patentee’s objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment’”
(quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369,
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
813. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727 (quoting Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton
Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1144, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1074 (Fed. Cir.
2004)) (alteration in original).
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said that Honeywell had, in essence, amended the claims to add the
IGV limitation and that “[b]ecause the alleged equivalent focuses on
the IGV limitation, the amendment bore a direct, not merely
814
tangential, relation to the equivalent.”
With respect to foreseeability, the essential inquiry is “whether the
alleged equivalent would have been unforeseeable to one of ordinary
815
skill in the art at the time of the amendment.”
By limiting the
application of prosecution history estoppel only to unforeseeable
equivalents, the exception “ensures that the doctrine [of equivalents]
does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter could have
816
In
foreseen during prosecution and included in the claims.”
Honeywell, the Federal Circuit had to decide whether the alleged
equivalent—“the use of IGV position to detect high flow and low
flow”—was later-developed technology and unforeseeable at the time
817
The defendant had not
of the amendments during prosecution.
developed the alleged equivalent until eight years after the patent
amendments, but the Federal Circuit held that this timing was
“ambiguous with respect to the foreseeability criterion” because, for
example, the defendant had developed the equivalent quickly after
818
noticing the problem.
The court ultimately found that “much of
the extrinsic evidence—most notably several prior art references in
the record—support[ed] the district court’s decision” that the
alleged equivalent was foreseeable to a person of ordinary skill at the
819
time of the amendment.
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Newman argued that prosecution
history estoppel did not apply because the claims were never
substantively amended, only changed in form from dependent to
820
Judge Newman disagreed with the majority’s
independent claims.
“presumption of surrender to all equivalents of the claim elements
and limitations that originated in dependent claims that were never
amended and that were not the subject of prosecution history
821
estoppel.” According to Judge Newman, the majority’s holding that
“surrender of the entire universe of potential equivalents is presumed
814. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727.
815. Id. at 1312, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724 (quoting Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369,
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327).
816. Id. at 1313, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725.
817. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725.
818. Id. at 1314, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
819. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726.
820. See id. at 1321, 86. U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(“Simply presenting claims of varying scope, whether in independent or dependent
form, is not a narrowing amendment or argument.”).
821. Id. at 1317, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728.
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822

when the original independent claim is cancelled,” even though
there was no narrowing amendment or limiting argument during
prosecution with respect to the dependent claims, “place[d] new
823
constraints on the patentee’s access to the doctrine of equivalents.”
With respect to the tangentiality exception, Judge Newman argued
that the majority did not review the reason for the narrowing
amendment and its relation to the accused equivalent as required by
824
Festo. According to Judge Newman, “[t]his criterion relates to why
an amendment was made; it does not become irrebuttable simply
when the accused equivalent concerns the same element that was
825
added by amendment.”
Furthermore, Judge Newman suggested that the majority applied
significantly more restrictive criteria for the foreseeability exception
826
than that established by the Supreme Court in Festo. According to
Judge Newman, under Festo, “foreseeability means ‘readily known
827
equivalents,’ not unknown equivalents developed a decade later.”
The alleged equivalent was not foreseeable because “[i]t was
uncontradicted that the [alleged] equivalent was developed years
after the [patentee’s] application was filed and prosecuted, and only
828
after considerable effort.”
2.

Argument-based prosecution history estoppel
“In addition to amendment-based prosecution history estoppel,
829
there can also be argument-based prosecution history estoppel.”
Argument-based prosecution history estoppel can arise when the
patentee makes unmistakable statements surrendering claim scope
830
during patent prosecution.
831
In Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., the Federal Circuit engaged
in an extensive analysis of argument-based prosecution history
estoppel. One of the defendants argued that the district court should
have instructed the jury that prosecution history estoppel limited the
832
range of “equivalents of the ‘wall surface’ limitation.”
822. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728.
823. Id. at 1318, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729.
824. Id. at 1321–22, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731–32.
825. Id. at 1322, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1732.
826. Id. at 1318, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729.
827. Id. at 1319, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713
(2002)).
828. Id. at 1321, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731.
829. SCHWARTZ, supra note 706, at 168.
830. Id. at 168 n.81.
831. 511 F.3d 1157, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
832. Id. at 1176, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.
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The appellant relied on Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., in
which the Federal Circuit discussed “the relationship between
prosecution disclaimer (limiting claim scope because of statements
made by the patentee in prosecution) and argument-based
prosecution history estoppel (limiting the scope of the doctrine of
equivalents because of statements made by the patentee in
834
In Omega, the Federal Circuit stated that both
prosecution).”
prosecution disclaimer and argument-based estoppel required “clear
and unmistakable” disavowing actions or statements during
835
prosecution.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the patentee
had not made any broad disclaimer regarding the “wall surface”
836
limitation during the prosecution history.
Instead, the patentee
had “simply made explicit the meaning of the term ‘wall surface’ that
837
A “reference to the ‘common
was already implicit in the patent.”
cylindrical plane’ in the prosecution history therefore did not
disclaim any subject matter that was otherwise within the scope of the
claim language, but merely explained, in more explicit terms, what
838
the claims already covered.” Thus, the Federal Circuit held, there
was no “clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope that would
839
eliminate any equivalents of the ‘wall surface’ limitation.”
3.

Other limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents is subject to additional limitations
besides prosecution history estoppel.
For example, “the ‘all
limitations rule’ restricts the application of the doctrine of
840
equivalents if doing so would vitiate a claim limitation.”
When
considering whether the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate a claim
limitation, a court must consider “whether the alleged equivalent can
be fairly characterized as an insubstantial change from the claimed
subject matter without rendering the pertinent limitation
841
meaningless.”

833. 334 F.3d 1314, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
834. Cordis, 511 F.3d at 1177, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
835. Omega, 334 F.3d at 1325–26, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
836. Cordis, 511 F.3d at 1177, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
837. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
838. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
839. Id. at 1178, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
840. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1129, 88
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1871 (1997)).
841. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243 (citing Freedman Seating Co. v. Am.
Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1359, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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In Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., the Federal
Court held that the “all limitations rule” prevented the patentee’s use
842
The patents related to “novel
of the doctrine of equivalents.
recombinant plasmids for the enhanced expression of an enzyme”
and to “methods for the conditional control of the expression of said
843
During prosecution, the patentee “specifically chose to
enzyme.”
limit claim 4 to a recombinant plasmid where the bacterial source
844
[was] E. coli.”
In litigation, the patentee argued that the
defendant’s product, which replaced E. coli with an enzyme known as
Thermus aquaticus (“Taq”) was insubstantial and equivalent to the
845
plaintiff’s product. The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that “a
finding that Taq is an equivalent of E. coli would essentially render the
‘bacterial source [is] E. coli’ claim limitation meaningless, and would
846
thus vitiate that limitation of the claims.”
After they “specifically
chose” E. coli to be the bacterial source, the plaintiffs “cannot now
847
argue that any bacterial source . . . would infringe that claim.”
848
In Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp., the Federal Circuit
held that “[w]here . . . a patentee has brought what would otherwise
be equivalents of a limitation into the literal scope of the claim, the
doctrine of equivalents is unavailable to further broaden the scope of
849
The patents at issue related to High Performance
the claim.”
Liquid Chromatography (“HPLC”), which is a “process for
separating, identifying, and measuring compounds contained in a
850
The key claim limitation at issue referred to particles
liquid.”
851
“having average diameters of greater than about 30 µm.”
The
Federal Court’s decision focused on the meaning of the word “about”
852
in the phrase “about 30 µm.”
The patent owner accused the defendant’s “30 µm” HPLC columns
of being within the scope of equivalents of the “about 30 µm”
853
limitation. The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that “the word
‘about’ in the context of the written description and the claims . . .
makes clear [that] ‘about 30 µm’ encompasses particle diameters that
842. Id. at 1129, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
843. Id. at 1118, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
844. Id. at 1129, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
845. Id. at 1128, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
846. Id. at 1129, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243 (alteration in original).
847. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
848. 543 F.3d 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
849. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
850. Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
851. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (emphasis added).
852. See id. at 1371–72, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916–17 (analyzing the purpose of
the numeric range in the limitation).
853. Id. at 1358, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
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perform the same function, in the same way, with the same result as
854
the 30 µm particles.” Thus, such equivalents are already within the
literal scope of the claim and the “patentee cannot rely on the
855
doctrine of equivalents to encompass equivalents of equivalents.”
C. The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
The mirror image of the doctrine of equivalents is the reverse
doctrine of equivalents. The reverse doctrine of equivalents “allows a
court to find no infringement even though each element of the
patent’s claim literally reads on the product or process of the alleged
856
infringer.” It is a factual determination and the test is “whether the
apparently literally infringing product or process is so far changed in
principle that it performs the same or similar function in a
857
The Federal Circuit “has never
substantially different way.”
affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of
858
equivalents,” and 2008 was no exception.
In Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., the defendant Apotex
attempted unsuccessfully to invoke the reverse doctrine of
859
Plaintiff Roche
equivalents as a defense against infringement.
asserted infringement by Apotex based on a drug formulation
covered by an Apotex abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”)
860
that was directed to a generic version of Roche’s ACULAR LS drug.
The defendant did not argue that its formulation fell outside of the
literal scope of the patent; instead it argued that its formulation did
861
not infringe under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
The defendant argued that:
[A] person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the
‘principle’ of [the asserted patent] is the use of [Octoxynol 40] in
an amount sufficient to cause the formation of micelles and
thereby provide robust stability to the formulation by preventing
interactions
between
[ketorolac
tromethamine]
and
862
[benzalkonium chloride].

According to the defendant, the concentration of Octoxynol 40 in
its drug formulation “is far below the concentration required to form
854. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
855. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
856. SCHWARTZ, supra note 706, at 169.
857. Id.
858. Roche Palo Alto, LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1308, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
859. Id. at 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
860. Id. at 1374–76, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309–11.
861. Id. at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
862. Id. at 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
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863

According to the defendant, its formulation was
micelles.”
“stabilized by a completely different ingredient and mechanism, and
functions in a ‘substantially different way’ from” Roche’s
864
formulation.
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected the reverse doctrine of
865
The Federal Circuit held that the defendant
equivalents defense.
had failed to properly establish the “principle” or “equitable scope of
866
the claims” in the patented invention.
The Federal Circuit noted
that “[t]he ‘principle’ . . . of the patented invention is determined in
light of the specification, prosecution history, and the prior art,” but
stated that there was “no mention of ‘micelle’”—the core of the
alleged “principle” of the patent—“in the claims, specification, or
867
prosecution history.”
Furthermore, the specification disclosed a
formulation containing the same concentration of Octoxynol 40 as in
868
The Federal Circuit therefore
the alleged infringing formulation.
held that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of
non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, and that
the district court had properly granted summary judgment of literal
869
infringement.
D. Indirect Infringement
In 2008, the Federal Circuit also resolved a few cases dealing with
induced infringement. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), “‘[w]hoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
870
infringer.’”
To prevail on a claim of inducement, “the patentee
must show, first that there has been direct infringement, and second
871
that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement.”
Two
872
years ago, in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., the Federal Circuit
clarified the meaning of the intent required for induced
873
infringement.
It “requires more than just intent to cause the acts
that produce direct infringement. Beyond that threshold knowledge,

863. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
864. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
865. Id. at 1378–79, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
866. Id. at 1378, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
867. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
868. Id. at 1379, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
869. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
870. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304–05,
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
(2006)).
871. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276–77 (internal citations omitted).
872. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
873. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.

834

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:747

the inducer must have an affirmative intent to cause direct
874
infringement.”
875
In Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission, the
Federal Circuit reiterated the level of intent required for induced
876
infringement. The ITC’s administrative law judge decided the case
before the DSU decision, and therefore only required a showing of
877
“the intent to cause the acts that constitute infringement.”
The
Federal Circuit explained that although proper at the time, this
878
approach was improper after DSU. The court therefore vacated and
879
remanded the ITC’s determination of induced infringement. The
Federal Circuit also reiterated that induced infringement requires
not only intent to cause the infringing acts, but also “‘evidence of
culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement,’
880
The court did,
i.e., specific intent to encourage infringement.”
however, note that this specific intent may be shown by circumstantial
881
evidence.
882
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., the Federal Circuit reiterated
that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to show intent for
883
induced infringement.
The district court had found that
Qualcomm directly infringed and induced infringement of certain
884
The
claims, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
Federal Circuit agreed with the plaintiff Broadcom that substantial
885
evidence supported the jury’s induced-infringement verdict.
The
law, the court concluded, did not require direct evidence as
886
defendant Qualcomm argued.
The circumstantial evidence here
was enough to establish intent, which under DSU required a showing
that the alleged infringer “knew or should have known his actions would
887
induce actual infringements.” The court noted that Qualcomm did
874. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (internal citations omitted).
875. 545 F.3d 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
876. Id. at 1354, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
877. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
878. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
879. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
880. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471
F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
881. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
882. 543 F.3d 683, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For discussion of
this case’s implications upon permanent injunctions, see infra notes 1663–1676 and
accompanying text.
883. Id. at 699–700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654–55.
884. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654–55.
885. Id. at 700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
886. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
887. Id. at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS
Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added)).
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“not dispute that it was on notice of Broadcom’s patents and
infringement contentions,” conceded it “worked closely with its
customers to develop and support the accused products,” and did not
“make changes to those products or give its customers” warnings even
888
after suit was filed.
Qualcomm had also argued that the district court erred by
instructing the jury to consider a failure to obtain an opinion of
889
counsel as a factor in determining intent to induce infringement.
890
Qualcomm argued that the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Seagate
made such an instruction erroneous. According to Qualcomm,
because the Federal Circuit held in Seagate that willful infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 284 would be determined based on an “objective
recklessness” standard and that a defendant had no obligation to
obtain opinion of counsel to defeat allegations of willful
infringement, there also could be no such obligation for a defendant
accused of induced infringement as the Federal Circuit had
established in DSU that induced infringement put an even higher
891
burden on the plaintiff—i.e., showing specific intent.
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected Qualcomm’s assertion that
opinion-of-counsel evidence is no longer relevant in determining
892
intent to induce infringement. According to the court, Qualcomm
was correct that a defendant has no affirmative duty to seek an
opinion of counsel and that, as the Federal Circuit held in Knorr893
Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge, GmbH v. Dana Corp., a court may
not impose, when a defendant fails to obtain an opinion of counsel,
an “adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an
894
The Federal Circuit,
opinion would have been unfavorable.”
however, held that even if an adverse inference or evidentiary
presumption was inappropriate, a failure to obtain counsel’s opinion
could be a factor that a jury could consider in evaluating an alleged
895
infringer’s intent.
“Because opinion-of-counsel evidence, along
with other factors, may reflect whether the accused infringer ‘knew or
should have known’ that its actions would cause another to directly
896
infringe . . . such evidence remains relevant.” The court stated that
888. Id. at 700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (internal quotations omitted).
889. Id. at 698–99, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
890. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
891. Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
892. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
893. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
894. Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (quoting KnorrBremse, 383 F.3d at 1346, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566).
895. Id. at 699–700, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654–55.
896. Id. at 699, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
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just as an opinion of counsel can be used by a defendant as
exculpatory evidence with respect to intent under DSU, “failures to
procure such advice” can be circumstantial evidence used by a
897
plaintiff to show intent to infringe.
The Federal Circuit also was not swayed by Qualcomm’s argument
based on Seagate. The Federal Circuit held that, whatever effect
Seagate’s objective recklessness standard may have had to limit the
relevance of opinion of counsel with respect to willful infringement,
the standard for induced infringement continued to be the “specific
intent” standard established in DSU, and on that question, opinion-of898
counsel evidence remained relevant.
Finally, in another induced-infringement case, Symantec Corp. v.
899
Computer Associates International, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed a
district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.
The district court held that the patentee had not established induced
infringement because it had not shown direct infringement by third
900
parties. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the
901
The court held that even
district court’s summary judgment.
though the plaintiff had not produced evidence that “any particular
customer” had directly infringed, the plaintiff had shown that the
defendant encouraged customers to use the accused products and
902
that customers could use those products only in an infringing way.
The plaintiff therefore had “produced sufficient circumstantial evidence
903
of direct infringement to create a genuine issue of material fact.”
The Federal Circuit also addressed in 2008 “an important, and
previously unresolved, question concerning the scope of liability”
under the second form of indirect infringement—contributory
904
infringement under § 271(c). In Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer
Inc., 550 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the accused infringer
manufactured an optical disk drive that, for purposes of the appeal,
was assumed to contain both (a) components that had no substantial
noninfringing use (i.e., separate hardware and embedded software
modules that necessarily performed the patented process) and
905
(b) components that did have substantial noninfringing uses. The
897. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
898. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
899. 522 F.3d. 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
900. Id. at 1287, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
901. Id. at 1299, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
902. Id. at 1293, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
903. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457 (emphasis added).
904. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1336, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
1577, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
905. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585.
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accused manufacturer could not be held directly liable because only
its customers practiced the patented method, but the patent owner
sought to hold the manufacturer liable for indirect contributory
infringement under § 271(c). Section 271(c) imposes liability on
anyone who sells “a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process,” if, among other things, the
component, material, or apparatus is not “suitable for substantial
906
noninfringing use.”
In a per curiam decision, the Federal Circuit held that the accused
manufacturer could be held liable for contributory infringement
under § 271(c). Even though the ultimate device that the accused
manufacturer sold—i.e., the optical disk drive—had substantial
noninfringing uses, the Federal Circuit held that the sale of the disk
drive could constitute contributory infringement based on the
included component that did not have substantial noninfringing
907
The court stated that under any other rule, evasion of
uses.
§ 271(c) “would become rather easy”: a manufacturer that wanted to
sell hardware that would be used to infringe a patented process could
avoid contributory liability simply by adding additional hardware that
908
also performs another (noninfringing) process.
Judge Gajarsa dissented. He argued that, under the Federal
Circuit’s prior decision in Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1987), the accused manufacturer could be considered, for
purposes of § 271(c), to have “sold” only the optical disk drive (which
909
had substantial noninfringing uses) and not the component. Judge
Gajarsa also argued that the facts in Ricoh did not rise to the standard
for contributory infringement established by the Supreme Court in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltc., 545 U.S. 913 (2005),
which Judge Gajarsa said allowed such liability only where one could
“presume an intent that a product [would] be used to infringe
910
another’s patent” and where there was “more acute fault than the
911
mere understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.”

906. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
907. 550 F.3d at 1337-38, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586-87.
908. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586.
909. Id. at 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
910. Id. at 1346, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
911. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932-33, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1010 (2005)).
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E. Section 271(e)(1): Research Exemption to Infringement
The Federal Circuit resolved two cases dealing with 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), the “safe harbor” statute that protects from infringement
liability the making, sale, use, or importation of a patented invention
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
912
913
products.” In Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Amgen
complained to the ITC that Roche’s importation of human
erythropoietin and derivatives (collectively “EPO”) was in violation of
914
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. Amgen argued
that the EPO and the process by which it was made in Europe
915
infringed Amgen’s patents.
Roche moved for summary judgment,
and the Commission granted it, holding that the importation of EPO
916
was protected by the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor. Amgen appealed the
Commission’s ruling, arguing that the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor statute
did “not apply to Tariff Act violations based on foreign practice of
patented processes,” and, moreover, that “not all of the imported
917
Amgen argued
EPO was used for the statute’s exempt purposes.”
that the safe-harbor statute did not protect the importation at issue
because liability was based, in part, on the infringement of process
918
patents.
The safe-harbor statute protects the importation of only
“patented invention[s]”; Amgen argued that “a process cannot be
imported” and that importation of products produced offshore by an
919
infringing process therefore would not fall within the safe harbor.
Amgen also indicated that the Commission had “a long-standing . . .
right” to block importation based on offshore practice of U.S.
920
patented process and argued that Congress preserved this authority
921
Amgen cited Congress’s
when it enacted § 271(g) in 1988.
statement that the addition of § 271(g) “shall not deprive the patent
owner of any remedies available under subsections (a) through (f) of
912. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
913. 519 F.3d 1343, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
914. Id. at 1344–45, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189; see also Tariff Act of 1930,
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
915. Id. at 1345, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. A foreign process can be the basis
for U.S. infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which provides that
importing a product “made by a process patented in the United States” constitutes
infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006).
916. Amgen, 519 F.3d at 1345, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
917. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
918. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
919. Id. at 1346, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
920. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
921. Id. at 1347, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
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922

section 271 . . . [and] under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”
According to Amgen, this showed that although the safe harbor
might block process patent infringement when enforced in the
district courts under § 271(g), a remedy was retained for process923
patent infringement enforced under section 337.
Judge Newman’s majority opinion agreed with the Commission
that the safe-harbor statute protected Roche’s EPO from section 337
exclusion “not only as to infringement of Amgen’s product patents
924
but also as to Amgen’s process patents.” According to the majority,
§ 271(g)’s legislative history as well as Supreme Court guidance
925
supported the Commission’s ruling.
The majority cited a
congressional report directly on this issue, stating that Congress did
not intend that it shall be an act of infringement to import a
product which is made by a process patented in the United States
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
926
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”

The Federal Circuit also cited Supreme Court statements
emphasizing Congress’s broad purpose “of removing patent-based
barriers to proceeding with federal regulatory approval of medically
927
The court said that this “weigh[ed] heavily against
products.”
selectively withholding the § 271(e)(1) exemption depending on
whether the infringement action is in the district court or the
928
That interpretation of this
International Trade Commission.”
broad policy has extended § 271(e)(1) to “all uses of patented
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and
929
The Federal
submission of any information under the FDCA.”
Circuit therefore “affirm[ed] the Commission’s ruling that the safe
harbor statute applies to process patents in actions under Section
337, when the imported product is used for the exempt purposes of
930
§ 271(e)(1).”
With respect to Amgen’s second argument—that at least some of
the imported EPO was “not exempt because its actual use was not
922. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (quoting Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9006(c), 102 Stat. 1107, 1567
(1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2006)).
923. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
924. Id. at 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
925. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191–92.
926. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191–92 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 48 (1987)).
927. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
928. Id. at 1348–49, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
929. Id. at 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1805 (2005)).
930. Id. at 1349, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
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reasonably related to the development and submission of
931
information” —the Federal Circuit remanded the case back to the
Commission to determine the exempt status of each study in which
932
the EPO was to be used.
In his dissent, Judge Linn agreed with the majority that § 271(e)(1)
was intended to protect process patents, but he argued that the
statute’s protection did not extend to block the Commission’s authority
to exclude imports. Judge Linn noted that “§ 271(e)(1) declares that
certain activities ‘shall not be an act of infringement,’” whereas the
plain language of section 337 of the Tariff Act allows the Commission
933
to exclude products even without an act of infringement. Although
a separate section, section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), makes it unlawful to
import articles that “infringe a valid and enforceable United States
934
patent,” section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) prohibits importation of articles
that “are made, produced, processed . . . [by] a process covered by
935
the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.”
According to Judge Linn, “this difference in language [was] not
accidental,” and the legislative history showed that process claims are
936
not within the safe-harbor statute.
937
In Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., the Federal Circuit
considered whether the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor applied to the
importation of products that were not themselves regulated but that
938
were used with regulated devices.
Plaintiff Proveris sued
Innovasystems (“Innova”) for infringing its patent related to nasal
939
spray pumps and inhalers.
Innova’s accused device—an Optical
Spray Analyzer (“OSA”)—is not FDA-regulated, but it is used with a
940
Innova argued that the safe-harbor statute
regulated device.
protected the OSA devices because they were “used by third parties
solely for the development and submission of information to the

931. Id. at 1349, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
932. Id. at 1350, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.
933. See id. at 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195 (Linn, J., dissenting) (“19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) does not require an act of infringement for the Commission to
issue an exclusion order.”).
934. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i)
(2006)) (emphasis added).
935. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195 (quoting § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
936. Id. at 1353–54, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195–96.
937. 536 F.3d 1256, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
938. Id. at 1258, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
939. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
940. Id. at 1259, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.

2009]

2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

841

941

FDA.” The district court, however, ruled as a matter of law that the
942
safe-harbor statute did not include the OSA devices.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that one of the purposes of
the Hatch-Waxman Act was to eliminate the de facto extension in
patent life caused by the fact that other parties could not produce
competitive products upon expiration of a patent because such
products required FDA pre-market approval, and a competitor
ordinarily could not begin that process until after the patent
943
expired. Section 271(e)(1) sought to eliminate that distortion “by
providing a safe harbor that immunized competitors from
infringement on account of making, using, offering to sell, or selling
. . . a ‘patented invention solely for use reasonably related’” to an
944
FDA submission. “The basic idea behind this provision was to allow
competitors to begin the regulatory approval process while the patent
was still in force, followed by the market entry immediately upon
945
patent expiration.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that the OSA devices are protected
by the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor because they are not subject to the
946
FDA pre-market approval, and they thus “face[] no regulatory
947
The defendant
barriers to market entry upon patent expiration.”
Innova was therefore “not a party who, prior to [§ 271(e)(1)], could
be said to have been adversely affected by the [above-mentioned]
948
distortion.”
In short, because Proveris’s patented product “is not
subject to a required [Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act] approval
process, it does not need the safe harbor protection afforded by
949
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).”
F.

Design Patent Infringement
950

In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
reconsidered (in an en banc proceeding) the appropriateness of its
951
point-of-novelty test in design patent cases. The main issue before

941. Id. at 1260, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
942. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
943. Id. at 1260–61, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
944. Id. at 1261, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
(2006)).
945. Id. at 1261, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
946. Id. at 1265, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
947. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
948. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
949. Id. at 1266, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
950. 543 F.3d 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
951. Id. at 671, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63.
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the Court was “whether the ‘point of novelty’ test should continue to
952
be used as a test for infringement of a design patent.”
The Federal Circuit began by discussing the rule of law for design
patent infringement established by the Supreme Court in Gorham Co.
953
v. White. In that case, the Supreme Court established the “ordinary
observer test” as the proper standard to determine infringement of a
954
design patent. Accordingly,
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one
955
patented is infringed by the other.

The Federal Circuit acknowledged that, since its 1984 case, Litton
956
Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., it has held that satisfying the ordinary957
observer test is not sufficient to prove similarity. Rather, the court
has also required patentees to satisfy a “point of novelty test,” which
requires that the accused design “also appropriate the novelty of the
958
Thus, in
claimed design in order to be deemed infringing.”
essence, “[f]or a design patent to be infringed . . . no matter how
similar two items look, ‘the accused device must appropriate the
novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the prior
959
Since its inception, the point-of-novelty test has been used
art.’”
both as “conjunctive” with, and “distinct” from, the ordinary-observer
960
test.
On appeal, the plaintiff urged the Federal Circuit to abandon the
961
point-of-novelty test and replace it with an ordinary-observer test
focusing on the “appearance that distinguishes the patented design
962
from the prior art.” The defendant attempted to defend the point963
of-novelty test, arguing that the Supreme Court had adopted the
964
test in an 1893 decision, Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co.

952. Id. at 670, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
953. 81 U.S. 511 (1871).
954. Egyptian Goddess, 542 F.3d at 670, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
955. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citing Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528).
956. 728 F.2d 1423, 221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
957. Egyptian Goddess, 542 F.3d at 670, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
958. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
959. Id. at 670–71, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (quoting Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444,
221 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 109).
960. Id. at 671, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
961. Id. at 672, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
962. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
963. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
964. 148 U.S. 674 (1893).
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After a lengthy discussion of Whitman Saddle, the Federal Circuit
concluded that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion suggested that it
965
was fashioning a separate point of novelty test for infringement.”
The court therefore held that the point-of-novelty test “should no
longer be used in the analysis of a claim of design patent
infringement [case] . . . . [T]he ‘ordinary observer’ test should be the
966
sole test . . . .”
Finally, the Federal Court applied the ordinaryobserver test and affirmed the summary judgment of non967
infringement.
V. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
Every issued patent is presumed to be valid, and each claim of a
patent is “presumed valid independently of the validity of other
968
claims.”
This statutory presumption of validity arises because it is
assumed that the patent examiner conducted a diligent review of the
prior art and verified that all requirements of patentability were met
969
before allowing the claims. An alleged infringer may overcome the
statutory presumption of validity only upon a showing of clear and
970
convincing evidence of invalidity.
A. Patentable Subject Matter
It is a well-known threshold requirement that, in order to qualify
for patent protection, an invention must encompass patentable
subject matter. The Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
971
of this title.” Therefore, a patent’s validity may be challenged if the
claimed subject matter does not fall within one of the four statutory
classes listed above.

965. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 673, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664–65.
966. Id. at 678, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
967. Id. at 680–83, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670–72.
968. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
969. See Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1474, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The presumption of validity . . .
carries with it a presumption the examiner did his duty and knew what claims he was
allowing.”).
970. See, e.g., Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367,
53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View
Eng’g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1377, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948, 1953 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Medtronic Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 741, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641, 645
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
971. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
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As the Supreme Court has noted, the broad language of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 reflects Congress’s intention that patentable subject matter
972
“‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s § 101 decisions have imposed
some limits. In particular, one may not obtain a patent on laws of
nature, physical phenomena, abstract intellectual concepts, or
973
In 2008, the Federal Circuit issued a key
mathematical formulas.
decision that addressed the line between such patent-ineligible
principles and patent-eligible subject matter.
974
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Bilski clarified the
test for determining what constitutes a patentable “process” under
§ 101, addressing patentability in the context of a prospective
975
business method patent. Bilski and his co-applicant sought a patent
directed to “[i]n essence, . . . a method of hedging risk in the field of
976
On review, the examiner noted that the
commodities trading.”
applicants had not limited their claims to implementation on a
computer and concluded that the claims were not limited by any
977
The examiner ultimately rejected all eleven
particular apparatus.
claims as unpatentable under § 101, and the Board of Patent Appeals
978
and Interferences sustained the rejection.
The Federal Circuit, in a 9-3 decision, affirmed the PTO’s rejection
of Bilski’s claims, holding that the claims were not directed to a
979
patent-eligible “process” under § 101.
Writing for the majority,
Chief Judge Michel explained that, while the Supreme Court has
held that a claim is not a patentable “process” if it is drawn to
“fundamental principles” (such as “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, [or] abstract ideas”), a process may be patentable if it is
980
drawn to a particular “application” of a fundamental principle.
This distinction is designed to prevent the issuance of claims that
seek to pre-empt entirely others’ use of a law of nature or abstract
981
According to the majority, the Supreme Court, particularly
idea.
982
983
through its decisions in Diamond v. Diehr and Gottschalk v. Benson,
972. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197
(1980) (citing S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952)).
973. Id.; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 201 (1978).
974. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
975. Id. at 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
976. Id. at 949, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
977. Id. at 950, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
978. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
979. Id. at 949, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
980. Id. at 952–53, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389–90 (emphasis omitted) (citing
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 187, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 7, 8 (1981)).
981. Id. at 953, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
982. 450 U.S. 185, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981).
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“enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is
tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application
of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle
984
That test is the “machine-or-transformation” test, under
itself.”
which a process is “surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied
to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
985
article into a different state or thing.”
Adopting this test, the court rejected as “inadequate” “several other
986
purported articulations of § 101 tests,” including the Freeman987
988
Walter-Abele test, the “technological arts test,” and the “useful,
989
concrete, and tangible result” test set forth in State Street Bank &
990
991
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. and In re Alappat. With
respect to the last test, the Federal Circuit noted, without explicitly
992
overruling its decision in State Street, that “those portions of our
opinions in State Street and AT&T [Corp. v. Excel Communications,
993
Inc.] relying solely on a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’
994
The Federal Circuit
analysis should no longer be relied on.”
further rejected any “categorical exclusions”—such as for all business

983. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972).
984. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
985. Id. at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (referencing Benson, 409 U.S. at 70,
175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6; Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 n.9 (1978); Cocrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)).
986. Id. at 958, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
987. Id. at 959, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. Described and refined in In re
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978), In re Walter, 618
F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980), and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902,
214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A 1982), this test required two separate steps:
“(1) determining whether the claim recites an ‘algorithm’ within the meaning of
Benson, then (2) determining whether that algorithm is ‘applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps.’” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 959 (citing Abele, 684 F.2d at 905–07, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 686).
988. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. Urged by some
amici, the technological arts test would, in the Federal Circuit’s view, “be unclear
because the meanings of the terms ‘technological arts’ and ‘technology’ are both
ambiguous and ever-changing. And no such test has ever been explicitly adopted by
the Supreme Court, this court, or our predecessor court.” Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1395.
989. Id. at 959–60, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
990. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
991. 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
992. The State Street decision, which involved a claim directed to a data processing
system for managing a portfolio of mutual funds, held that claims drawn toward
methods of conducting business should be “treated like any other process claims”
under § 101. 149 F.3d at 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
993. 172 F.3d 1352, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
994. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 n.19, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395 n.19.
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method patents—“beyond those for fundamental principles already
995
identified by the Supreme Court.”
Having concluded that the machine-or-transformation test was the
proper test to apply, the Federal Circuit then elaborated upon the
996
“transformation” prong that was at issue in the case. To qualify as a
patent-eligible process under the “transformation” prong, the
“transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed
997
process” and may not constitute merely “‘insignificant postsolution
998
[or extra-solution] activity.’” In addition, the “article” transformed
should be drawn from one of two categories of items: The first (and
most “self-evident”) category consists of “physical objects or
999
substances” that undergo chemical or physical transformations.
The second category consists of “electronic signals and electronically1000
manipulated data” that represent physical objects or substances.
As
an example of the latter category, the court cited its mixed decision
in In re Abele, in which it deemed unpatentable a claim directed to a
process of graphically displaying variances in data, but deemed
patentable a separate claim specifying that such data constituted “Xray attenuation data produced in a two dimensional field by a
1001
computed tomography scanner.”
Thus, because the latter claim
encompassed a transformation of raw data into “a particular visual
1002
depiction of a physical object” (e.g., a bone or internal organ), it
constituted patentable subject matter.
The Federal Circuit held that Bilski’s claims did not satisfy the
machine-or-transformation test because they did not transform any
1003
The applicants’ process, as
article to a different state or thing.
claimed, involved simply an exchange of legal rights to purchase a
995. Id. at 960, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
996. The court declined to elaborate upon the “machine” component of the test.
Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (“As to machine implementation, Applicants
themselves admit that the language of claim 1 does not limit any process step to any
specific machine or apparatus. . . . We leave to future cases the elaboration of the
precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular
questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process
claim to a particular machine.”).
997. Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
998. Id. at 957 & n.14, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393 & n.14 (citing Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 185, 191–92, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 10 (1981)). In addition, the
Federal Circuit specified that Diehr further held that “mere field-of-use limitations are
generally insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible process claim patent-eligible.”
Id. at 957, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
999. Id. at 962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
1000. Id. at 962–63, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
1001. Id. at 962–63, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902,
908–09, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682, 687 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
1002. Id. at 963, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
1003. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
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1004

As such, it did
particular commodity at a particular time and price.
1005
not involve a patent-eligible transformation under § 101.
“Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or
private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical
objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical
1006
objects or substances.”
This, coupled with the applicants’
admission that their claims failed to meet the “machine” prong of the
1007
test, rendered Bilski’s claims unpatentable under § 101.
Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Linn, wrote a separate concurrence,
1008
and
which reviewed the legislative history of the patent statute
concluded that, under the statute, the only patent-eligible processes
are those concerning other types of patentable subject matter, i.e.,
1009
manufactures, machines, or compositions of matter.
Judge
Newman’s dissent disagreed with the concurrence’s reading of the
legislative history to preclude entirely patents on “business
1010
method[s]” or “human activity.”
In addition, Judge Newman
1011
and
criticized the majority for “usurp[ing] the legislative role”
“redefining the word ‘process’ in the patent statute” in a way that
1012
contradicted Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent,
1013
thereby creating uncertainty in the law and threatening to impede
1014
technological progress by diminishing inventors’ incentives.
The final two dissents expressed disagreement with the majority’s
enunciation of the machine-or-transformation test, while nevertheless
1004. Id. at 964, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1005. Id. at 963–64, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1006. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1007. Id. at 964, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1008. Id. at 966–76, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400–07 (Dyk, J., concurring).
1009. Id. at 966, 974, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400, 1407.
1010. Id. at 989, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1417 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 985–89, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414–17 (describing the English Statute of
Monopolies and the English common law, and contrasting them with U.S. patent law
in order to argue that the English laws do not inform the interpretation of § 101).
1011. Id. at 997, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
1012. Id. at 977, 981, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407, 1411. In particular, according
to Judge Newman, the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr “did not propose the
‘machine-or-transformation’ test” to limit patentable processes under § 101. Id. at
981, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
1013. See id. at 994–95, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421–22 (arguing that the
majority’s opinion upset settled expectations and failed to answer numerous
questions arising from the machine-or-transformation test, such as what types of
transformations may qualify as being “central to the purpose of the claimed process,”
whether “software instructions implemented on a general purpose computer are
deemed ‘tied’ to a ‘particular machine,’” and whether the inventions of State St. and
AT&T v. Excel would pass the new test).
1014. See id. at 997, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (“The court’s decision affects
present and future rights and incentives . . . .”).
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agreeing (implicitly or explicitly) that Bilski’s claims constituted
1015
Judge Mayer dissented on the
unpatentable subject matter.
grounds that the majority opinion did not go far enough to limit
patentability under § 101, and he criticized the majority for adopting
1016
a test that is “too easily circumvented.”
According to Judge Mayer,
“State Street and AT&T should be overruled” because “[a]ffording
patent protection to business methods lacks constitutional and
statutory support, serves to hinder rather than promote innovation
1017
and usurps that which rightfully belongs in the public domain.”
Finally, Judge Rader’s dissent argued that the majority should have
affirmed the Board’s rejection simply “[b]ecause Bilski claims merely
1018
This conclusion is supported by a direct reading
an abstract idea.”
of Supreme Court precedent, which holds that “the only limits on
[patent] eligibility are inventions that embrace natural laws, natural
1019
However, wrote Judge Rader, the
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”
majority “expands (transforms?) some Supreme Court language into
1020
rules that defy the Supreme Court’s own rule,” unduly limit the
scope of patentable subject matter, and “link[] patent eligibility to
the age of iron and steel at a time of subatomic particles and
1021
terabytes.”
1022
The Federal Circuit’s order in In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten denied
a request to rehear the dispute underlying its 2007 decision in In re
1023
Nuijten, in which the court affirmed the PTO’s determination that
claims directed to an electromagnetic “signal” were unpatentable
1024
under § 101.
Judge Linn, joined by Judges Newman and Rader,
dissented from the court’s order. Judge Linn would have reheard the
case, as it “raise[d] important questions about the relationship
1025
He also argued that the panel majority
between § 101 and § 103.”
1015. Id. at 998–1011, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424–34 (Mayer, J., dissenting); id.
at 1011-15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434–37 (Rader, J., dissenting).
1016. Id. at 1008, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
1017. Id. at 998, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. In particular, Judge Mayer wrote, it
was “highly unlikely that the framers . . . intended to grant patent protection to
methods of conducting business,” in light of their keen awareness of the “odious”
monopolies on trade that led to the seventeenth-century English Statute of
Monopolies. Id. at 998–99, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424–25.
1018. Id. at 1011, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (Rader, J., dissenting).
1019. Id. at 1012–13, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1020. Id. at 1013, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
1021. Id. at 1011, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
1022. 515 F.3d 1361, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1023. 500 F.3d 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1024. See id. at 1357, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502 (explaining that electromagnetic
signals are devoid of matter and they are not “manufacture[s]” under § 101)
(alteration in original).
1025. In re Petrus A.C.M. Nuijten, 515 F.3d at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928.
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had too narrowly construed the scope of a § 101 “manufacture” to
exclude “‘transient or ‘fleeting’” things like signals, in conflict with
1026
Following the Federal Circuit’s denial of the
applicable precedent.
petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court denied the appellant’s
1027
petition for a writ of certiorari.
B. Anticipation
1028

To be patentable, an invention must be “new.”
If the claimed
subject matter of a patent is not “new,” it is said to be “anticipate[d]”
1029
In order to invalidate a claim on the grounds of
by the prior art.
anticipation, a challenger must establish that every element of the
claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either
1030
In contrast with the standard for
expressly or inherently.
obviousness, discussed below in Section C, the standard for
anticipation is one of strict identity, requiring that the prior
1031
reference set forth all claimed elements “arranged as in the claim.”
Section 102 of the patent statute establishes various ways in which a
patent may be invalidated due to anticipation, among which are
1032
and
(1) disclosure in a prior patent or printed publication
1033
(2) disclosure by public use or sale.
1.

Patents and printed publications
Under § 102 of the patent statute,
[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was . . . patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or

1026. See id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928 (discussing prior decisions’
broader “framework” for delineating patentable “manufactures,” such as those in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1980),
and In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 221 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
1027. Nuijten v. Dudas, 129 S. Ct. 70 (2008).
1028. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2008) (specifying in § 101 that only a “new and
useful” invention—or a “new and useful” improvement upon an invention—is
entitled to patent protection (emphasis added)). Section 102 defines various sources
of prior art that may negate novelty, as discussed in further detail below. Id. § 102.
1029. EMI Group N. Am. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350,
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1030. See id. at 1350, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429 (“A prior art reference
anticipates a patent claim if the reference discloses, either expressly or inherently, all
of the limitations of the claim.”) (citing Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d
760, 771, 218 U.S.P.Q. 781, 789 (Fed Cir. 1983)).
1031. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
193, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 360 F.2d 954,
960, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 298, 301 (Ct. Cl. 1966)).
1032. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2008).
1033. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country . . . more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
1034
States.

These requirements are “grounded on the principle that once an
invention is in the public domain, it is no longer patentable by
1035
anyone.”
In the case of printed publications, which are not
necessarily “published” to the same degree as issued patents,
anticipation depends upon whether the particular reference was
“publicly available” or “publicly accessible” to interested skilled
artisans prior to the “critical date” (i.e., more than one year prior to
1036
The determination of whether
the date the application was filed).
a document constitutes a printed publication under § 102 is a
question of law based upon the underlying facts of each particular
1037
case.
1038
In Leggett & Platt Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc., the Federal Circuit applied
the doctrine of inherent anticipation to affirm summary judgment of
invalidity over a previously filed patent. Plaintiff Leggett & Platt
(“L&P”) instituted an infringement action against defendant VUTEk,
a manufacturer of large-scale commercial printers, for alleged
infringement of L&P’s ‘518 patent entitled “Method and Apparatus
1039
VUTEk argued that the
for Ink Jet Printing on Rigid Panels.”
asserted ‘518 claims were anticipated by VUTEk’s ‘823 patent, which
described a printer carriage that used UV radiation to set ink after it
1040
Although the parties agreed that the
is deposited on a surface.
‘823 reference anticipated numerous limitations of the ‘518 patent,
they disputed whether it disclosed an assembly that is “effective to
impinge sufficient UV light on the ink to substantially cure the ink,”
1041
as required by the ‘518 patent.
1034. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
1035. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1896)
(citing In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361, 196 U.S.P.Q. 670, 675 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
1036. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1377–78, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1684, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 898–99, 228 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 455.
1037. See, e.g., Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d
1317, 1321, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846, 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Whether an asserted
anticipatory document qualifies as a ‘printed publication’ under § 102 is a legal
conclusion based on underlying factual determinations.”); see also In re Hall, 781 F.2d
at 899, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 455 (“The § 102 publication bar is a legal
determination based on underlying fact issues, and therefore must be approached
on a case-by-case basis.”).
1038. 537 F.3d 1349, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1039. Id. at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
1040. Id. at 1352, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
1041. Id. at 1353–54, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
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In affirming the district court’s judgment of invalidity, the Federal
Circuit relied on evidence showing that the ‘823 reference disclosed
light emitting diodes (“LEDs”) that used UV energy to cure the ink
1042
Under the strict summary
about 75–80% when used as indicated.
judgment standard, the court was unable to hold, as a matter of law,
that seventy-five to eighty percent cured constituted “substantially
1043
cure[d]” as that term was construed by the district court.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that, while the ‘823 reference
may not have expressly disclosed LEDs that “substantially cure[d]”
ink, “it inherently disclose[d] LEDs that [were] ‘effective to’ do
1044
Therefore, the prior art reference anticipated the asserted
so.”
1045
claims, rendering them invalid.
1046
In Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed
a summary judgment of anticipation on the grounds that the district
court had improperly combined elements from two separate
examples disclosed within a single prior art reference. The claim at
issue recited a payment system for processing credit card transactions
over the Internet and comprised five “links” between various
participating entities (e.g., between a customer computer and a
vending computer, between a customer computer and a payment
1047
On defendant’s motion for summary
processing computer).
judgment, the district court concluded that the claim was invalidated
by a single prior art reference, the iKP reference, which included all
five of the claimed links, albeit in two separately disclosed
1048
examples.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court had
incorrectly applied the law of anticipation, under which a prior art
reference does not anticipate unless it “not only disclose[s] all
elements of the claim within the four corners of the document,
1049
but . . . also disclose[s] those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’”
This means, the court held,
that unless a reference discloses within the four corners of the
document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the
limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the

1042. Id. at 1354, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
1043. Id. at 1354, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
1044. Id. at 1354–55, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
1045. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
1046. 545 F.3d 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1047. Id. at 1362, 1368–69, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757–58.
1048. Id. at 1369, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758.
1049. Id. at 1369, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758 (citing Connell v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

852

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:747

claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing
1050
claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

In the present case, the iKP reference disclosed two separate
systems for online credit card payment, neither of which contained
all five links combined or arranged in the same way as in the asserted
1051
claim.
Because it was erroneous to combine different elements of
the separate systems merely because they all appeared within the
same prior art reference, the district court’s grant of summary
1052
judgment of invalidity was reversed.
1053
In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., the court affirmed the validity
of a patent on a dextrorotatory isomer, where prior patents
describing its chemical racemate did not sufficiently disclose or
1054
The patent
enable the separation of the particular isomer claimed.
at issue covered a chemical compound commonly known as
clopidogrel bisulfate, which is sold under the brand name Plavix to
1055
In particular, the asserted claim
treat and prevent blood clots.
recited the “dextrorotatory isomer”—one of a pair of stereoisomers
of a compound, which is identical to its counterpart (the levo-rotatory
isomer) in all aspects except its orientation in three-dimensional
1056
space.
The racemate—a combination of both stereoisomers—was
disclosed in two prior patents as part of a general class of
1057
In response to allegations of infringement, the
compounds.
alleged infringer argued that the prior disclosure of the racemate
1058
anticipated the asserted claims, rendering them invalid.
The
district court held that the prior art’s disclosure of a particular genus
of compounds did not anticipate the specific isolated stereoisomer
claimed, and that the earlier patent did not sufficiently enable one of
ordinary skill to make the invention without undue
1059
experimentation.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's
determination that the references did not constitute anticipating
disclosures of the detrorotatory isomer, where they contained only
general statements that the compounds (including the racemate)

1050.
1051.
1052.
1053.
1054.
1055.
1056.
1057.
1058.
1059.

Id. at 1371, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id. at 1371, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
550 F.3d 1075, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1084, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375–76.
Id. at 1077, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
Id. at 1077, 1080, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371, 1373.
Id. at 1078, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
Id. at 1083, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
Id. at 1084–85, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376–77.
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consisted of stereoisomers.1060 As noted in Net MoneyIN, an
anticipating reference must disclose all elements of a claim “arranged
1061
without requiring one of ordinary skill to pick,
as in the claim”
choose, and combine various elements not directly related to each
1062
other in the cited reference.
In addition, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court did not err when it concluded that the prior art
1063
references were not adequately enabling.
Anticipation “requires
the specific description as well as enablement of the subject matter at
1064
As the court noted, “[a]ny presumption of enablement of
issue.”
prior art does not exclude consideration of whether undue
1065
experimentation would be required to achieve enablement.”
In
this case, the evidence established that the process of separating
stereoisomers (into their dextrorotatory and levo-rotatory forms) was
known to be both difficult and unpredictable, thus requiring
1066
substantial experimentation even by those skilled in the art.
Therefore, there was no clear error in the district court’s finding that
the prior art reference would not have enabled a skilled artisan to
1067
isolate the dextrorotatory isomer of clopidogrel.
Similarly, the court in Impax Laboratories, Inc. v. Aventis
1068
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. affirmed the district court’s determination that
a prior art reference did not anticipate claims directed to a drug
1069
treatment, where the reference was not enabling.
According to the
Federal Circuit, “the trial court’s findings properly support[ed] its
conclusion that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have needed to
1070
The
experiment unduly to gain possession of the invention.”
asserted claims were directed to the use of riluzole to treat
1071
The
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”) or Lou Gehrig’s disease.
record established that the alleged prior art patent, which disclosed
several diseases and many thousands of compounds, only made
passing reference to riluzole, without discussing its use as a treatment

1060. Id. at 1084, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
1061. Id. at 1083, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1751, 1758 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
1062. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (referencing In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587,
172 U.S.P.Q. 524, 526 (C.C.P.A. 1972)).
1063. Id. at 1085, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376–77.
1064. Id. at 1083, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
1065. Id. at 1085, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1066. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1067. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376–77.
1068. 545 F.3d 1312, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1069. Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1070. Id. at 1315, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
1071. Id. at 1314, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
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Moreover, the dosage guidelines in the alleged prior art
for ALS.
reference were general and provided insufficient guidance regarding
1073
The reference also failed to provide
a treatment regimen for ALS.
1074
working examples.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded, the
reference did not enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to use
1075
riluzole as a treatment for ALS, and the patent was not invalid.
1076
In PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
considered whether the presumption of patent validity extends to the
1077
PowerOasis asserted two patents that
question of priority date.
derived from a June 2000 continuation-in-part (“CIP”) application,
which itself derived from an original application filed in February
1078
The alleged infringer, T-Mobile, argued that the asserted
1997.
claims were anticipated by the MobileStar Network, which was in
public use more than one year prior to the filing of the CIP
application. Because PowerOasis conceded that the MobileStar
Network included all the limitations of the asserted claims,
PowerOasis argued that the claims were entitled to the priority date
of the original 1997 application, which predated the MobileStar
1079
Network.
The district court placed the burden of proof on
1080
PowerOasis to establish entitlement to the earlier priority date.
After determining that the original patent’s written description did
not adequately disclose the later-issued CIP claims, the district court
granted T-Mobile’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity due to
1081
anticipation.
Affirming the decision on appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected
PowerOasis’s assertion that the presumption of validity should also
include a presumption that CIP claims must be accorded the earliest
1082
In the present case, the PTO had made no
effective filing date.
determination regarding the priority date of the claims, either in the
1083
The
context of a rejection or in the context of an interference.
court explained: “When neither the PTO nor the Board has
previously considered priority, there is simply no reason to presume

1072.
1073.
1074.
1075.
1076.
1077.
1078.
1079.
1080.
1081.
1082.
1083.

Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id. at 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id. at 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
522 F.3d 1299, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1301, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
Id. at 1301–02, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
Id. at 1302–03, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
Id. at 1303, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
Id. at 1304, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
Id. at 1304–05, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388–89.
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that claims in a CIP application are entitled to the effective filing date
1084
of an earlier filed application.”
That conclusion, the court explained, did not alter T-Mobile’s
burden, as the moving party, to prove invalidity by clear and
1085
convincing evidence.
Because PowerOasis did not dispute that the
MobileStar Network was in public use more than one year prior to
the filing of the CIP application, and it conceded that the MobileStar
Network would constitute § 102(b) prior art if not afforded the
1086
Therefore, “the
earlier filing date, T-Mobile had met its burden.
burden was on PowerOasis to come forward with evidence to the
1087
contrary,”
i.e., establishing entitlement to an earlier priority
1088
Upon review of the record, the Federal Circuit agreed with
date.
the district court’s determination that the asserted claims were not
entitled to the earlier filing date because the original written
1089
description did not support the later-issued asserted claims.
The Federal Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Technology
1090
Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., when it affirmed the district court’s
judgment that certain asserted claims were not entitled to an earlier
1091
filing date and were therefore invalid over the prior art.
The court
also clarified the burdens of proof raised in PowerOasis, distinguishing
between the burden of persuasion (“the ultimate burden assigned to
a party who must prove something to a specified degree”), and the
burden of production, also known as the burden of “going forward
1092
Because the patent statute imposes a presumption
with evidence.”
of validity,
a challenger has the burden of persuasion to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the contrary is true. That ultimate
burden never shifts, however much the burden of going forward
may jump from one party to another as the issues in the case are
1093
raised and developed.

Therefore, the court explained,
PowerOasis says nothing more than, and should be understood to
say, that once a challenger (the alleged infringer) has introduced
sufficient evidence to put at issue whether there is prior art alleged
1084.
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.
1089.
1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.

Id. at 1305, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
Id. at 1305–06, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
Id. at 1306–10, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389–94.
545 F.3d 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1320, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867–68.
Id. at 1326–27, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
Id. at 1329, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
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to anticipate the claims being asserted, prior art that is dated
earlier than the apparent effective date of the asserted patent
claim, the patentee has the burden of going forward with evidence
1094
and argument to the contrary.
1095

In SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems, Inc.,
the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s summary
judgment of invalidity on four SRI patents, because there was
insufficient evidence to establish that an SRI prior art paper was
publicly accessible—and thus a “printed publication”—under
1096
§ 102(b).
The patents at issue pertained to methods for securing
1097
SRI
computer systems and detecting suspicious network activity.
had described its invention in a paper analyzing the live traffic of
1098
TCP/IP gateways—the “Live Traffic” paper.
Approximately one
year and three months before SRI filed the priority patent
application, one of the inventors emailed the Live Traffic paper to a
program chair at the Internet Society, which was soliciting papers for
1099
The email noted that the Live Traffic
an upcoming symposium.
paper would also be available on SRI’s file transfer protocol (“FTP”)
1100
server, at a particular FTP address.
In SRI’s later patent
infringement action, the defendants moved for summary judgment
that all of the patents were invalidated by the prior art Live Traffic
1101
The district court granted the motion, holding that the
paper.
Live Traffic paper constituted a “printed publication” under § 102(b)
1102
and thus anticipated the claims of the patents-in-suit.
Vacating and remanding the district court’s decision as to the Live
1103
Traffic paper, the Federal Circuit held that the record contained
insufficient factual support for defendants’ assertion that the paper
1104
was publicly accessible by virtue of its location on the FTP server.
Like an uncatalogued graduate thesis stored in a remote library

1094. Id. at 1328–29, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
1095. 511 F.3d 1186, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1096. Id. at 1195, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
1097. Id. at 1188, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
1098. Id. at 1188, 1190, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490, 1492.
1099. Id. at 1190, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
1100. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
1101. Id. at 1192, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
1102. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
1103. Id. at 1198, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498. The court also affirmed a portion
of the district court’s decision, in which it granted summary judgment of invalidity as
to one of the patents on the grounds that a separate publication—the EMERALD
1997 paper—anticipated the claims. Id. at 1192–94, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493–
95.
1104. Id. at 1195, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
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1105

location, the Live Traffic paper was placed on SRI’s own FTP server
1106
Unlike
without an index, catalogue, or any other research tools.
1107
posters displayed at a publicized professional conference, the Live
Traffic paper was posted to a proprietary FTP server and known only
to a handful of non-SRI individuals charged with peer-reviewing the
1108
It was thus more akin to
unfinished paper for future publication.
1109
“posters at a vacant and unpublicized conference.”
Although the
record showed seven prior instances in which SRI directed a person
to other documents within the same subdirectory, there was “no
suggestion” that such individuals could freely navigate through the
1110
directory structure or that they “would—unprompted—look there
for an [entirely separate] unpublicized paper with a relatively obscure
1111
filename.”
Judge Moore dissented, arguing that the court should have
affirmed the district court’s ruling of invalidity based on the Live
1112
Traffic paper.
In particular, she argued that the defendants’
unrefuted evidence indicated that SRI’s FTP server was navigable and
1113
used by the cyber security community at the relevant time period.
She maintained that “[t]his case is quite unlike the uncatalogued,
1114
unshelved thesis in a general university library” because SRI placed
the paper on an FTP server used for cyber security, in a subdirectory
named for a well-known cyber security project, with a file name that
1115
abbreviated an annual cyber security symposium.
Moreover, the
factors governing public dissemination—length of time available
(seven days), the expertise of the target audience (sophisticated
computer scientists who knew how to use the FTP server), reasonable
expectation of copying (no confidentiality labels or protective
measures to dissuade copying), and ease of copying (simple in FTP
tool)—supported the conclusion that the Live Traffic paper was
1116
publicly available prior to the critical date.
1105. See In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1358–59, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 673
(C.C.P.A. 1978) (applicant’s uncataloged, unshelved thesis was not a “publication”).
1106. Id. at 1196, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
1107. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1347–50, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117,
1117–20 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing the slide presentation given by applicants at a
meeting of the American Association of Cereal Chemists, which was printed and
pasted on poster boards to be displayed for the next two-and-a-half days).
1108. Id. at 1196–97, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
1109. Id. at 1197, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
1110. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
1111. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
1112. Id. at 1198, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
1113. Id. at 1200, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1114. Id. at 1202, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
1115. Id. at 1201–02, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500–01.
1116. Id. at 1202–05, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501–03.
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Another decision discussing the “public accessibility” of a printed
publication under § 102 was Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade
1117
in which the Federal Circuit disagreed with the
Commission,
International Trade Commission’s (“ITC”) determination that an
alleged prior art reference was not publicly available prior to the
1118
The prior art at issue was the Global System for
critical date.
Mobile Communications (“GSM”) standard, a comprehensive set of
1119
technical specifications for a mobile network.
The ITC had
concluded that the GSM standard was analogous to the publication in
1120
Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., which comprised sensitive
documents about a complex military system and was maintained in a
1121
On appeal, however, the
restricted-access proprietary library.
Federal Circuit concluded that the record showed wide circulation of
the GSM documents prior to the critical date: “publicly available”
versions distributed as “consistent sets”; exchange of GSM
specifications between U.S. companies and their European
subsidiaries; and even the sale of over 25,000 copies of a “GSM
1122
Therefore, the GSM standard was “sufficiently accessible, at
bible.”
1123
least to the public interested in the art.”
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit affirmed the validity of the patentin-suit under § 102, on the grounds that the GSM standard did not
1124
constitute a single anticipating reference.
Indeed, the record
indicated that the hundreds of specifications making up the GSM
standard were authored by various sets of authors at different times
and consisted of hundreds of individual specifications, each
1125
Moreover,
“stand[ing] as a separate document in its own right.”
the internal cross-references to other parts of the GSM standard did
not constitute incorporation by reference so as to warrant
1126
consolidation.
For those reasons, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
ITC’s determination that the GSM standard did not anticipate the
patent claims under § 102. The court further foreclosed the
availability of an obviousness argument, holding that “[t]his court

1117. 545 F.3d 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1118. Id. at 1345, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1119. Id. at 1350, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063–64.
1120. 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1121. Kyocera Wireless, 545 F.3d at 1350, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
1122. Id. at 1350–51, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
1123. Id. at 1351, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065 (citing In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899,
228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation omitted).
1124. Id. at 1352, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
1125. Id. at 1351, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
1126. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
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need not engage in an obviousness inquiry when [respondent] did
1127
not assert relevant obviousness arguments at the proper time.”
Similarly, where a patent holder raised a new issue of fact on
1128
appeal, in Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., the Federal
Circuit refused to disturb the district court’s initial judgment. The
asserted claims, which described a mobile communication system
using a code division multiple access (“CDMA”) scheme, were held
invalid by the district court, primarily on the basis of defendant’s
expert testimony showing the presence of each limitation in a prior
1129
On appeal, the patent holder asserted, for the first
art reference.
time, that the prior art reference failed to disclose a particular
1130
Noting that that patent holder had
“synchronization” limitation.
ample opportunities to present its arguments to the trial court, the
Federal Circuit “decline[d] to remand this case to the district court to
decide an argument as to what a prior art reference discloses [a fact
finding] when that argument, without any justification, is raised for
1131
the first time on appeal.”
The court chastised the patent holder:
“Appellate courts review district court judgments; we do not find
1132
facts.”
2.

Public use and on-sale bar
Section 102(b) of 35 U.S.C. bars the ability to patent an invention
that was “in public use or on sale in this country[] more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
1133
States.”
Therefore, once an inventor publicly uses or sells an
invention, she has one year in which to file a patent application. As
the Supreme Court has noted, underlying both the public use bar
and the on-sale bar is a “reluctance to allow an inventor to remove
1134
existing knowledge from public use.”
The determination of patent
validity under § 102(b)’s public use or on-sale bar is a question of law
1135
based on underlying facts.
1136
In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court set forth a
two-pronged test that has been applied to both the public use and on1127. Id. at 1352, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
1128. 527 F.3d 1318, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1129. Id. at 1320–22, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
1130. Id. at 1322, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
1131. Id. at 1324, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
1132. Id. at 1323, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053.
1133. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2008).
1134. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645
(1998).
1135. Netscape Communs. Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1136. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
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1137

Under this test, the on-sale bar
sale bars under § 102(b).
invalidates a patent if, prior to the critical date (1) the invention was
the subject of a commercial sale or offer for sale; and (2) the
1138
Similarly, the public use bar
invention was ready for patenting.
mandates invalidation if, prior to the critical date, (1) the invention
1139
A
was in public use; and (2) the invention was ready for patenting.
party may show that an invention was “ready for patenting” in at least
two ways: (1) by demonstrating that the invention was reduced to
practice; or (2) by demonstrating that the inventor had prepared
drawings or other written descriptions of the invention that were
sufficiently specific to enable one skilled in the art to practice the
1140
invention.
Even in the case of a pre-critical-date public use or sale, however, a
patentee may nevertheless avoid invalidation of the patent by
establishing that the prior public use or sale was undertaken for the
1141
purpose of experimentation, in an effort to “perfect” the invention.
Under this “experimental use” exception, an inventor’s limited
testing in public does not constitute “public use” for the purpose of
§ 102(b), so long as the inventor maintains control over the use of
1142
1143
the invention and does not attempt to profit by it.
In E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. MacDermid Printing Solutions,
1144
LLC,
the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its
1137. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1741, 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he [Pfaff] Court’s analysis of the statutory
term ‘invention,’ or the ready for patenting prong, applies to both . . . parts of
section 102(b), ‘on sale’ and ‘public use.’ Thus, the Supreme Court’s ‘ready for
patenting test’ applies to the public use bar under § 102(b).”).
1138. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646–47.
1139. See Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1379, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 (“A bar under
§ 102(b) arises where, before the critical date, the invention is in public use and
ready for patenting.”).
1140. Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1705, 1712 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1141. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64–65, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645; see also Elizabeth v.
Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877) (holding that an inventor’s
public use “by way of experiment” does not bar patentability).
1142. See, e.g., Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen.
Elec. Co., 417 F.3d 1203, 1214–15, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“[C]ontrol and customer awareness ordinarily must be proven if experimentation is
to be found.”); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1100, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[I]f the inventor has no control over the alleged
experiments, he is not experimenting. If he does not inquire about the testing or
receive reports concerning the results, similarly, he is not experimenting.”); In re
Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1581, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1890, 1894 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he inventor must keep the invention under his own control.”).
1143. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645–46 (describing the onsale bar, which prevents an invention from being patented if it has been on sale any
time before the patent application is filed) (quoting Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 137).
1144. 525 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

2009]

2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

861

discretion in failing to accord a patent the priority date of the
1145
original provisional application, as required by the patent statute.
In that case, the patentee changed its position over the course of the
district court proceedings by asserting an earlier priority date in light
1146
of the accused infringer’s assertions of invalidity under § 102.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that the undisputed facts
contained in the prosecution history established that the patent,
which derived from a non-provisional application, was entitled to the
1147
filing date of the earlier provisional application as a matter of law.
Because the provisional and non-provisional applications were
identical and shared a common inventor, because the nonprovisional was filed within twelve months of the provisional, and
finally because the non-provisional explicitly referenced the
provisional in the application, 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) of the patent
statute mandated that the non-provisional filing be given “the same
effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the
1148
provisional application.”
1149
In American Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., the Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court’s refusal to grant summary judgment of
invalidity, over a jury verdict to the contrary, where the prior public
1150
The asserted patent was
use of the invention was experimental.
directed to a wheelchair restraint system for use in mass transit
1151
vehicles.
The accused infringer, USSC Group, argued that the
claims were invalid for being in public use more than one year prior
1152
to the December 1996 filing date.
In particular, USSC pointed to
the inventors’ failure to obtain formal confidentiality agreements
1153
when disclosing the device to others before December 1995.
In upholding the district court’s denial of USSC’s motion for
summary judgment, the Federal Circuit held that
the fact that the inventors revealed the prototype to a select group
of individuals without a written confidentiality agreement is not
dispositive. When access to an invention is clearly limited and
controlled by the inventor, depending upon the relationships of
1145. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
1146. Id. at 1355–56, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736.
1147. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741.
1148. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1)
(2008)); see also id. at 1359–63, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737–39 (discussing the
requirements for a non-provisional application to claim priority over a provisional
application).
1149. 514 F.3d 1262, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1150. Id. at 1265, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1151. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1152. Id. at 1267, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1153. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
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the observers and the inventor, an understanding of confidentiality
1154
can be implied.

Here, the record established that the inventors had maintained
1155
control of the invention throughout the pre-critical-date period.
The periodic demonstrations to a limited number of friends and
colleagues were used to solicit feedback regarding “evolving
1156
All disclosures
prototypes” as the invention was being developed.
occurred in an out-of-service bus—indeed, there was no evidence that
a prototype was placed in service before December 1995—and the
inventors consistently removed the invention from the bus for storage
1157
under their control.
Therefore, these early disclosures fell within
the experimental use exception, and the district court appropriately
1158
confirmed the jury’s verdict that the patent was valid.
In contrast, the court in Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt,
1159
reversed the district court’s judgment applying the
Inc.
experimental use exception and concluded that the claimed
1160
invention was invalid for being on sale prior to the critical date.
Sewing machine manufacturer Atlanta Attachment had developed, in
response to a request from potential customer Sealy, Inc., the
1161
The asserted
invention that became the subject of the ‘603 patent.
claim of the ‘603 patent was directed to an automatic gusset ruffler
1162
More than a
machine for use in producing pillowtop mattresses.
year prior to the critical date, Atlanta Attachment sent several
prototypes to Sealy for testing and approval, along with offers to sell
1163
Atlanta Attachment also sent an
production models to Sealy.
invoice, which Sealy paid, for one prototype that embodied all
1164
elements of the asserted claim.
Although Sealy ultimately decided
not to buy the machines, Atlanta Attachment applied for a patent on
its invention and later sued Leggett & Platt for patent
1165
infringement.
Applying the two-pronged test described by the Supreme Court in
Pfaff, the Federal Circuit held that claimed invention was both (1) the
subject of a pre-critical-date commercial offer for sale and (2) ready
1154.
1155.
1156.
1157.
1158.
1159.
1160.
1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.
1165.

Id. at 1268, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86.
Id. at 1267–68, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685–86.
Id. at 1268, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
516 F.3d 1361, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1363, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996–97.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1997.
Id. at 1363, 1365, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1997–98.
Id. at 1364, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1997.
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for patenting at the time of the offer, thus rendering the asserted
1166
In the
claim invalid under the on-sale bar provision of § 102(b).
case of the prototype embodying all elements of the claim, Atlanta
Attachment had offered the machine for sale (by sending an invoice)
and Sealy had accepted (by paying the invoice). Thus, the invention
was the subject of an actual commercial sale, not merely an offer for
1167
sale.
The court also rejected Atlanta Attachment’s argument that
1168
In giving the
its sales to Sealy qualified as “experimental use.”
prototypes to Sealy to conduct its own testing, Atlanta Attachment
relinquished control over the prototypes and the alleged
1169
experimentation.
Moreover, “once there has been a commercial
1170
Finally, the
offer, there can be no experimental use exception.”
Federal Circuit concluded that the invention was “ready for
patenting” under Pfaff because it had been reduced to practice at the
time of the sale of the prototype, even though other improvements
1171
were later made.
In a separate concurrence, Judge Prost called attention to “the
confusion in our caselaw” regarding the application of the
1172
experimental use doctrine to the two-prong test set forth in Pfaff.
In particular, wrote Judge Prost, the Pfaff decision distinguished
between “ready for patenting” (the second prong of the inquiry) and
1173
Nevertheless, numerous post-Pfaff
“reduction to practice.”
decisions have held that the experimental use exception is
1174
categorically unavailable once the invention is reduced to practice.
Judge Prost disagreed with this position, noting that “[i]f we were to
accept that reduction to practice eliminates availability of the
experimental use doctrine as a whole, the continuing viability of that
doctrine would exist only between the time an invention is ready for
1175
patenting and the time it is reduced to practice.”
This would
1166. Id. at 1367, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
1167. Id. at 1365, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1998.
1168. Id. at 1366, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
1169. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1998.
1170. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
1171. Id. at 1367–68, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
1172. Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000 (Prost, J., concurring).
1173. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
1174. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000–01 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods,
Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1371 n.10, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1714 n.10 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1354, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1769, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 2002); New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg.
Comp. 298 F.3d 1290, 1297, 1299, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843, 1850, 1851 (Fed. Cir.
2002); EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Sys., Inc., 276 F.3d 1347, 1357, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., concurring); Zacharin v. United States, 213
F.3d 1366, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
1175. Id. at 1368–69, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001.
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dramatically restrict inventors’ abilities to continue developing an
1176
Therefore, in her view, even after creating a complete
invention.
invention that is ready for patenting, inventors “should be able to
continue to privately develop any claimed aspect of that invention
without risking invalidation, if they conduct development activities in
a way that is neither public nor simply commercial, even if there is
some commercial benefit to the inventor[s] in connection with the
1177
experimental use.”
Notwithstanding Judge Prost’s concurrence in Atlanta Attachment,
the Federal Circuit issued two additional opinions in 2008 affirming
the rule that reduction to practice eliminates the availability of the
experimental use exception to the on-sale bar. In re Cygnus
1178
Telecommunications Technology, LLC Patent Litigation
affirmed the
district court’s ruling of invalidity explicitly “based on this court’s law
1179
that ‘experimental use cannot occur after a reduction to practice.’”
There, the inventor’s own declaration stated that the invention—a
computerized call-back system for placing telephone calls from
abroad—had been reduced to practice by the time the inventor
began charging two “beta testers” a per-minute rate to use the
1180
system.
Other information provided by the inventor further
established that the system was functional and embodied all
1181
limitations of the claim prior to the sales to the beta testers.
Thus,
the district court had correctly declined to apply the experimental
1182
use exception, and the patent was invalid under § 102(b).
1183
Similarly, in In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, the Federal Circuit
reiterated that “experimental use cannot negate a public use when it
is shown that the invention was reduced to practice before the
1184
In this matter, which involved patents on the
experimental use.”
drug omeprazole (the active ingredient in Prilosec), the court
concluded that the district court had misapplied the law when it
found that the experimental use exception would prevent

1176. Id. at 1369, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001.
1177. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2001 (emphasis added).
1178. 536 F.3d 1343, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1179. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (citing Cont’l Plastic Containers v.
Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1180. Id. at 1354–55, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1181. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1182. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808–09.
1183. 536 F.3d 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1184. Id. at 1372, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (acknowledging, as a “But see,”
Judge Prost’s concurrence in Atlanta Attachment).
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invalidation even if the invention had been reduced to practice before
1185
or during the experimentation period.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
determination that clinical studies investigating the claimed drug
formulation did not qualify as invalidating public uses under §
102(b), on the grounds that the drug was not yet ready for patenting
1186
at the time of the clinical trials.
The alleged infringers argued that
the claimed drug formulation had been successfully reduced to
1187
The
practice and was therefore “ready for patenting” under Pfaff.
1188
district court found otherwise, and the Federal Circuit agreed.
Although it was undisputed that the formulation had been
produced prior to the trials, this “[did] not establish that the
[patentees] had determined that the invention would work for its
intended purpose” of increasing in vivo drug stability without
1189
Moreover,
significantly compromising long-term storage stability.
the fact that the formulation was “more stable” than prior
formulations was insufficient to prove that the drug was stable enough
1190
Finally, even if it was well-known before
to be used in treatment.
the critical date that omeprazole was a safe and effective treatment,
the challenge faced by the inventors was not providing safe and
effective treatment, but developing a formulation that could be
delivered to the small intestine and overcome the drug’s sensitivity to
the acidic environment—a goal that had not been achieved before
1191
Thus, there was no clear error in the district
the critical date.
court’s finding that the claims were not ready for patenting—and
1192
thus not invalidating—under § 102(b).
C. Obviousness
In keeping with the goal of limiting patent monopolies to cases of
true innovation, the patent statute also bars the patentability of
inventions that are obvious. In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
provides that a claimed invention is unpatentable “if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious

1185.
1186.
1187.
1188.
1189.
1190.
1191.
1192.

Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
Id. at 1373–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873–74.
Id. at 1373, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
Id. at 1373–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873–75.
Id. at 1373–74, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874–75.
Id. at 1374–75, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874–75.
Id. at 1375, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
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at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
1193
in the art.”
Obviousness is a legal question, based upon underlying factual
1194
determinations.
The relevant factual inquiries are (1) the scope
and content of the prior art, (2) the level of ordinary skill in the art,
(3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art,
and (4) evidence of secondary factors (also called objective indicia of
non-obviousness), such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
1195
needs, and the failure of others.
In contrast with anticipation, obviousness may be proven by
combining elements disclosed in various separate prior art
references. In evaluating obviousness based on a combination of
references, the Supreme Court has noted that “it can be important to
identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill
in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed
1196
As explained in the Supreme Court’s 2007
new invention does.”
1197
decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., obviousness must
be assessed in a flexible manner, as the motivation to combine
references can be triggered by “any need or problem known in the
1198
field of endeavor at the time of invention.”
Nevertheless, a
“combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
1199
results.”
In deciding KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
strict use of the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test,
under which a patent claim is only found obvious if the prior art, the
nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill
in the art evidences some motivation or suggestion to combine the
1200
prior art teachings.
1201
In Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp., the Federal Circuit
addressed the relationship between the patent-law doctrines of
anticipation and obviousness. The underlying dispute involved
1193. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2008).
1194. Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1181, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17,
148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966)).
1195. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467.
1196. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,
1396 (2007).
1197. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).
1198. See id. at 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (reasserting the applicability of
the Graham analytical framework).
1199. Id. at 416, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
1200. Id. at 418–19, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
1201. 543 F.3d 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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patents relating to high-performance liquid chromatography, a
process of identifying and separating various chemical compounds in
1202
At the jury trial, the alleged infringer, Waters Corp.,
a liquid.
argued that the asserted claims were anticipated by seven different
1203
prior art references.
Waters also argued that the seven references,
either separately or in various combinations, rendered the claims
1204
obvious.
Over Waters’s objection, the district court submitted
obviousness, but not anticipation, to the jury, reasoning that
1205
The jury found, inter alia,
anticipation is “a subset of obviousness.”
1206
that the claims were not obvious over the prior art references.
On
appeal, Waters asserted that the district court had erred by granting
judgment as a matter of law on the anticipation issue, and the Federal
1207
Circuit agreed.
The two-judge majority of the panel held that the district court had
erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider anticipation without
making the requisite finding that no reasonable jury could have
1208
concluded that the references anticipated the claims.
Instead, the
district court had characterized Waters’s anticipation position as
“iffy,” which did not foreclose the possibility of a favorable jury
1209
verdict.
The majority went on to assert that, “[w]hile it is
commonly understood that prior art references that anticipate a
claim will usually render that claim obvious, it is not necessarily true
1210
that a verdict of nonobviousness forecloses anticipation.”
Anticipation and obviousness are separate statutory conditions of
1211
patentability and involve distinct tests.
Therefore, the majority
refused to accept the dissent’s assertion that every anticipated claim is
1212
The court stated:
also obvious.
1202. Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
1203. Id. at 1358–59, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1204. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1205. Id. at 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1206. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1207. Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1208. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1209. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1210. Id. at 1364, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
1211. Id. at 1363–64, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910–11.
1212. Id. at 1364 n.2, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911 n.2. As an example, the
majority posed the following hypothetical:
Consider . . . a claim directed toward a particular alloy of metal. The
claimed metal alloy may have all the hallmarks of a nonobvious invention—
there was a long felt but unresolved need for an alloy with the properties of
the claimed alloy, others may have tried and failed to produce such an alloy,
and, once disclosed, the claimed alloy may have received high praise and
seen commercial success. Nevertheless, there may be a centuries-old
alchemy textbook that, while not describing any metal alloys, describes a
method that, if practiced precisely, actually produces the claimed alloy.
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A court cannot refuse to submit the issue of anticipation to the
jury simply because the accused infringer has also asserted an
obviousness defense. It is for the litigants—not the court—to make
the strategic decision as to whether to assert one, both, or neither
1213
of these defenses in a jury trial.

The majority therefore reversed the district court’s grant of
judgment as a matter of law on anticipation and remanded for
1214
further proceedings.
Judge Mayer dissented from the majority’s decision to remand the
issue of anticipation to the trial court. He agreed that the tests for
establishing obviousness and anticipation are separate and that a
district court cannot refuse to submit an anticipation defense to a
jury simply because the accused infringer had also presented an
1215
obviousness defense.
Nevertheless, Judge Mayer maintained that
once the jury had already determined that the claims were not
obvious, there was no logical reason to remand the case to consider
1216
anticipation.
The jury here considered all of the allegedly anticipating prior
art references, but nonetheless returned a verdict that the asserted
claims are non-obvious. If a series of prior art references did not
render the claimed invention obvious, how could one of those
references contain each and every element of the claimed
1217
invention so as to render it anticipated?

Therefore, Judge Mayer would have affirmed the district court’s
1218
directed verdict on anticipation.
A series of Federal Circuit decisions in 2008, addressing the
1219
Supreme Court’s April 2007 decision in KSR, clarified the test for
determining obviousness based on a combination of prior art
1220
references. The dispute in Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp.
represented a “textbook case of [obviousness] when the asserted
claims involve a combination of familiar elements according to
1221
known methods that does no more than yield predictable results.”
The patent at issue was directed to a method and device for
While the prior art alchemy textbook inherently anticipates the claim under
§ 102, the claim may not be said to be obvious under § 103.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911 n.2.
1213. Id. at 1364–65, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
1214. Id. at 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
1215. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
1216. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
1217. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
1218. Id. at 1377, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
1219. Supra discussion Part I.A.1.
1220. 520 F.3d 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1221. Id. at 1344, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
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1222

electrocuting small rodents, using an electrical resistive switch.
The undisputed facts showed that a prior art device, the Gopher
Zapper, disclosed all elements of the asserted claims, with the
exception of the type of switch used: the Gopher Zapper used a
mechanical pressure switch, rather than an electrical resistive
1223
The use of resistive switches, however, was taught in two
switch.
prior patents, the Dye and Madsen references, which both described
devices for applying electrical current to an external body and were
directed toward solving the same problem as the patent-in-suit—the
tendency for mechanical switches to malfunction in damp and dirty
1224
environments.
In light of this evidence, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the patentee’s device was invalid as embodying merely
an obvious combination of prior art teachings to yield predictable
1225
results.
Because the objective indicia of non-obviousness were
insufficient to overcome such a clear case of obviousness, the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the accused infringer’s
1226
motion for judgment as a matter of law as to obviousness.
In Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v.
1227
Buffalo Technology, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit concluded that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to the motivation to combine
prior art references to render the patent obvious, and thus, the
district court had erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
1228
The patents-in-suit were aimed at addressing a problem
patentee.
affecting indoor wireless local area networks—called the “multipath
problem”—in which multiple, echoed signals (caused by radio waves
1229
“bouncing” off objects in a room) interfere with the main signal.
Before the district court, the alleged infringer argued that the claims
were obvious in light of several combinations of prior art
1230
references.
Applying the pre-KSR teaching, suggestion, and
motivation (“TSM”) test, the district court granted summary
judgment of non-obviousness, distinguishing between the general
motivation to address a problem (which it deemed insignificant to
prove obviousness) and a specific motivation to pursue a particular
1231
solution to the problem.
The Federal Circuit vacated the district
1222.
1223.
1224.
1225.
1226.
1227.
1228.
1229.
1230.
1231.

Id. at 1339–40, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111.
Id. at 1344, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
542 F.3d 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1378, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
Id. at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
Id. at 1372–73, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570–71.
Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
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court’s determination in light of the new analytical framework
1232
discussed in KSR.
The court explained that the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR had
criticized the Federal Circuit’s TSM test for focusing solely on the
1233
precise problem that an inventor sought to solve.
Rather, the
Court ruled in KSR that “any need or problem known in the field of
endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can
provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner
1234
Therefore, the alleged infringer had raised a valid
claimed.”
argument that all of the relied-upon references addressed a common
problem, the “multipath” problem for wireless radio frequency
1235
This, coupled with the patentee’s
communication systems.
counterargument that the prior art presented a different problem,
created a factual issue regarding the motivation to combine
1236
The Federal Circuit accordingly remanded the matter
references.
to the district court for further proceedings on the obviousness
1237
issue.
1238
The court in Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc. affirmed the
trial court’s decision to set aside a jury verdict of non-obviousness
where the jury improperly failed to consider a piece of relevant prior
art. The infringement suit involved a patented system for tracking
items, such as silicone semiconductor wafers, in a manufacturing
1239
facility.
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that one
prior art patent, the “Hesser” reference, disclosed “essentially the
1240
same structure” as the patent-in-suit.
The sole material difference
was that the Hesser reference disclosed that tracking information was
communicated over a bus, while the claims of the asserted patent
1241
The alleged
recited communication by way of a multiplexer.
infringers had argued that the Hesser reference, in combination with
the well-known interchangeability between a bus and a multiplexer in
1242
the relevant prior art, rendered the claims invalid for obviousness.
Following a trial, the jury concluded that the Hesser reference did
not constitute relevant prior art and therefore deemed the asserted
1232. Id. at 1374, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
1233. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
1234. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,
1389–90 (2007).
1235. Commonwealth Scientific, 542 F.3d at 1375, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
1236. Id. at 1375–76, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
1237. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1238. 544 F.3d 1310, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1239. Id. at 1312, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
1240. Id. at 1314, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
1241. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626–27.
1242. Id. at 1314–15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
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1243

Following post-trial briefing, the Supreme
claims non-obvious.
Court rendered its decision in KSR, and the district court, after
hearing additional arguments in light of KSR, set aside the jury
1244
verdict and entered judgment of obviousness as a matter of law.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that the jury had erred in
1245
Hesser was
finding that the Hesser reference was not prior art.
1246
directly pertinent to the art of tracking articles in a factory.
In fact,
the patent holder’s own technical expert had acknowledged that the
1247
Moreover,
relevant prior art would include the Hesser reference.
one of ordinary skill in the art would have been familiar with both
buses and multiplexers, each of which had well-known advantages
1248
The
and disadvantages at the time the patent-in-suit was filed.
court noted KSR’s point that “‘if a technique has been used to
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using
the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or
1249
her skill.’”
Therefore, because the patent holder had presented no
evidence to indicate that the multiplexer in its invention operated in
an unconventional or unfamiliar way, the Federal Circuit agreed with
the district court that it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan
to replace Hesser’s bus with a multiplexer to arrive at the claimed
1250
invention.
As a procedural matter, the court in Asyst Technologies also ruled
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
accused infringer to introduce a new theory of invalidity (based on
1251
the Hesser reference).
“[T]he change in claim construction
resulting from this court’s decision on appeal ‘changed the rules of
1252
the game.’”
It was therefore appropriate for the district court to
allow the accused infringer to amend its defenses in light of the new
1253
claim construction.
1243. Id. at 1313, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
1244. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625.
1245. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
1246. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
1247. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626.
1248. Id. at 1314–15, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
1249. Id. at 1315, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389 (2007)).
1250. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627. In addition, the secondary considerations
asserted by the patent holder were either inapplicable or not attributable to the
particular bus/multiplexer substitution that distinguished the patent from Hesser.
Id. at 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628.
1251. Id. at 1317, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629.
1252. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro,
Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1253. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629.
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In Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., however, the Federal Circuit held
that a defendant had waived its argument under KSR by not raising
the argument in the district court, even though KSR had been
decided after the jury verdict and post-trial briefing. The court held
that the defendant could have raised KSR after the post-trial briefing
was completed because the district court judge did not decide the post1255
As the
trial motions for almost four months after the KSR decision.
court summarized, “when there is a relevant change in the law before
entry of final judgment,” a party that fails to notify the district court
1256
“waives arguments on appeal that are based on that change of law.”
1257
In Erico International Corp. v. Vutec Corp.,
the Federal Circuit
addressed obviousness in the context of a grant of a preliminary
injunction. The dispute arose out of Erico’s ‘994 patent, which
disclosed a method of using Erico’s popular J-Hook fasteners to
1258
The asserted claim
support low voltage communication cables.
included a limitation that required “spacing the [J-Hooks] . . . so that
1259
the run sags between [the J-Hooks] no more than about 30 cm.”
Erico sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant from
1260
selling its own version of the J-Hook.
While admitting that it had
1261
the defendant argued that the
copied Erico’s J-Hook design,
asserted claim was invalid as obvious over a similar hook device
disclosed in “the OBO Betterman” reference, in combination with a
1990
publication
by
the
Electronics
Industries
Alliance/Telecommunications Industry Association (“EIA/TIA”)
setting forth proper standards for hanging open-top cable
1262
supports.
Nevertheless, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction, which the Federal Circuit vacated by a 2-1 panel
1263
majority.
The majority decision determined that the defendant raised a
substantial question of invalidity, thus negating the patent holder’s
1264
“likelihood of success” on the merits.
As the Federal Circuit
explained, “[v]alidity challenges during preliminary injunction
proceedings can be successful, that is, they may raise substantial
1254.
1255.
1256.
1257.
1258.
1259.
1260.
1261.
1262.
1263.
1264.

550 F.3d 1112, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1117, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420.
516 F.3d 1350, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1351, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031–32.
Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id. at 1351–52, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
Id. at 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
Id. at 1351–52, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
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questions of invalidity, on evidence that would not suffice to support
1265
Raising a substantial question of
a judgment of invalidity at trial.”
invalidity “requires less proof than the clear and convincing standard
1266
to show actual invalidity.”
Under this lowered standard, the court
concluded that the alleged combination of references, supported by
the inventor’s own testimony, posed a “serious challenge” to the
1267
The OBO Betterman reference
validity of the asserted claim.
disclosed a hook with downward flaring flanges that were nearly
1268
The EIA/TIA standards set
identical to those of Erico’s J-Hook.
out appropriate circumstances for using an open-top cable support
1269
system for communication cables.
Moreover, the inventor had
testified that it was common practice for installers of communication
cables to pull cable taut in order to reduce sagging to less than
1270
30 cm.
This combination, explained the majority, suggests an
“implicit motivation to combine the prior art” to use J-Hooks to meet
1271
the claim limitation of 30-cm-or-less cable sag.
Thus, a preliminary
injunction was not warranted.
Dissenting, Judge Newman argued that the majority applied an
incorrect standard to the factor of “likelihood of success on the
1272
The proper inquiry is “not whether there is a ‘substantial
merits.”
question’; it is whether the defendants have shown that they are likely
to succeed on the merits, on the standards and burdens of proof as
1273
would prevail at trial.”
Moreover, Judge Newman criticized the
majority for not explaining how the district court abused its
1274
discretion and for failing to consider the other equitable factors
(irreparable harm, the balance of hardships, and the public interest)
1275
that are relevant to a preliminary injunction.
1276
The court in Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd. clarified the
post-KSR standard for determining obviousness in the context of
patents on chemical compounds. The patent at issue, owned by Eisai,
1277
Rabeprazole is
claimed the compound rabeprazole and its salts.
part of a class of drugs called proton pump inhibitors, which suppress
1265.
1266.
1267.
1268.
1269.
1270.
1271.
1272.
1273.
1274.
1275.
1276.
1277.

Id. at 1355–56, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
Id. at 1356–57, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034–35.
Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036.
Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
Id. at 1358–59, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036.
533 F.3d 1353, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
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1278

When Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and
the secretion of gastric acid.
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. filed abbreviated new drug
applications (“ANDAs”) seeking to produce a generic version of the
1279
Teva countered
drug, Eisai initiated a patent infringement lawsuit.
by asserting that Eisai’s claimed drug compound was obvious in view
of EP ‘726 (claiming lansoprazole, a known anti-ulcer drug), the
‘431 patent (claiming omeprazole), and an article by Brandstrom, et
1280
In particular, Teva focused on the EP ‘726 patent disclosing
al.
lansoprazole, which is structurally identical to rabeprazole, except
that lansoprazole has a fluorinated substituent, whereas rabeprazole
1281
has a methoxypropoxy substituent.
The district court granted Eisai
1282
summary judgment of non-obviousness, and Teva appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that
1283
Where the patent claims a chemical
the claims were non-obvious.
compound, an obviousness analysis typically turns on “structural
similarities and differences” between the claimed compound and
1284
other compounds disclosed in the prior art.
Thus, one may prove
obviousness by establishing some motivation for why a skilled artisan
would select and then alter a known compound (i.e., lead
1285
compound) to arrive at the claimed invention.
The Supreme
Court’s decision in KSR supports this reasoning, as it noted that “an
invention may have been obvious ‘[w]hen there [was] . . . a design
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there [were] . . . a
1286
“In other
finite number of identified, predictable solutions.”
words,” wrote the Federal Circuit, “post-KSR, a prima facie case of
obviousness for a chemical compound still, in general, begins with
1287
the reasoned identification of a lead compound.”
Here, Teva chose to identify lansoprazole as the lead compound in
1288
However, one of the most desirable traits of
its obviousness theory.
lansoprazole is its ability to cross lipid membranes—a property that is
1278. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
1279. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
1280. Id. at 1357, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
1281. Id. at 1357–58, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
1282. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
1283. Id. at 1362, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
1284. Id. at 1356–57, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith
Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)).
1285. Id. at 1357, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
1286. Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1390 (2007)) (alteration in
original).
1287. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457.
1288. Id. at 1358–59, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
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Because the record
attributable to its fluorinated substituent.
1290
provided “no discernable reason” for why a skilled artisan would be
motivated to select lansoprazole, only to remove its key feature, Teva
1291
failed to establish that the patented claims were obvious.
1292
The Federal Circuit’s decision in In re DBC affirmed the PTO’s
rejection of claims directed to a “nutraceutical composition” from the
1293
fruit of the manogsteen tree as obvious over the prior art.
DBC
had obtained a patent on its composition, claiming a mixture of the
juice and rind of the mangosteen fruit, combined with at least one
1294
On re-examination, the
other type of fruit or vegetable juice.
examiner rejected all claims as obvious over a combination of seven
references, of which only one (the JP ‘442 patent) was not before the
1295
In response,
original examiner who found the claims patentable.
DBC submitted three declarations to show objective indicia of nonobviousness, including the success of XanGo, the commercial
1296
The examiner, however,
embodiment of DBC’s invention.
finalized the rejection, and the Board of Patent Appeals and
1297
On appeal, DBC argued (1) that the Board
Interferences affirmed.
failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based upon a
substantial new question of patentability because the JP ‘442 patent
was cumulative prior art and (2) that the Board erred in not giving
1298
adequate weight to its evidence of commercial success.
1299
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision.
Regarding
DBC’s first argument, the JP ‘442 reference was not cumulative
because it was the only reference that taught the production of a
compound with dietary or health benefits (i.e., a “neutraceutical
composition” under the patent’s definition of the term) by
1300
combining the bitter mangosteen rind with fruits and fruit juices.
Although one prior art patent disclosed the use of mangosteen rind
as a drug, it only disclosed administration via “a syrup, solution, or
suspension with a carrier”; it did not disclose a combination of the
1301
Therefore, the PTO correctly
rind with fruits or fruit juices.
1289.
1290.
1291.
1292.
1293.
1294.
1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.
1301.

Id. at 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
Id. at 1358–59, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456–57.
545 F.3d 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1376, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id. at 1375–76, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id. at 1376, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125–26.
Id. at 1377, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
Id. at 1375, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id. at 1376, 1382, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125, 1130.
Id. at 1382, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
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concluded that the JP ‘442 reference presented a substantial new
1302
question of patentability and appropriately rejected the claims.
Regarding DBC’s second argument, the Federal Circuit agreed with
the PTO that DBC’s evidence of commercial success was insufficient
1303
to rebut the strong prima facie case of obviousness.
DBC had
merely presented its sales figures without establishing “that the sales
were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed
1304
invention.”
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112
1.

Enablement
Under the enablement requirement, every patent must describe
“the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the
1305
same.”
This statutory mandate is “part of the quid pro quo of the
1306
patent bargain”
and is designed to ensure that the public is
enriched (by an adequate disclosure of the invention) just as the
inventor is enriched (by a limited monopoly to commercialize the
invention). It therefore follows that a patent specification must
1307
enable the full scope of each and every claim.
Enablement is a question of law, based upon underlying questions
1308
of fact.
Moreover, because a patent is presumed valid, a party
challenging enablement must prove non-enablement by clear and
1309
convincing evidence.
1310
In Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC,
the Federal Circuit affirmed
summary judgment of invalidity due to a lack of enablement, where
the scope of the claims was broader than the disclosures in the
specifications. The two patents at issue concerned a process for
integrating a user’s own audio signal or visual image into a pre-

1302. Id. at 1382–83, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
1303. Id. at 1384, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
1304. Id. at 1384, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132 (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135,
140, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotations
omitted).
1305. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
1306. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
1307. Id. at 1241, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284, 1287.
1308. Id. at 1238, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731,
735, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1309. Id. at 1238–39, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
1310. 516 F.3d 993, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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1311

Defendants’ allegedly infringing
existing audiovisual presentation.
product, “ReVoice Studio,” allowed a user to combine her voice with
1312
The asserted claims applied
pre-existing movie images on a DVD.
1313
to both video games and movies.
Nevertheless, the district court
found that the patent specifications did not adequately explain how
the invention would function in the context of movies, which, unlike
video games, did not use discrete signals for identifying and
1314
Thus, the district court
retrieving particular character images.
1315
adjudged the claims invalid for lack of enablement as to movies.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, maintaining that “‘[t]he scope of the
claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement’ to
‘ensure[] that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent
specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the
1316
Defendants showed, by clear and convincing evidence,
claims.’”
that the patents-in-suit did not teach how the patented system would
perform certain necessary steps in the context of movies, which did
1317
not have easily separable character functions as video games did.
In addition, expert testimony clearly established that, as a result of
such technical differences, one skilled in the art would not be able to
1318
apply the patents’ teachings to movies.
Therefore, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court correctly granted summary
1319
judgment of invalidity for lack of enablement.
2.

Written description
Paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112 also requires “a written
1320
description of the invention.”
The Federal Circuit has explained
that the written description requirement is separate and distinct from
1321
No particular form of disclosure is
the enablement requirement.
1311. Id. at 995, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
1312. Id. at 995, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
1313. Id. at 996, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
1314. Id. at 998, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829.
1315. Id. at 996–97, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827.
1316. Id. at 999, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830 (quoting Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc.
v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1671, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1317. Id. at 1000, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
1318. Id. at 1000–01, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
1319. Id. at 1000, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
1320. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
1321. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111,
1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707 (2002) (listing, as statutory
requirements, that the patent application “describe, enable, and set forth the best
mode of carrying out the invention”); see also In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1357, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 to
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required, but the written description must be sufficient to convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art that the patentee was “in possession” of
1322
the invention, i.e., that the patentee invented what is claimed.
Satisfaction of the written description requirement is an issue of
1323
fact.
The sufficiency of a patent’s written description is evaluated
as of the filing date of the patent; therefore, the inquiry centers on
1324
the original disclosure and the originally filed claims.
1325
In Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,
the
Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of invalidity of patents
concerning recombinant plasmids, where the patent specifications
failed to provide adequate written description support for the full
1326
Discussing its precedent in Regents of
genus of plasmids claimed.
1327
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court explained that “to
satisfy the written description requirement for a claimed genus, a
specification must describe the claimed invention in such a way that a
person of skill in the art would understand that the genus that is
1328
being claimed has been invented, not just a species of the genus.”
Contrary to this rule, the facts showed that the asserted claims
encompassed an entire genus of recombinant plasmids containing
coding sequences of DNA polymerase from any bacterial source,
while the more narrow specifications of the patents disclosed solely
1329
the polA gene coding sequence from a single bacterial source.
Particularly in light of record evidence showing that the polA gene
varied among different bacterial sources, the court agreed with the
district court that this narrow disclosure was insufficient, under Eli
1330
Thus, the
Lilly, to support the much broader scope of the claims.
patent holders did not satisfy the written description requirement,
1331
and the patents were invalid.
require a written description requirement separate and apart from the enablement
requirement.”).
1322. In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111, 1117; see O’Reilly
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120 (1853) (holding that a patentee “can lawfully claim only
what he has invented and described, and if he claims more his patent is void”).
1323. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
1324. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1325. 541 F.3d 1115, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For discussion of
this case’s implications on the doctrine of equivalents, see supra notes 840–847 and
accompanying text.
1326. Id. at 1126, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
1327. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1328. Carnegie Mellon, 541 F.3d at 1124, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
1329. Id. at 1125, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
1330. Id. at 1126, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
1331. Id. at 1127, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241.

2009]

2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

879
1332

when it
The court reached a similar result in In re Alonso,
affirmed the PTO’s rejection of claims directed to the use of human
antibodies to treat a rare form of cancer, where the sole antibody
described in the specification was not representative of the “densely
1333
The court held that
populated genus” encompassed by the claims.
1334
the PTO’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.
Several articles had shown that the type of antibody required for
Alonso’s claimed method “var[ied] substantially in their
1335
Nevertheless, Alonso only disclosed a single
composition.”
antibody. Moreover, the specification failed to teach anything “about
the structure, epitope characterization, binding affinity, specificity, or
pharmacological properties common to the large family of antibodies
1336
implicated by the method.”
It also did not describe the antigens to
1337
which the antibodies of the claimed method must bind.
Therefore, the PTO correctly rejected the claims for lack of adequate
written description of the full claimed genus.
The court’s opinion in Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research
1338
Organisation v. Buffalo Technology (USA), Inc. addressed the issue of
whether an amendment to a patent application impermissibly added
“new matter” to the specification so as to broaden the disclosure
1339
As
beyond what was supported in the written description.
originally filed, the application had described the use of “radio
transmissions” to communicate between devices in a wireless local
1340
However, the claims were limited to radio
area network.
1341
transmissions “in excess of 10 GHz.”
A later amendment
substituted the phrase “radio frequencies” for several references to
1342
This had the effect of “increas[ing] the
“in excess of 10 GHz.”
range of frequencies specifically referenced by [these] passages” to
include frequencies between 3 KHz and 300 GHz (the range
1343
attributable to “radio frequencies”).
The alleged infringer argued that these amendments improperly
broadened the disclosure by adding “new matter” in violation of

1332.
1333.
1334.
1335.
1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.
1341.
1342.
1343.

545 F.3d 1015, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1021, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id. at 1020, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
Id. at 1020, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
Id. at 1022, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
Id. at 1020, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
542 F.3d 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
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1344

35 U.S.C. § 132, and that the disclosure was no longer supported
by the original written description, thus rendering the claims invalid
1345
The district court disagreed, finding that the
under § 112.
invention was described broadly enough in the original written
description to encompass systems operating at the larger range of
1346
frequencies.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district
court’s determination, holding that “there [was] enough material in
the original disclosure” to support the broader reading of the
1347
A close reading of the original application established
invention.
that the references to a 10 GHz minimum represented “useful
embodiments” of the invention, rather than limitations on the
1348
Moreover, the original specification
claimed subject matter.
indicated that the frequency range was not limited to greater than
10 GHz; in fact, there were explicit and implicit references to
1349
This was further supported by
frequencies as low as 1–3 GHz.
expert testimony, which indicated that a person of ordinary skill
would understand that the system permitted continuous transmission
1350
Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
at 2–3 GHz.
court’s refusal to invalidate the claims based upon the alleged
1351
addition of new matter.
Judge Lourie concurred, solely for the purpose of pointing out “a
reasonable alternative view” regarding the introduction of new
1352
In light of the full record in the case, Judge Lourie
matter.
asserted, it would also be reasonable to conclude that the applicants
had altered the nature of the specification by their 1995 amendment,
1353
thus invalidating the claims.
3.

Definiteness
As a further condition of patentability, 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a
patent to include claims that “particularly point[] out and distinctly
claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his

1344. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006) (providing, inter alia, that “[n]o amendment shall
introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention”).
1345. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org., 542 F.3d at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1575.
1346. Id. at 1380, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
1347. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
1348. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576.
1349. Id. at 1381, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576–77.
1350. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
1351. Id. at 1382, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
1352. Id. at 1386, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (Lourie, J., concurring).
1353. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
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1354

This is referred to as the definiteness requirement, and
invention.”
claims that lack particularity and distinctness are deemed
1355
The purpose behind this provision is two-fold: (1) to
indefinite.
provide clear warning to others regarding the scope of activities that
may constitute infringement and (2) to assist examiners and courts in
1356
Thus, the only patentable claims are
determining patentability.
those that “clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before
in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future
1357
enterprise.”
Because every claim is presumed to be valid, a claim is indefinite
only if it is “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly
1358
A claim is not indefinite simply because “it poses a
ambiguous.”
1359
difficult issue of claim construction.”
In the case of means-plusfunction elements, which are limited by statute to “the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
1360
the specification must provide a person of
equivalents thereof,”
ordinary skill in the art with enough information to “know and
1361
understand what structure corresponds to the means limitation.”
1362
In Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I, LLC, the Federal Circuit
affirmed summary judgment of invalidity for indefiniteness, where
the claim term could not be construed from the disclosures in the
1363
The term at
patent or distinguished from the disclosed prior art.
issue was “fragile gel,” as used in a claim for a method of drilling in
1364
Halliburton asserted that the term “fragile gel” referred
oil fields.
to a gel that, inter alia: (1) “easily transitions to a liquid state upon
the introduction of force (e.g., when drilling starts) and returns to a
1354. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
1355. See United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236, 55 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 381, 385 (1942) (“The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness
in claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went
before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future
enterprise.”).
1356. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 385.
1357. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 385.
1358. Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1358, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1128, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338–39, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (concluding that Honeywell’s patent claims were
invalid as indefinite).
1359. Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
1360. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2006).
1361. Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1118, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices,
Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1382, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1362. 514 F.3d 1244, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1363. Id. at 1256, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1364. Id. at 1246, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
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gel when the force is removed (e.g., when drilling stops)” and (2) “is
1365
The
capable of suspending drill cuttings and weighting materials.”
Federal Circuit concluded that neither this proposed definition nor
any other construction of the term “fragile gel” could resolve the
1366
ambiguity as to its scope in the asserted claims.
Therefore, the
1367
court affirmed the district court’s judgment of invalidity.
It was not sufficient that the patent specification included a
definition of fragile gel that closely tracked the first part of
1368
“Even if a claim term’s
Halliburton’s description set forth above.
definition can be reduced to words, the claim is still indefinite if a
person of ordinary skill in the art cannot translate the definition into
1369
Here, nothing in the patent
meaningfully precise claim scope.”
sufficiently defined the requisite degree of fragileness as compared to
the prior art; that is, “how much more quickly the gels broke when
stress was imposed or how much more quickly the gels reformed when
1370
stress was removed.”
Likewise, the patent failed to delineate what
1371
degree of suspending capability (i.e., gel strength) was required.
Because a variety of factors could affect the liquid-gel transitioning or
gel strength in a particular oil well (e.g., geology of the terrain,
wellbore size, depth, and angle), an ordinary skilled artisan would be
unable to determine, from one oil well to the next, whether a
particular drilling fluid would fall within the scope of the claimed
1372
invention.
“When a proposed construction requires that an artisan
make a separate infringement determination for every set of
circumstances in which the composition may be used, and when such
determinations are likely to result in differing outcomes (sometimes
infringing and sometimes not), that construction is likely to be
1373
indefinite.”
The Federal Circuit also noted that Halliburton’s proposed
definition was “functional, i.e., the fluid is defined ‘by what it does
1374
rather than what it is.’”
As the court explained, the Supreme Court
has warned against the “dangers of using only functional claim

1365. Id. at 1250, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
1366. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
1367. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1368. Id. at 1251, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
1369. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659–60.
1370. Id. at 1253, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (emphasis added).
1371. Id. at 1254, 1256, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
1372. Id. at 1254–55, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
1373. Id. at 1255, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
1374. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212,
169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 226, 228 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
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1375

limitations to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.”
Although claims are not necessarily indefinite for using functional
language, the use of such functional language may fail to clearly
delineate the scope of the subject matter claimed, thus rendering the
1376
claims indefinite.
Unlike in Halliburton, the Federal Circuit in Microprocessor
1377
Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc.
reversed the district
court’s summary judgment of invalidity and held that the claims were
1378
The asserted patent claimed a computer processor
not indefinite.
architecture and methods for increasing the efficiency of
1379
microprocessors.
At the district court, asserted claims one and
seven—claiming a “method of executing instructions in a pipelined
processor” and a “pipelined processor,” respectively—were deemed
invalid as indefinite on two grounds: (1) that the claims were
insolubly ambiguous for requiring that the same word be construed
differently in different portions of one claim; and (2) that the claims
impermissibly mixed classes of subject matter (i.e., both method and
1380
apparatus) within a single claim.
The Federal Circuit, however,
disagreed on both counts, holding that the claims were definite and
1381
thus valid.
Regarding the use of differing interpretations for the same word
within a claim, the court held that the claim was “amenable to
1382
construction” and therefore definite.
Although the term could
have had one of two meanings, the appropriate meaning was “readily
apparent from each occurrence in context,” and, as used, the term
“was not surrounded by uniform language that require[d] a single
1383
Indeed, although it is generally assumed that a
interpretation.”
single claim term should be defined consistently throughout all
claims of a patent, “the patentee’s mere use of a term with an
antecedent [such as ‘said’ or ‘the’] does not require that both terms

1375. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (citing United Carbon Co. v. Binney &
Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234, 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381, 381 (1942); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371, 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466, 469 (1938)).
1376. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63 (citing Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 212–13,
169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 228).
1377. 520 F.3d 1367, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1378. Id. at 1369, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63.
1379. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
1380. Id. at 1374, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
1381. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
1382. Id. at 1376, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32.
1383. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
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1384

In light of the evidence, the court
have the same meaning.”
1385
concluded that the asserted claims were not insolubly ambiguous.
Regarding the mixing of classes of subject matter, although claim
one appeared to recite both a method and an apparatus for
executing the method, the court determined that the apparatus
description actually served as a component of the preamble, rather
1386
than a separate claimed component.
Thus, there was no ambiguity
as to the scope of the claim, which was “clearly limited to practicing
the claimed method in a pipelined processor possessing the requisite
1387
Conversely, claim seven was not indefinite simply for
structure.”
1388
In fact,
using functional language in an apparatus claim.
functional language is explicitly permitted by statute in the context of
1389
means-plus-function limitations, as were employed here.
Moreover, the court found, claim seven was limited to an apparatus
possessing a certain structure and merely capable of performing
1390
1391
Therefore, the claim was not indefinite.
certain functions.
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International Game
1392
Technology, the court addressed the definiteness requirement in the
context of means-plus-function claims directed to a computer1393
implemented invention.
The patent-in-suit, the ‘102 patent,
disclosed an electronic slot machine that allowed a user to select her
1394
own combinations of winning symbol positions.
Appearing in
several places in the asserted claims were the terms “control means”
and “game control means,” which the parties agreed were means1395
The patent
plus-function terms invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6.
owner, Aristocrat, conceded that the only part of the specification
describing the structure that performed the functions of the “control
means” was a statement that one of ordinary skill in the art could
“introduce the methodology on any standard microprocessor base
1384. Id. at 1375, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (citing Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Process
Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1356–57, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added).
1385. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
1386. Id. at 1374–75, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
1387. Id. at 1375, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
1388. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
1389. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Halliburton
Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I, LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1654, 1658
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
1390. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
1391. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
1392. 521 F.3d 1328, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1393. Id. at 1375, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
1394. Id. at 1330, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
1395. Id. at 1331, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
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1396

[sic] gaming machine by means of appropriate programming.”
The district court held that this constituted an insufficient disclosure
of the requisite structure under § 112 and concluded that the claims
1397
were invalid for indefiniteness.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, explaining that
[i]n cases involving a computer-implemented invention in which
the inventor has invoked means-plus-function claiming, this court
has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the
specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or
microprocessor . . . . For a patentee to claim a means for
performing a particular function and then to disclose only a
general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform
1398
that function amounts to pure functional claiming.

Thus, the corresponding structure for a computer-implemented
function is “not [a] general purpose computer, or microprocessor,
but rather [a] special purpose computer programmed to perform [a]
1399
disclosed algorithm.”
Here, the ‘102 patent’s references to a “standard microprocessor”
and “appropriate programming” were insufficient to describe a
1400
The
structure capable of performing the required functions.
1401
specification disclosed no more than a general purpose computer.
Although Aristocrat “was not required to produce a listing of source
code or a highly detailed description of the algorithm to be used,” it
was required, at the very least, to provide some algorithm that
“transform[ed] the general purpose microprocessor [in]to a ‘special
purpose computer’” to satisfy the corresponding structure
1402
Because it had not,
requirement for means-plus-function claims.
1403
the district court properly adjudged the claims invalid as indefinite.
Two subsequent 2008 decisions reached a similar conclusion. In
1404
Finisar Corp. v. The DirecTV Group, Inc., the Federal Circuit upheld
the district court’s determination that a means-plus-function claim
directed to scheduling satellite or cable broadcasts was indefinite,
where the patent simply recited that “software” performed the
1405
The district court correctly noted that this
disclosed function.
1396. Id. at 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240 (citation omitted).
1397. Id. at 1333, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
1398. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
1399. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240 (quoting WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game
Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1400. Id. at 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
1401. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
1402. Id. at 1338, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
1403. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
1404. 523 F.3d 1323, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1405. Id. at 1364, 1366, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611, 1623.
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constituted an insufficient disclosure of the purported structure, as it
1406
provided no detail about the means to accomplish the function.
Because the patent disclosed no algorithm or description of the
1407
requisite structure, the claims were invalid for indefiniteness.
1408
Likewise, the court in Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc. affirmed the
trial court’s judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness where the
specification failed to disclose an algorithm by which the general
“bank computer” performed the function of “generating an
1409
authorization indicia” for online credit card transactions.
1410
In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
the Federal
Circuit reversed a judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness, where
the district court’s determination was based upon an incorrect
1411
In the
understanding of the law regarding claim definiteness.
claims at issue, which were directed to a method of curing tobacco,
one limitation required “an airflow sufficient to substantially prevent
an anaerobic condition around the vicinity of [the tobacco
1412
The district court determined that the term “anaerobic
plants.]”
condition” was indefinite and granted summary judgment for the
1413
defendants.
Reversing, the Federal Circuit noted that “[w]hen a word of degree
is used . . . the patent’s specification [must] provide[] some standard
1414
for measuring that degree” in order to be deemed definite.
Because an “anaerobic condition” implies some degree of oxygen
deficiency, it was necessary to show, within the patent specification, a
1415
The standard, held the
standard for measuring that condition.
1416
The claims
court, was clearly established within the patent.
explicitly referred to curing in an anaerobic environment in order to
1417
“substantially prevent the formation of at least one nitrosamine.”
Moreover, the district court had construed the “substantially prevent”
term, based upon the intrinsic record, to mean a series of defined

1406. Id. at 1340–41, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
1407. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
1408. 545 F.3d 1359, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1409. Id. at 1362, 1365–67, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753, 1755, 1757.
1410. 537 F.3d 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1411. Id. at 1360–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
1412. Id. at 1360, 1364, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
1413. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
1414. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011 (citing Datamize LLC v. Plumtree
Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1801 (Fed. Cir.
2005)) (alterations in original).
1415. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011.
1416. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
1417. Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citation omitted).

2009]

2008 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

887
1418

numerical ranges for levels of particular nitrosamine compounds.
Thus, because one of ordinary skill in the art could ascertain the
existence of an “anaerobic condition” by measuring the levels of the
1419
various nitrosamines, the term was not insolubly ambiguous.
“The district court’s contrary conclusion,” noted the Federal
Circuit, “was based on its misunderstanding that claim definiteness
requires that a potential infringer be able to determine if a process
1420
infringes before practicing the claimed process.”
However, this is
1421
“The test for indefiniteness
incorrect under the court’s precedent.
does not depend on a potential infringer’s ability to ascertain the
nature of its own accused product to determine infringement, but
instead on whether the claim delineates to a skilled artisan the
1422
bounds of the invention.”
Because the term “anaerobic
condition,” as construed by the district court, sufficiently delineated
1423
the bounds of the claim, it was not indefinite.
E. Double Patenting
The judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double
patenting prevents one inventor from obtaining more than one valid
patent on essentially the same invention, by precluding attempts to
“claim inventions so alike that granting both exclusive rights would
1424
An analysis of
effectively extend the life of patent protection.”
double patenting consists of two steps: (1) construing the claims of
the two patents to determine the differences; and (2) determining
1425
“A
whether the differences render the claims patentably distinct.
later patent claim is not patentably distinct from an earlier patent
claim if the later claim is obvious over, or anticipated by, the earlier
1426
claim.”
In the examination context, the courts typically use a one-way test,
in which “the examiner asks whether the application claims are

1418. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
1419. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
1420. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
1421. Id. at 1372–73, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
1422. Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp.
v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1404 (Fed. Cir.
2005)); see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1384,
76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing same standard).
1423. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
1424. In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litig., 494 F.3d 1011, 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
1425. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1869, 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1426. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
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1427

In rare circumstances, however,
obvious over the patent claims.”
where an applicant has been unable to issue its first-filed application,
a two-way test may apply, in which “the examiner also asks whether
1428
The
the patent claims are obvious over the application claims.”
1429
two-way test is “a narrow exception” that may apply only where “the
PTO is solely responsible for . . . delay” that causes a second-filed
improvement application to issue prior to a first-filed basic
1430
application.
Double patenting is a question of law that is reviewed
1431
de novo.
1432
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., the Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court had erred when it did not hold a
1433
The patents-inpatent invalid on the grounds of double patenting.
suit, owned by Pfizer, covered a genus of non-steroidal antiinflammatory compounds that included the compound celocoxib—
1434
During
the active ingredient in Pfizer’s arthritis drug Celebrex.
prosecution, Pfizer had responded to the examiner’s restriction
requirement by electing to pursue only some of its composition
claims in the original application (which ultimately issued as the
‘823 patent), while pursuing the restricted-out composition claims in
a divisional application (which became the ‘165 patent) and the
restricted-out method claims in a continuation-in-part application
1435
(which became the ‘068 patent).
In the resulting Hatch-Waxman
Act infringement suit, Teva Pharmaceuticals argued that the
‘068 patent was invalid due to obviousness-type double patenting,
1436
because the ‘165 patent constituted prior art to the ‘068 patent.
Although the district court determined that the relevant claims of the
‘068 patent and ‘165 patent were not patentably distinct, it
nonetheless determined that the ‘068 patent was valid under the
1437
“safe-harbor” provision of 35 U.S.C. § 121.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the trial court that the
relevant claims of the two patents were not patentably distinct,
because the ‘068 claims simply recited methods of administering a
1427. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
1428. Id. at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
1429. Id., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
1430. Id. at 1437, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1431. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1590, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1432. 518 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1433. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1434. Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1435. Id. at 1357–58, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
1436. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
1437. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
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“therapeutically-effective amount” of the compounds claimed in the
‘165 patent and the term “therapeutically-effective amount” appeared
in the ‘165 patent and was stipulated to have identical meaning in
1438
Nevertheless, the court disagreed with the trial
both patents.
court’s conclusion that the ‘068 patent could claim protection under
1439
§ 121’s so-called safe harbor provision.
Under the safe harbor provision of § 121,
[a] patent issuing on an application with respect to which a
requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or
on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not
be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office
or in the courts against a divisional application or against the
original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the
divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on
1440
the other application.

Reviewing the statutory language, the legislative history, and
Federal Circuit precedent, the court ultimately concluded that “the
protection afforded by section 121 to applications (or patents issued
therefrom) filed as a result of a restriction requirement is limited to
1441
Not only do both the statute’s literal
divisional applications.”
language and the legislative history “refer[] specifically to ‘divisional
1442
application[s],’”
but there are also “plausible reasons” why
Congress would have limited the safe harbor provision to divisional
1443
applications.
In particular, “[i]f the section had included CIPs,
which by definition contain new matter, the section might be read as
providing the earlier priority date even as to the new matter, contrary
to the usual rule that new matter is not entitled to the priority date of
1444
Therefore, the court concluded, because
the original application.”
the ‘068 patent was filed as a continuation-in-part application, rather
than as a divisional application, it did not fall under the safe harbor
provision, and as a result, it could be—and it was—invalidated by the
1445
‘165 patent.
1446
In In re Basell Poliolefine Italia S.P.A., a majority of the Federal
Circuit panel affirmed the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences’ (the “Board”) rejection, based on obviousness-type
1438.
1439.
1440.
1441.
1442.
1443.
1444.
1445.
1446.

Id. at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002–03.
Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
Id. at 1360, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
547 F.3d 1371, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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double patenting, of claims directed to a method of polymerizing
1447
The claims at issue were contained
unsaturated hydrocarbons.
within the ‘687 patent, which had derived from a 1955 application
that was not issued until 2002, following a long series of continuations
1448
and divisionals.
Shortly after the ‘687 patent issued, the PTO
initiated a Director-ordered reexamination, which reviewed all claims
for double patenting, in view of several expired patents issued to one
of the ‘687 inventors, and ultimately concluded that the ‘687 claims
1449
The Board
were unpatentable in light of the expired ‘987 patent.
1450
affirmed.
The Federal Circuit held, as an initial matter, that the Board did
not err in applying a one-way test, rather than a two-way test, for
double patenting because the patentees’ own actions or inactions
1451
were directly responsible for the delay in prosecution.
In
particular, the patentees “did not present any claim resembling the
claims at issue until 1964, nine years after . . . fil[ing] the first U.S.
application in the chain of priority,” and the patentees had
repeatedly submitted claims covering other inventions, urged the
examiner to declare interferences for unrelated inventions, and filed
1452
numerous continuing applications without appeal.
The Federal
Circuit majority then concluded that the patent claims at issue were
1453
not patentably distinct from the claims of the expired ‘987 patent.
This was because both sets of claims could be read to cover the
polymerization of ethylene with alpha-olefins of C4 to C6, using
1454
catalysts of titanium halides and aluminum alkyls.
Indeed, “the[]
claims are both generic and specific to each other in interchangeable
1455
Therefore, the court
ways, involving the same groups of species.”
held that the ‘687 claims were not patentable as a result of double
1456
patenting.
In dissent, Judge Newman argued that the PTO’s reexamination of
the ‘687 claims occurred in violation of reexamination law as it then
1457
existed.
In particular, prior to November 2, 2002, reexamination
“was available only on certain grounds not considered during the
1447.
1448.
1449.
1450.
1451.
1452.
1453.
1454.
1455.
1456.
1457.

Id. at 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id. at 1374, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
Id. at 1376, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
Id. at 1377, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
Id. at 1377–78, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
Id. at 1378, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
Id. at 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031–32.
Id. at 1379, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
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1458

Nevertheless, Judge Newman asserted, the
initial examination.”
PTO ordered reexamination based on double patenting in June
2002, even though the examiner had already considered the issue of
1459
double patenting during the initial examination of the claims.
Judge Newman also argued that it was “unfair to chastise [the]
patentee[s]” for the delay in issuing the patent, when “most of the
delay was agreed by the PTO to be due to its procedures [for
1460
Finally, Judge Newman argued that the PTO’s
interferences].”
own findings, as well as expert testimony, establish that the claims of
the ‘687 patent were patentably distinct from those of the ‘987
1461
patent.
VI. UNENFORCEABILITY
A. Inequitable Conduct
A patent applicant’s duty of candor and good faith includes the
duty to disclose information known to the applicant to be material to
1462
Breach of this duty constitutes inequitable conduct
patentability.
1463
To prove inequitable
and renders an entire patent unenforceable.
conduct, an accused infringer must present clear and convincing
evidence of at least a threshold level of materiality and intent to
1464
Even if
deceive the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).
this showing is made, however, the district court must balance the
equities to determine whether the applicant’s conduct was so
1465
egregious as to warrant holding the entire patent unenforceable.
The district court may thus decline to render the patent
unenforceable even in the face of clear and convincing evidence of
1466
The materiality prong may be
materiality and intent to deceive.
proven with evidence that an applicant “made an affirmative
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material
1467
information, or submitted false material information.”
Information is material “when a reasonable examiner would consider
1458. Id. at 1380, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
1459. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
1460. Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
1461. Id. at 1381–82, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
1462. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009).
1463. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365–66,
87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1464. Id. at 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
1465. Id. at 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
1466. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
1467. Id. at 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra
Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
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it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
1468
“[I]nformation is not material if it is cumulative of other
patent.”
1469
information already disclosed to the PTO.”
The deceptive intent prong requires that the “applicant had the
1470
Because
specific intent to . . . mislead[] or deceiv[e] the PTO.”
direct evidence of deceptive intent is often not available, the Federal
Circuit has held that intent may be inferred from indirect and
1471
circumstantial evidence.
This indirect and circumstantial evidence
must still be clear and convincing, however, and an inference of
deceptive intent drawn from such evidence must be “the single most
1472
reasonable inference able to be drawn.”
If the evidence is
susceptible of multiple reasonable inferences, a district court must
consider all inferences and render a judgment on the evidence “as
1473
informed by the range of reasonable inferences.”
A district court
“errs in overlooking one inference in favor of another equally
1474
reasonable inference.”
In balancing the equities after threshold showings of materiality
and deceptive intent, the district court may weigh the substance of
the facts underlying those showings and all of the equities of the
1475
case.
In this balancing, the materiality and intent inquiries are not
independent.
“The more material the omission or the
misrepresentation, the lower [the] level of intent . . . required to
1476
establish inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”
While factual findings on the threshold issues of materiality and
1477
intent are reviewed for clear error,
the district court’s ultimate
1468. Id. at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (quoting Symantec Corp. v.
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1460
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
1469. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (citing Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal
Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 1000, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1900 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
1470. Id. at 1366, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron,
Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1995))
(alterations in original).
1471. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (citing Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1364,
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710).
1472. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (citing Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision
Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
1473. Scanner Techs., 528 F.3d at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1474. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (quoting Scanner
Techs., 528 F.3d at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233).
1475. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1476. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson
Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1668 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
1477. Reversal for clear error of a district court’s determination requires “a
‘definite and firm conviction’ that a mistake has been made.” Monsanto Co. v. Bayer
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determination that an applicant committed inequitable conduct is
1478
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
1479
In Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision Systems Corp.,
the
Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in finding materiality
because it did not consider all reasonable inferences from the
1480
The applicant had stated in a petition to make special
evidence.
that he made a “rigid comparison” of the claims of the application
with the alleged infringing device when, in fact, he had never actually
1481
Reasoning that the applicant’s statement
seen the device.
suggested that he had seen the device, the district court deemed the
1482
applicant to have made a false statement to the PTO.
The Federal
Circuit found that, although it was reasonable for the district court to
infer that “rigid comparison” meant a physical inspection of the
infringing device, it was equally reasonable to infer that the applicant
had made a comparison using the infringing device’s product
literature, especially because the applicant cited the literature in its
1483
petition.
This alternative inference was also reasonable because
product literature may provide just as much information as a physical
1484
inspection.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court failed to draw all reasonable inferences on the factual findings
1485
to show materiality.
In Scanner Technologies, the Federal Circuit also reaffirmed that “a
false statement that succeeds in expediting the application is, as a
matter of law, material for purposes of assessing the issue of
1486
Inequitable conduct may thus be shown in
inequitable conduct.”
the absence of a misrepresentation bearing on the patentability of
1487
the claims in the application.
“An inference of intent to deceive is generally appropriate . . .
when (1) highly material information is withheld; (2) ‘the applicant
knew of the [prior art and] knew or should have known of [its]
Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1233, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1582, 1586 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1364,
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1478. Scanner Techs., 528 F.3d at 1374, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (citing Modine
Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 541, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1624
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1479. 528 F.3d 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1480. Id. at 1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1481. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1482. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1483. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1484. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
1485. Id. at 1377, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
1486. Id. at 1375, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
1487. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
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materiality . . . ; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible
[good faith] explanation’” for failing to disclose prior art to the
1488
1489
In Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
PTO.
the district court’s finding that one patent was unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct, concluding that the district court properly
1490
First, the undisclosed prior art was
inferred deceptive intent.
material. The feature (“use of a small, flow-restricting hole”) of the
prior art devices that the applicant failed to disclose was similar to the
1491
use of capillaries to “restrict fluid flow” in the asserted patent.
Second, intent to deceive was inferred from the high degree of
materiality of the prior art to the patent, as confirmed by four
1492
the applicant’s
statements made in the course of prosecution,
1493
knowledge of the highly material, undisclosed prior art, and the
1494
In particular, the
applicant’s lack of a good faith explanation.
applicant’s conclusory testimony that he never intentionally misled
the PTO in his career and that he did not knowingly withhold any
1495
information during prosecution was “entitled to no weight.”
Although the applicant provided additional testimony that could at
best be interpreted as an explanation that he believed the prior art to
be cumulative, this did not provide a sufficient good faith
explanation because it was a “[h]indsight construction of reasons why
1496
a reference might have been withheld.”
The applicant did not
suggest that he believed the prior art was cumulative at the time of

1488. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313–14, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1705, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181,
1191, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (alterations in original).
1489. 543 F.3d 1306, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1490. Id. at 1318, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. The Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s finding of inequitable conduct as to the ‘609 patent for failure to
prove deceptive intent. See id. at 1318–19, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713–14 (finding
that the statements indicating deceptive intent concerning the other patent were
made after the issuance a “notice of allowability indicating that all claims of the ‘609
patent would be issued”).
1491. Id. at 1314, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–11.
1492. Id. at 1315–16, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711–12 (“(1) The prior art did not
teach the claimed ‘extreme limitation in flow’ used ‘to provide a commercially
practical container’ that prevents ‘the catastrophic discharge’ of toxic contents;
(2) Existing safety measures were limited to ‘highly complex methods’ and ‘elaborate
systems;’ (3) There was no indication in the prior art to use ‘severe flow restriction’
to overcome[] the problems of delivering highly toxic fluids from portable
containers”; and (4) “[N]one of the prior art comes close to disclosing a restriction
in the flow path from a pressurized container that has a diameter that does not
exceed 0.2 mm.” (quoting Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 n.8
(D. Del. 2006)) (alterations in original)).
1493. Id. at 1316–17, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712–13.
1494. Id. at 1317–18, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1495. Id. at 1317, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citations omitted).
1496. Id. at 1317–18, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
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prosecution, and the applicant never stated that cumulativeness was
1497
the reason he failed to disclose the prior art.
Judge Lourie dissented regarding the inequitable conduct holding
because the majority inferred intent but cited no evidence of intent
to deceive, thereby “incorrectly conflat[ing] intent with materiality
. . . . Non-citation of a reference does not necessarily justify an
1498
inference of intent to deceive.”
1499
In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of intent to
deceive in the patentee’s failure to disclose that the half-life
comparisons between the claimed compound and the prior art were
1500
On a prior appeal, the Federal Circuit
at different dosages.
remanded the question of deceptive intent, holding that the district
court had failed to consider the reasonable inference that the failure
to disclose different dosages in the applicant’s declaration may have
been due to mere inadvertence, if making a comparison at different
1501
dosages was indeed reasonable.
On remand, the district court
1502
In its second appeal, the patentee
again found intent to deceive.
presented a different justification for its failure to disclose the use of
different dosages in its half-life comparisons. The patentee argued
that the dosage information was not material because the half-life
comparisons using different dosages were intended to show a
difference in properties, which was relevant to—and in response to—
1503
The half-life comparisons were not
an obviousness rejection.
intended to address the anticipation rejection, for which comparisons
1504
using equivalent dosages would be relevant.
The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, relying in part on the patentee’s failure to
“delineate between evidence intended to address the anticipation
rejection and evidence intended to address the obviousness
1505
The court concluded that the district court properly
rejection.”
found that the half-life comparisons were directed to both the
anticipation and obviousness rejections, and “to the extent that they

1497. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1498. Id. at 1329, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (citing
M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1342–43,
78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
1499. 525 F.3d 1334, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1500. Id. at 1346, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1501. Id. at 1342, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116–17.
1502. Id. at 1346, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1503. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117.
1504. Id. at 1344, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1505. Id. at 1346, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119–20.
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were intended to address the anticipation rejection, the failure to
1506
disclose dosage information evidenced intent to deceive.”
Judge Rader dissented, noting that inequitable conduct “has taken
on a new life as a litigation tactic” that allows a trial court to dispose
of a case “without the rigors of claim construction and other patent
1507
In numerous cases, including Aventis, the district court
doctrines.”
has “elected to try [inequitable conduct] in advance of the issues of
1508
infringement and validity.”
Citing the Federal Circuit’s Kingsdown
1509
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc. opinion, Judge Rader noted
that inequitable conduct is “not a remedy for every mistake, blunder,
1510
or fault in the patent procurement process.”
In Aventis, the
omission of dosage information was evidence of neglect, rather than
culpable intent, because data were not concealed in the declaration
1511
but rather submitted without mention of the different doses.
Furthermore, the chemist who made the declaration explained that
1512
the different dosage “did not come to his mind.”
Such negligence
1513
did “not rise to the level of intent to deceive.”
1514
In Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V.,
the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that the patentee’s ‘565 patent
1515
was unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
The Federal Circuit
held that the failure to disclose notes related to a prior art abstract
was material because the patentee made statements about the
abstract in support of patentability that “directly contradict[ed]” the
1516
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit noted that
notes.
it “do[es] not suggest that all internal documents of potential
1517
relevance must be submitted to the PTO as a matter of course.”
An
inference of deceptive intent was also proper because the prosecuting
1506. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1507. Id. at 1349–50, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122 (Rader, J., dissenting).
1508. Id. at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122–23 (citing Frazier v. Roessel Cine
Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
1509. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
1510. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
1511. Id. at 1351, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
1512. Id. at 1351–52, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
1513. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
1514. 514 F.3d 1229, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1582 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1515. Id. at 1231, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
1516. Id. at 1240, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591. The notes were taken by a Bayer
employee while in front of a poster for which the prior art abstract was made. Id. at
1235, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587. The poster contained much more information
than the prior art abstract itself. Id. at 1235, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587.
1517. Id. at 1240, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591.
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attorney was admittedly aware of the notes during prosecution, had
discussed the notes with their author, and had conceded that the
notes would have been important to the Examiner if they contained
1518
His explanation that he did not understand
reliable information.
the notes after discussing them with the notes’ author lacked
1519
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s
credibility.
holding that the patentee’s three other patents were unenforceable
1520
for inequitable conduct.
Although the patentee dismissed its
infringement claims under these three patents and covenanted not to
sue the defendant for infringement, the district court properly
retained jurisdiction to rule on attorney fees and to make findings of
1521
inequitable conduct.
1522
In Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
the Federal
Circuit found that the district court’s factual findings on deceptive
intent were clearly erroneous, and reversed the judgment of
1523
The prosecuting attorney had received a letter
unenforceability.
that potentially disclosed prior art, yet had concluded that the
content was not material to the patent application he was
1524
Shortly after filing the patent application, the patentee
preparing.
1525
The defendant theorized that the patentee
replaced the attorney.
replaced its attorney because of concerns about the need to disclose
1526
the letter to the PTO.
However, because there was no evidence
indicating that the patentee even knew the contents of the letter or
that the letter was the reason that the patentee changed attorneys,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had clearly erred
in accepting the theory that the patentees replaced the prosecuting
1527
attorney in order to prevent disclosure of the letter to the PTO.
The fact that the applicant did not provide a credible alternative
explanation for the attorney’s replacement was not sufficient to
1528
warrant an inference of deceptive intent.
1518. Id. at 1241, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
1519. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592.
1520. Id. at 1243, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593.
1521. Id. at 1242–43, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592–93 (citing Highway Equip. Co.,
Inc. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027, 1033 n.1, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1124 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
1522. 537 F.3d 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1523. Id. at 1360, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
1524. Id. at 1361–62, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1525. Id. at 1363, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
1526. Id. at 1367, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1527. Id. at 1367–69, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008–09.
1528. Id. at 1368, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (citing M. Eagles Tool Warehouse,
Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1341, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229,
1235 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
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1529

In Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct
because of the district court’s erroneous analysis of the deceptive
1530
On materiality,
intent prong and failure to consider materiality.
the Federal Circuit held that the patentees’ failure to disclose one of
the inventors’ experiments was not material because: (1) the
inventors had no obligation to report experiments that occurred
after filing of the patent application; (2) the experiments were not
necessary to practice the patented invention; and (3) the inventor
performed the experiments as part of her continuing doctoral thesis,
1531
In its
and not to accomplish the objective of the patents.
discussion of materiality, the Federal Circuit also noted that the
inventor published the experiments in question, and publication “is
an act inconsistent with an intent to conceal data from the
1532
On the issue of intent to deceive, the Federal Circuit
USPTO.”
held that the district court’s analysis was clearly erroneous because
the district court improperly focused on the inventor’s stated views at
1533
Such views and
trial regarding the purposes of the patent system.
motives for applying for a patent are “generally irrelevant to a proper
1534
determination of inequitable conduct.”
1535
In Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court that the alleged infringers
had failed to prove the patent unenforceable for inequitable
1536
The patentee’s failure to disclose its own co-pending
conduct.
application for a compound it considered separately patentable was
not material because, even if disclosure of the application led to a
provisional obviousness-type double-patenting rejection, applicants
1537
routinely overcome such rejections.
The district court’s finding
that the materiality of this potential situation was low was therefore
1538
The alleged infringer’s theory that the patentee intended
proper.
to deceive the PTO by filing its two patent applications separately was
also properly rejected by the district court as evidence not rising to
1539
A separate filing, “while not
the level of inequitable conduct.
1529.
1530.
1531.
1532.
1533.
1534.
1535.
1536.
1537.
1538.
1539.

536 F.3d 1247, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1519 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1253, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
Id. at 1252–53, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523–24.
Id. at 1252, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.
Id. at 1253, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
533 F.3d 1353, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1355, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
Id. at 1360, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457–58.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
Id. at 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
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completely forthcoming,” was not deemed an attempt to hide from
the PTO because similar applications are usually assigned to the same
1540
examiner in the same art unit.
1541
In Symantec Corp. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,
the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that the accused
infringer failed to prove the materiality prong for inequitable
1542
First, the Federal Circuit held that an inventor’s
conduct.
declaration that he was “an original, first and joint inventor” was not
false simply because the inventor could not identify his contribution
1543
The inventor and his co-inventor
precisely fourteen years later.
both testified in general terms that the inventor had come up with
1544
Second, the Federal Circuit held that
the idea for the invention.
the inventor’s declaration that he had practiced in the field of
computer software for ten years and become intimately familiar with
the state of the art was not a misrepresentation simply because he was
1545
“a marketing person” and lacked technical expertise.
As the
Federal Circuit noted, the “mere fact that he was not a technical
person does nothing to refute” his familiarity with the state of the
1546
Third, the Federal Circuit concluded that the inventor’s
art.
declaration that he reviewed and understood the contents of the
specification, including the claims, when he did not fully understand
1547
A “failure
the language of the claim contents, was not misleading.
to understand the meaning of the claims,” on the other hand, would
1548
“likely be considered material.”
B. Breach of Duty to Standards Setting Organization
Breach of the duty to disclose relevant intellectual property rights
to a standards-setting organization (“SSO”) before the adoption of a
1549
standard may also result in an unenforceability finding.
The

1540. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
1541. 522 F.3d 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1542. Id. at 1296–98, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459–61.
1543. Id. at 1297, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460 (citation omitted).
1544. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
1545. Id. at 1297–98, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460–61.
1546. Id. at 1298, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460–61.
1547. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
1548. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461 (quoting Symantec Corp. v. Computer
Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 02-CV-73740-DT, 2008 WL 3950254, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31,
2006)) (emphasis added).
1549. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1010, 89
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the need for this
disclosure to avoid “patent hold-up” which occurs when a patent holder fails to
disclose intellectual property rights to an SSO “prior to the adoption of a standard”
and, therefore, prevents “industry participants from implementing the standard”).
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existence of a disclosure duty is “a legal question with factual
1550
underpinnings.”
1551
In Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s unenforceability judgment, finding that the
plaintiff breached its duty to disclose its patents to a video
1552
compression SSO known as the Joint Video Team (“JVT”).
Although the language of the JVT policy did not expressly require
disclosure by all JVT participants in all circumstances, and only
explicitly required disclosure of members submitting technical
proposals, the Federal Circuit concluded that participants
understood the policy to impose a disclosure duty on all
1553
Turning to the scope of the disclosure duty, the
participants.
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the duty
required JVT participants to disclose patents that “reasonably might
1554
Finding that the plaintiff
be necessary” to practice the standard.
had breached that disclosure duty, the Federal Circuit addressed the
question of whether the district court was within its authority to order
1555
Although the district
the patents unenforceable against the world.
court had correctly concluded that the patents were unenforceable,
the Federal Circuit concluded that its remedy ordering the patents
unenforceable against the world was too broad and remanded the
judgment with instructions to hold the patents unenforceable only
1556
against products that comply with the standard.
C. Improper Inventorship
To show co-inventorship, the alleged co-inventor must “prove his
contribution to the conception of the claims by clear and convincing
1557
evidence.”
An alleged co-inventor’s testimony alone is insufficient
1550. Id. at 1012, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon
Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1087 n.3, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
1551. 548 F.3d 1004, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For discussion of
this case’s implications regarding the award of attorney fees, see infra notes 1842–
1858 and accompanying text.
1552. Id. at 1008, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1553. Id. at 1013–16, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328–29.
1554. Id. at 1017–18, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (citation omitted). By not
disclosing these patents prior to the adoption of the standard, a patentee that has
patent protection covering the standard can keep industry participants from using
the standard unless they entered a license agreement. Id. at 1020, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1325.
1555. Id. at 1019, 1024–26, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326, 1335.
1556. Id. at 1027, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337–38.
1557. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1295,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1461, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
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1558

Whether an alleged
evidence unless it is sufficiently corroborated.
co-inventor’s testimony is sufficiently corroborated is evaluated using
a “rule of reason analysis,” which in turn requires an evaluation of all
1559
relevant evidence.
1560
In Symantec Corp. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,
the
alleged co-inventor sought to corroborate his declaration with the
named inventor’s notes, which reflected a conversation between the
1561
named inventor and the alleged co-inventor.
However, the Federal
Circuit held that the alleged co-inventor’s declaration lacked the
requisite corroboration because the notes at most reflected only that
the two had a discussion of the then-current state of the art and did
not establish any contribution to the invention by the alleged co1562
inventor.
D. Laches
The laches defense, when established, bars a patentee’s claims for
1563
damages incurred prior to suit.
In order to invoke the defense of
laches, a defendant must prove: “(1) [that] the plaintiff delayed
filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from
the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its
claim against the defendant; and (2) [that] the delay operated to the
1564
prejudice or injury of the defendant.”
A rebuttable presumption of laches arises when the patentee delays
filing suit for more than six years after the date the patentee knew or
1565
If the alleged
should have known of the alleged infringer’s activity.
infringer shows that the patentee’s delay in filing suit exceeds six
years, then the burden shifts to the patentee to rebut the
presumption by raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding
either the reasonableness of its delay or the lack of prejudice to the

1558. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (citing Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461,
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548).
1559. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (quoting Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1382, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1631 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
1560. 522 F.3d 1279, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1561. Id. at 1295–96, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
1562. Id. at 1296, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
1563. Id. at 1294, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
1564. Id. at 1294, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (en banc)) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
1565. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035–36,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331).
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1566

Once the patentee makes such a showing, the
alleged infringer.
burden shifts back to the alleged infringer to prove the elements of
1567
The Federal Circuit
laches by a preponderance of the evidence.
reviews the district court’s determination on laches for an abuse of
1568
discretion.
1569
In Serdarevic v. Advanced Medical Optics, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment that the
1570
plaintiff’s inventorship claim was barred by laches.
The plaintiff
filed an action asserting inventorship eight years after learning of the
existence of the patents, thereby giving rise to a presumption of
1571
laches.
The plaintiff contended that laches should not bar her
claim because her suit was filed within six years of the issuance of the
1572
reexamination certificate for one of the patents.
The Federal
Circuit held that this “other litigation” excuse for the delay in filing
suit did not prevent the application of the presumption of laches
because the plaintiff was not engaged in the “other litigation,” which
1573
In addition, the plaintiff did not
may have excused her delay.
identify any way in which the reexamination proceeding changed her
1574
inventorship claim.
The plaintiff attempted to rebut the laches presumption by
1575
In particular, the plaintiff claimed
justifying the delay in filing suit.
1576
that she was unfamiliar with the U.S. patent system.
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiff’s
unfamiliarity with the U.S. patent system was not sufficient evidence
to rebut the presumption of an unreasonable delay because she was
represented by patent counsel who could have enabled her to file
1577
suit.
Finally, the plaintiff’s attempt to preclude the application of laches
through an unclean hands claim also failed. The plaintiff was unable

1566. Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915,
1917 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1035–38, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1331–33).
1567. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1038, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323–33.
1568. Id. at 1039, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
1569. 532 F.3d 1352, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1570. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
1571. Id. at 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1572. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1573. Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1574. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1575. Id. at 1360, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1576. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1577. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
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to show that the defendant had engaged in “particularly egregious
1578
conduct” and was responsible for plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit.
In Symantec, the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not
1579
err in dismissing a laches defense.
The court reasoned that—even
if the plaintiff knew about an earlier product that was later rebranded to be the infringing product—there was no evidence that
the earlier product was the same or similar to the product in suit, and
1580
“laches would only apply if the products were the same or similar.”
The Federal Circuit also held that the plaintiff’s earlier warning letter
alleging willful infringement by the earlier product, which was sent
before the defendant re-branded the earlier product, did not
necessarily assume or concede that the two products were similar for
1581
purposes of the laches period of delay.
VII. NON-PATENT ISSUES
A. Alternate Sources of Liability
1582

In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that
settlement agreements between the patent holders, brand-name
manufacturers of the drug, and generic manufacturers to resolve
Hatch-Waxman Act cases did not violate section 1 of the Sherman
1583
1584
Act, which prohibits “unreasonable restraints” of trade.
In the
settlement agreements, the patent holder agreed to make payments
to the generic manufacturers (“reverse payments”), who in turn
agreed not to challenge the validity of the patent or to market a
generic version of the drug containing the patented compound until
1585
The Federal Circuit concluded that the
after the patent expired.
1586
district court properly applied a “rule of reason analysis”
to
1578. Id. at 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486–87 (citation omitted).
1579. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1295,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1580. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458–59 (citing Watkins v. Nw. Ohio Tractor
Pullers Assoc., Inc., 630 F.2d 1155, 1164, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 545, 552–53 (6th Cir.
1980)).
1581. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458–59.
1582. 544 F.3d 1323, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1583. Id. at 1333, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
1584. Id. at 1331, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
1585. Id. at 1328–29, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
1586. Id. at 1332, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. The “rule of reason” analysis is a
three-step process. First, the plaintiff must show that the “challenged action had an
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.” The burden
then “shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive redeeming virtues of
the action.” Finally, if defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must “show that the
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determine whether the settlement agreements were unlawful and
properly found that plaintiffs had failed to show that the
“[a]greements had an anti-competitive effect on the market . . .
1587
beyond that permitted by the patent.”
The Federal Circuit observed that long-standing judicial policy
1588
A settlement that protects a patent holder’s legal
favors settlement.
right to a monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the
patented invention is not unlawful, even though it may have some
1589
adverse effects on competition.
The Federal Circuit emphasized that the “essence of the inquiry is
whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary
1590
The court thus agreed with the United States
zone of the patent.”
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh Circuits that, in the
absence of sham litigation or fraud before the PTO, the court “need
not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a
1591
settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”
1592
In Dominant Semiconductors SDN. BHD. v. Osram GMBH,
the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment dismissing the alleged infringer plaintiff’s claims for unfair
competition, intentional interference with contractual relations,
1593
interference with prospective economic advantage, and trade libel.
The bases for plaintiff’s claims were its contentions that the
defendant made false and misleading public infringement allegations
about the plaintiff’s products and that the defendant filed its patent
1594
infringement complaint before the ITC in bad faith.
A plaintiff
seeking to prove bad faith must prove that the allegations were
objectively baseless, such that “no reasonable litigant could
1595
“[A]n objectively
reasonably expect success on the merits.”
reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of subjective
same pro-competitive effect could be achieved through an alternative means . . . less
restrictive of competition.” Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (quoting Clorox Co. v.
Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (2d Cir.
1997)).
1587. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (citation omitted).
1588. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlorine Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333,
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.,
238 F.3d 1362, 1368, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1589. Id. at 1337, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811 (citing In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208 (2d Cir. 2006)).
1590. Id. at 1336, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
1591. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
1592. 524 F.3d 1254, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1480 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1593. Id. at 1255–56, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1481.
1594. Id. at 1258, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1595. Id. at 1260, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (quoting GP Indus., Inc. v. Eran
Indus., Inc., 500 F.3d 1369, 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1604, 1607 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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1596

The Federal Circuit further suggested that “a successful
intent.”
outcome of the underlying litigation refutes a conclusion that the
1597
The defendant’s
litigation was objectively baseless at the outset.”
evidence of success in its patent infringement claims before the ITC
thus provided sufficient proof that its infringement claims were not
1598
objectively baseless.
B. Discovery Decisions
“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties must be
afforded adequate time for general discovery before being required
1599
to respond to a motion for summary judgment.”
A showing of
necessity and diligence otherwise required for a Rule 56(f) request
for additional discovery does not apply when parties do not initially
1600
In Metropolitan Life
have adequate opportunity for discovery.
1601
the Federal Circuit held
Insurance Co. v. Bancorp Services, L.L.C.,
that the district court erred in denying the patentee’s Rule 56(f)
1602
motion seeking additional discovery.
The district court
erroneously reasoned that the patentee had not proven that the
defendant’s deponents would testify contrary to their declarations if
1603
However, the appropriate fact to consider was that the
deposed.
patentee had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct
1604
Where, as in this case, there has not been an adequate
discovery.
initial opportunity for discovery, a Rule 56(f) request for additional
discovery need not be accompanied by a strict showing of necessity
1605
The Federal Circuit remanded to permit
and diligence.
1606
reasonable discovery by the patentee to proceed.

1596. Id. at 1261, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (quoting Prof’l Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 57, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1645 (1993)).
1597. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485 (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at
62, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647).
1598. Id. at 1263, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1599. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C., 527 F.3d 1330, 1336,
87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Iverson v. Johnson Gas
Appliance Co., 172 F.3d 524, 530 (8th Cir. 1997)).
1600. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144 (citing Iverson, 172 F.3d at 530).
1601. 527 F.3d 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1602. Id. at 1332, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
1603. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1604. Id. at 1337–38, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1605. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (citing Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana
Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1311, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
1606. Id. at 1338, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
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C. Motions to Transfer
1607

On petition for a writ of mandamus in In re TS Tech USA Corp.,
the Federal Circuit ordered the district court to transfer venue of a
patent infringement case filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio. In September 2007, plaintiff Lear
Corporation filed suit against TS Tech in the Eastern District of Texas
for infringement of a patent relating to pivotally attached vehicle
1608
headrest assemblies.
Lear’s complaint alleged that TS Tech had
been making and selling infringing headrest assemblies to Honda,
and that TS Tech induced Honda to infringe the patent by
incorporating the headrest assemblies into Honda vehicles, which are
sold throughout the United States, including in the Eastern District
1609
of Texas.
In December 2007, TS Tech filed a motion to transfer venue for
convenience to the Southern District of Ohio, under 28 U.S.C.
1610
In support of transfer, TS Tech argued that the physical
§ 1404(a).
and documentary evidence was mainly located in Ohio and the key
witnesses all lived in Ohio, Michigan, and Canada, and that none of
the parties were either incorporated in Texas or had any offices in
1611
the Eastern District of Texas.
Lear opposed, arguing that the
Eastern District of Texas was the proper venue because several
Honda vehicles containing the allegedly infringing headrest
1612
In September 2008, the district
assemblies had been sold in Texas.
court denied transfer, finding that TS Tech failed to demonstrate
that the inconvenience to the parties and witnesses clearly
outweighed the deference entitled to Lear’s choice of forum, and
that because several Honda vehicles containing the allegedly
infringing headrests had been sold in the venue, the Eastern District
1613
of Texas had a “substantial interest” in adjudicating the case.
TS Tech petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus
1614
Relying on the
ordering the district court to transfer the case.
Fifth Circuit’s recent en banc decision granting a similar petition for
1615
a writ of mandamus in In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Federal
1607.
1608.
1609.
1610.
1611.
1612.
1613.
1614.
1615.

551 F.3d 1315, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1318, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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Circuit granted TS Tech’s petition, finding that under the
circumstances, the district court’s decision not to transfer was a “clear
abuse of discretion” that produced a “patently erroneous result” and
1616
therefore justified the extraordinary writ.
The Federal Circuit confirmed that regional circuit law governs
whether a motion to transfer a patent infringement case under
§ 1404(a) should be granted, and that under Fifth Circuit law, a
motion to transfer venue should be granted upon a showing that the
transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than the venue chosen
1617
by the plaintiffs.
From Volkswagen, the court identified both
“public” and “private” factors, taken from forum non conveniens law, to
1618
consider when ruling on a motion to transfer under § 1404(a).
Applying those factors, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court applied some of the relevant factors correctly, but that overall
1619
The district court’s first
the analysis “contained several key errors.”
1620
error was to give too much weight to Lear’s choice of forum.
As
the Fifth Circuit had explained in Volkswagen, “the plaintiff’s choice
of venue corresponds to the burden that a moving party must meet in
order to demonstrate that the transferee venue is a clearly more
convenient venue,” but it is not a separate factor to be considered in
1621
favor of the plaintiff on a motion for transfer.
The district court’s second error, according to the Federal Circuit,
was that it “ignored Fifth Circuit precedent in assessing the cost of
1622
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a “100attendance for witnesses.”
mile” rule “which requires that ‘[w]hen the distance between an
existing venue for trial of a matter and a proposed venue under
§ 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to
witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to
1616. In re TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1319, 1322, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569, 1570
(recounting the high burden that must be met for the granting of a writ of mandmus
and finding that the petitioner had met that standard).
1617. Id., at 1319, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1618. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568-69. “The ‘private’ interest factors include:
(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing
witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious,
and inexpensive.” Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)). “The ‘public’ interest factors to be considered
are (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local
interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the
forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems of conflicts of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Id., 89
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (quoting Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315).
1619. Id. at 1320, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1620. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1621. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1622. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
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1623

The Federal Circuit noted that witnesses would need
be traveled.”
to travel approximately 900 more miles to attend trial in the Eastern
1624
District of Texas than to do so in the Southern District of Ohio.
The third error identified by the Federal Circuit was the district
court’s determination that the “relative ease to access of sources of
proof” factor was neutral because “many of the documents were
1625
Again following the Fifth Circuit’s
stored electronically.”
Volkswagen opinion, the Federal Circuit concluded that because all of
the physical evidence, including the headrests and the documentary
evidence, were far more convenient to the Southern District of Ohio,
1626
the district court’s conclusion that this factor was neutral was error.
Finally, the Federal Circuit identified the district court’s
determination that the Eastern District of Texas had a “substantial
interest” in having the case heard locally as a fourth error in the
1627
Based on the facts presented, the Federal Circuit
court’s analysis.
concluded that “there is no relevant connection between the actions
giving rise to this case and the Eastern District of Texas. . . . [T]he
vehicles containing TS Tech’s allegedly infringing headrest
assemblies were sold throughout the United States and thus the
citizens of the Eastern District of Texas have no more or less of a
1628
The
meaningful connection to this case than any other venue.”
Federal Circuit therefore concluded that “[b]ecause the district
court’s errors here are essentially identical [to the errors identified by
the Fifth Circuit in Volkswagen], we hold that TS Tech has
1629
demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to a writ.”
In addition, the Federal Circuit clarified that TS Tech was not
required to seek reconsideration of the district court’s denial of its
transfer motion before seeking a writ of mandamus because TS Tech
has no reasonable expectation that the district court would reverse its
prior ruling and because interlocutory review of a denial of a motion
1630
to transfer is unavailable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

1623. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201,
204-05 (5th Cir. 2004)).
1624. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1625. Id. at 1320-21, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
1626. Id. at 1321, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
1627. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
1628. Id. 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
1629. Id. at 1322, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
1630. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
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VIII. REMEDIES
A. Permanent Injunction
1631

In the 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
decision, the
Supreme Court confirmed that a patentee-plaintiff must satisfy the
following four-factor test before a court may grant a permanent
injunction:
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
1632
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

The Federal Circuit continued to refine the application of eBay to
different factual circumstances in 2008. In Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott
1633
Laboratories,
Innogenetics brought an action against Abbott for
infringement of its patent relating to diagnostic tools that detected
and classified hepatitis C virus genotypes which facilitated
1634
At the
customizing treatments of patients with varying genotypes.
infringement trial, Innogenetics’ damages expert proposed an
upfront “market entry fee” payment of $5.8 million and a running
royalty of five to ten euros per test on the 190,000 tests Abbott had
1635
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury
sold up to that point.
trial found in favor of Innogenetics, and the court entered judgment
of infringement and reasonable royalties in the amount of
1636
$7 million.
1637
Innogenetics moved for a permanent injunction.
In granting
Innogenetics a permanent injunction in addition to the $7 million
damages award, the district court stated, “[i]t would denigrate the
value of plaintiff’s patent rights to allow defendant to continue to sell
plaintiff’s invention as its own in exchange for the same fee it would
1638
have paid without the lawsuit.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of
a permanent injunction prohibiting the future sales of Abbott’s
1631. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).
1632. Id. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (citing Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–313 (1982); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531,
542 (1987)).
1633. 512 F.3d 1363, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1634. Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
1635. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1636. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1637. Id. at 1369, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
1638. Id. at 1380 n.8, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 n.8.
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genotyping assay kits, finding that the lower court’s ruling was an
abuse of discretion. Counsel for Innogenetics argued that the jury’s
damages calculation was a royalty for Abbott’s past infringement
1639
only.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding on review of
the trial record that, during the damages portion of the trial,
Innogenetics’ damages expert factored in the cost of a license that
would allow Abbott to continue selling the infringing product—and
concluded that the jury’s award “include[d] both an up-front
1640
payment and an ongoing royalty payment.”
The court held that
“[w]hen a patentee requests and receives such compensation, it
cannot be heard to complain that it will be irreparably harmed by
future sales” and that “this factor greatly outweighs the other eBay
1641
The court also noted that “[i]njunctive relief
factors in this case.”
ought not to act as a form of ‘extra damages’ to compensate for
litigation costs” and that “[i]f litigation costs were a factor, injunctive
1642
relief would be warranted in every litigated patent case.”
The
Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court to “delineate
1643
the terms of the compulsory license.”
1644
In Amado v. Microsoft Corp., plaintiff Amado filed a suit against
Microsoft for infringement of his patent relating to a software
program that combines the functionalities of spreadsheet and
1645
database software.
Following a 2005 jury verdict that Amado’s
patent was valid and infringed, the district court granted Amado’s
motion for a permanent injunction but stayed the injunction until
1646
“[s]even days after the resolution or abandonment of any appeal.”
The district court rejected Amado’s motion to enforce the stay seven
days after the mandate issued and, instead, interpreted the term
1647
“appeal” to include a petition for certiorari.
The district court
granted Microsoft’s request for an extension of the stay following the
1648
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari.
Microsoft then moved for
permanent dissolution of the permanent injunction, arguing that the
“Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay made the grant of

1639.
1640.
1641.
1642.
1643.
1644.
1645.
1646.
1647.
1648.

Id. at 1380, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id. at 1380 n.8, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
517 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1356, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.
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1649

After applying the four-factor test for
injunction inappropriate.”
injunctive relief, the district court found “both an absence of
irreparable harm and that the public interest would be disserved by
granting an injunction,” and therefore dissolved the permanent
1650
injunction.
Amado appealed, arguing that the “mandate rule foreclosed
Microsoft from challenging the injunction or the district court from
1651
modifying it.”
Although it agreed that the mandate rule would
have foreclosed Microsoft from challenging the initial entry of the
permanent injunction, the Federal Circuit rejected Amado’s
argument that the district court abused its discretion when it
modified the stay of the injunction once it was incorporated into the
1652
mandate from the Federal Circuit’s 2006 order.
The court noted
that “district courts possess broad equitable authority to modify
injunctions” and concluded that there was no abuse of discretion
when the district court reconsidered the permanent injunction in
light of eBay and, ultimately, decided to dissolve the injunction when
it determined that it was “no longer equitable under the
1653
The court also noted that it did not reach the
circumstances.”
argument of “whether there remains a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm following a judgment of validity and infringement
following eBay” because the district court in this case was “within its
discretion to find an absence of irreparable harm based on the
1654
evidence presented at trial.”
1655
In Voda v. Cordis Corp.,
plaintiff Voda alleged that Cordis had
infringed three of its patents relating to catheter designs for
1656
After the district court found that
interventional cardiology.
Voda’s patents were not invalid and were infringed, Voda moved for a
1657
permanent injunction.
Rather than attempting to prove
irreparable injury to himself, Voda attempted to show the effect
Cordis’s infringement had on its exclusive licensee of the patents-in1658
suit.
The district court denied Voda’s motion for a permanent
injunction, finding that Voda had failed to demonstrate irreparable
1649. Id. at 1359, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094.
1650. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1651. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095.
1652. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094. The Federal Circuit’s 2006 order
affirming the district court’s final judgment, Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 185 F. App’x
953 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), is also referred to as Amado I.
1653. Id. at 1358–61, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094–96.
1654. Id. at 1359 n.1, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095 n.1.
1655. 536 F.3d 1311, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1656. Id. at 1315, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744–45.
1657. Id. at 1315, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1658. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755–56.
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injury and failed to show that monetary damages were inadequate to
1659
Voda appealed the district
compensate for Cordis’s infringement.
1660
The Federal Circuit
court’s denial of the permanent injunction.
affirmed the denial of a permanent injunction, finding that Voda’s
attempt to proof of injury to his exclusive licensee, rather than to
himself, did not provide a basis for entry of a permanent
1661
injunction.
While affirming the denial of a permanent injunction
of the facts of Voda, however, the court noted that “patent owners
that license their patents rather than practice them ‘may be able to
1662
satisfy the traditional four-factor test’ for a permanent injunction.”
1663
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., plaintiff Broadcom filed an
action against Qualcomm for infringement of three of its patents
relating to baseband chips designed to work in cell phones on 3G
1664
networks.
A jury found that Broadcom’s patents were infringed
1665
Subsequently,
and not invalid, and awarded Broadcom damages.
1666
the district court held a bench trial on the issue of injunctive relief.
In support of its motion for an injunction, Broadcom put forth
evidence that it would be irreparably injured because it has a general
policy not to license its patents and that monetary damages were
insufficient because it would not have agreed to enter a licensing
1667
agreement with its direct competitor for strategic business reasons.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the district court entered a
1668
The
permanent injunction against Qualcomm on all patents.
permanent injunction barred Qualcomm’s future sales of products
using Broadcom’s patents but included a “sunset” provision that
allowed “continued sales pursuant to a mandatory royalty through
1669
In its analysis of the eBay factors, the district
January 31, 2009.”
court found that (1) Broadcom had demonstrated irreparable harm
because, even though it did not practice the claimed inventions, the
competition for “design wins” in the baseband marketplace could

1659. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755–56.
1660. Id. at 1315, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1661. Id. at 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756.
1662. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393, 78 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1577, 1579 (2006)).
1663. 543 F.3d 683, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For discussion of
this case’s implications regarding indirect infringement, see supra notes 882–889 and
accompanying text.
1664. Id. at 686, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
1665. Id. at 687, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
1666. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
1667. Id. at 702–04, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–58.
1668. Id. at 687, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
1669. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
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1670

have a competitive effect on firms; (2) the lack of adequate remedy
at law weighed in favor of an injunction with respect to all of the
1671
(3) the permanent injunction would harm
infringed patents;
Qualcomm, but held that “with a sunset provision which ameliorates
the negative effects on Qualcomm, the balance of hardships favors
1672
and (4) an immediate permanent injunction would
Broadcom”;
adversely affect the public, network carriers, and handset
manufacturers, but that the sunset provisions “balance[] the policy of
protecting the patentee’s rights against the desirability of avoiding
1673
immediate market disruptions.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a permanent injunction,
noting that the “district court provided a well-reasoned and
1674
comprehensive opinion addressing injunctive relief.”
The court
held that Broadcom demonstrated irreparable harm, “despite the fact
that it does not currently practice the claimed inventions,” when it
showed that Qualcomm competes indirectly with Broadcom in the
1675
baseband chip market.
The court distinguished this ruling from a
prior decision: whereas in Voda the alleged harm was to an “exclusive
licensee,” in this case Broadcom did not “rely on harm to others, but
rather allege[d] that its own commercial activities will be irreparably
1676
injured by Qualcomm’s infringing activity.”
1677
Likewise, in Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corporation, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court’s decision to grant an injunction despite the
defendant’s arguments that the eBay factors did not warrant one.
Acumed asserted a patent directed to a proximal humeral nail
(“PHN”)—a type of orthopedic nail used for the treatment of
fractures of the upper arm—against one of Stryker’s PHN
1678
products.
In 2005, a jury found willful infringement and awarded
damages, and in early 2006, the district court issued a permanent
1679
injunction.
While Stryker’s appeal was pending in 2006, however, the Supreme
1680
and the Federal Circuit, in addition to
Court decided eBay,
affirming the jury’s verdict and damages award, remanded the case to
1670. Id. at 702–03, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656–57.
1671. Id. at 703–04, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657–58.
1672. Id. at 704, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1673. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
1674. Id. at 702, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
1675. Id. at 703, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1676. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1677. 551 F.3d 1323, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1612 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1678. Id. at 1326, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
1679. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
1680. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577
(2006).
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the district court for reconsideration of the four-factor test for
1681
injunctive relief in light of eBay.
On remand, defendant Stryker responded to Acumed’s motion for
a permanent injunction by submitting an opposition memorandum
supported by the declarations of five physicians attesting to their use
of Stryker’s product, and stating that it was less prone to nail “back1682
out” than Acumed’s competing product.
Stryker also argued that
Acumed’s prior licensing of the asserted patent barred a finding of
1683
irreparable injury.
The district court rejected Stryker’s arguments and again issued a
1684
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded
permanent injunction.
that the district court’s findings and determination were not an abuse
of discretion. First, the Federal Circuit rejected Stryker’s argument
that Acumed’s prior licensing of the asserted patent precluded
findings of irreparable injury and no adequate remedy at law: “While
the fact that a patentee has previously chosen to license the patent
may indicate that a reasonable royalty does compensate for an
infringement, that is but one factor for the district court to
1685
consider.”
The court confirmed the district court’s analysis that
the addition of Stryker as a licensee could still cause Acumed
irreparable harm, stating that:
[a]dding a new competitor to the market may create an irreparable
harm that the prior licenses did not. In this case, the fact that
Acumed licensed the [asserted] patent under two particular sets of
circumstances does not mean that the district court abused its
discretion in not holding that Acumed must now grant a further
license to Stryker and receive only a royalty as compensation.1686

Second, the court rejected Stryker’s arguments that the balance of
hardships counseled against an injunction because the evidence
showed an injunction would cause a hardship for Stryker’s customers
and patients and because Stryker had made significant expenditures
1687
“As a
in designing and manufacturing its infringing product.
preliminary matter, the balance of hardship is only between a
plaintiff and a defendant, and thus the effect on customers and
patients alleged by Stryker is irrelevant under this prong of the

1681. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 811, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481,
1489 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1682. Acumed, 551 F.3d at 1326, 1331, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613, 1617.
1683. Id. at 1327-28, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1684. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614-1615.
1685. Id. at 1328, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1686. Id. at 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
1687. Id. at 1329-30, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615-1616.
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1688

The court also stated, “We also see no abuse of
injunction test.”
discretion in the court’s decision not to consider Stryker’s expenses
in designing and marketing the [accused product], since those are
1689
expenses related to an infringing product.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the district court had
not abused its discretion when it concluded that the public interest
1690
did not preclude an injunction.
The court concluded that the
district court’s findings that there was “considerable dispute” at trial
about whether Stryker’s evidence of a public health issue regarding
screw back-out with Acumed’s competing product was the product of
“biased experts,” and that Stryker had not proven that there was any
public health problem with Acumed’s product were not an abuse of
1691
discretion.
However, while affirming the district court’s ruling, the Federal
1692
The court
Circuit expressed that this presented a close case.
specifically indicated that its affirmance took into account that its
review was under the abuse of discretion standard:
Ultimately, this was a close case, especially with regard to the
irreparable harm and lack of adequate remedy at law prongs of the
four-factor test, in view of past licenses having been granted, and
the public interest prong, in light of testimony that the accused
product was a medically superior one. Nonetheless, the standard
of review, viz., abuse of discretion, compels our decision to affirm
the district court.1693

B. Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is entered before trial to protect a party’s
rights while an infringement trial is pending. Preliminary injunctions
require an examination of the following four factors: (1) likelihood
of success on the merits, (2) harm to the moving party if the
injunction is not granted, (3) the balance of hardships, and (4) the
1694
impact of the injunction on the public interest.
1688. Id. at 1330, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1578 (2006)).
1689. Id. at 1330, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (citing Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF,
Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562, 567 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
1690. Id. at 1330-31, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616-1617.
1691. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616-1617.
1692. Id. at 1332, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
1693. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
1694. See Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1347, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Whether a preliminary injunction should issue
turns upon four factors: (1) the probability that the movant will succeed on the
merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant should a preliminary
injunction be denied; (3) the balance between this harm and the harm that granting
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1695

In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., plaintiff Abbott brought an
infringement action against Sandoz for infringement of its patents
involving its extended release formulations of one its brand name
1696
In granting Abbott a preliminary injunction
antibiotic drugs.
against Sandoz, the district court found that (1) Abbott had
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving infringement of its
1697
(2) Abbott would suffer irreparable harm despite the
patents;
existence of generic producers already in this market because the
generic producers “do not negate the market share and revenue loss
1698
(3) the
upon Sandoz[’s] entry while the litigation proceeds”;
balance of hardships weighed in favor of Abbott because “Abbott will
lose much more if this Court did not enjoin Sandoz’s infringing
conduct than if the Court enjoins Sandoz and it is subsequently
1699
and
found that the ‘718 patent is invalid or unenforceable”;
(4) while the public interest may be served by the availability of less
expensive forms of successful medicines, the court also recognized
“the public interest in creating beneficial and useful products and the
cost involved in that process” and, thus, enforcing the Abbott
1700
Laboratories patent would also serve the public interest.
On appeal, Sandoz argued that the district court had abused its
discretion by granting the preliminary injunction because Sandoz
had raised a “substantial question” as to the validity of the patent at
issue as well as Abbott’s “inequitable conduct” in obtaining the
1701
patents.
1702
Affirming the grant of preliminary injunction, a panel majority
of the Federal Circuit found that the district court had not abused its
discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against Sandoz.
The correct standard is not whether a substantial question has
been raised, but whether the patentee is likely to succeed on the
merits, upon application of the standards of proof that will prevail
at trial. The question is not whether the patent is vulnerable; the
the injunction will cause to the other parties litigant; and (4) the public interest.”)
(quoting Pretty Punch Shoppettes, Inc. v. Hauk, 844 F.2d 782, 783, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1563, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1695. 544 F.3d 1341, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1696. Id. at 1343–44, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65.
1697. Id. at 1361, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1698. Id. at 1361–62, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1699. Id. at 1362, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1700. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179–80.
1701. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1166 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Sandoz assigns legal error to the district court’s rulings that
Abbott is likely to prevail on the issues of validity, infringement, and inequitable
conduct, and states that the district court abused its discretion in balancing the
equities and granting the injunction.”).
1702. Id. at 1371, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1186.
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question is who is likely to prevail in the end, considered with
equitable factors that relate to whether the status quo should or
should not be preserved while the trial is ongoing.
The
presentation of sufficient evidence to show the likelihood of
prevailing on the merits is quite different from the presentation of
1703
substantial evidence to show vulnerability.

The majority opinion also provided an overview of the law granting
preliminary injunction to address the issues raised by Judge Gajarsa’s
1704
dissent.
Writing for the majority, Judge Newman noted that “[no]
circuit has held that it suffices to raise a ‘substantial question’” as to
1705
The
whether or not a defendant is likely to prevail on the merits.
court went on to hold that “[r]aising a substantial question may avoid
dismissal on the pleadings, but contrary to the view of the dissent,
establishing that there is an issue for trial is not the same as
1706
establishing the likelihood of prevailing at trial.”
In his dissent, Judge Gajarsa found that there was “no legal basis
for the granting of the preliminary injunction and its issuance is an
1707
abuse of discretion.”
Judge Gajarsa focused on the preliminary
injunction factor of “a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits”
and argued that there were “substantial questions of both validity and
enforceability of the ‘718 patent preventing a finding of likelihood of
1708
The dissent found that the district court
success on the merits.”
erred when it failed to “properly consider and weigh the ample
evidence produced by Sandoz that clearly established a substantial
question of invalidity and rendered the patent vulnerable to an
1709
Furthermore, the dissent argued that
invalidity challenge at trial.”
the district court had abused its discretion by finding the “concededly
false statement” made by Abbott to be immaterial and thus failing to
1710
find a substantial question of inequitable conduct on Abbott’s part.
1711
In Judkins v. HT Window Fashion Corp.,
the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for preliminary
1712
The patents at
injunction based on a Lanham Act counterclaim.
issue in Judkins involved a process for manufacturing window
1713
coverings.
On HT’s motion for a preliminary injunction, HT
1703.
1704.
1705.
1706.
1707.
1708.
1709.
1710.
1711.
1712.
1713.

Id. at 1364, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–81.
Id. at 1363–68, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–84.
Id. at 1368, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184.
Id. at 1369, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184.
Id. at 1371, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1186.
Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194.
Id. at 1372, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1187.
Id. at 1379–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.
529 F.3d 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1336, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
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alleged that Judkins had “violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
by sending HT’s customers and potential customers letters stating
that an HT product infringed its patents” and that Judkins had acted
1715
in bad faith because he knew that his patent was unenforceable.
The district court denied HT’s motion for preliminary injunction
holding that “HT could not establish bad faith or overcome the
presumption of the patent’s validity by clear and convincing evidence
and therefore could not show the requisite likelihood of success on
1716
the merits.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of HT’s
1717
Plaintiff Judkins obtained his
request for a preliminary injunction.
‘120 patent for the process after the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences granted priority for his patent application over a patent
assigned to a competitor and soon filed a suit against HT for
1718
The court rejected HT’s argument
infringement of its ‘120 patent.
that the district court had erred when it failed to find that an earlier
settlement was collusive and thus indicative of bad faith on Judkins
assertion of the ‘120 patent; instead, the court deferred to the court’s
judgment and declined to make an assumption on the district court’s
1719
diligence.
The court also rejected HT’s arguments that the district
court clearly erred by questioning the substance of the finding in an
earlier litigation, applying a presumption of validity, and failing to
1720
use the “objective baselessness” standard of bad faith.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. MacDermid
1721
Printing Solutions, L.L.C.
The patents at issue in DuPont were
directed to a process for preparing a flexographic printing plate from
1722
a photosensitive element for use in the process.
In opposition to
DuPont’s motion for a preliminary injunction, defendant MacDermid
argued that DuPont could not show a likelihood of success on the
merits because DuPont’s patent “was invalid under Section 102(b)
because the invention was on sale or in public use before the critical
date . . . of February 27, 2001, or one year before the filing date of the

1714. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
1715. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
1716. Id. at 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
1717. Id. at 1344–45, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361.
1718. Id. at 1337, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
1719. Id. at 1341, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358.
1720. Id. at 1341–42, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357–59.
1721. 525 F.3d 1353, 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
[hereinafter DuPont].
1722. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
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1723

The district court agreed and denied
non-provisional application.”
DuPont’s motion for a preliminary injunction because DuPont had
not shown that MacDermid’s asserted invalidity defenses lacked
1724
substantial merit.
On appeal of the preliminary injunction, the Federal Circuit found
that the district court had abused its discretion in finding that a
“substantial question” as to the validity of the patent existed because
the “non-provisional application was entitled to the filing date of the
1725
The court vacated and
provisional application as a matter of law.”
remanded the case for consideration because the district court had
not reached “the parties’ remaining arguments as to validity and
enforceability as well as the remaining preliminary injunction
1726
factors.”
1727
In Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc.,
Proctor &
Gamble (“P & G”) filed an action against Kraft for infringement of its
patent for a plastic container, intended to replace conventional metal
cans for marketing and storing ground coffee, and moved for a
1728
While the motion for preliminary
preliminary injunction.
injunction was pending, the district court granted Kraft’s motion to
1729
stay, effectively denying P & G’s motion for preliminary injunction.
1730
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the
P & G appealed.
lower court had “abused its discretion by effectively denying P & G’s
motion for a preliminary injunction without considering and
1731
The Federal Circuit rejected the
balancing the required factors.”
district court’s refusal to hear P & G’s arguments regarding
likelihood of success without first construing the claims, as well as its
refusal to consider arguments regarding irreparable harm and the
balance of hardships on the basis that such arguments would only be
1732
considered if Kraft’s motion for a stay were not granted.
The court
remanded the matter to the district court for a full evaluation of the
1733
preliminary injunction factors.

1723. Id. at 1355, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.
1724. Id. at 1357, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736.
1725. Id. at 1358, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737.
1726. Id. at 1354, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734.
1727. No. 2008-1105, 2008 WL 5101824, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. Dec.
5, 2008).
1728. Id. at *1, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
1729. Id. at *1, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086–87.
1730. Id. at *2, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
1731. Id. at *4, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
1732. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088–89.
1733. Id. at *6, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
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C. Damages
1734

In TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp.,
plaintiff TiVo
brought a suit against Echostar in the Eastern District of Texas for
infringement of claims related to its patent on technology that
enables television users to “time-shift” television signals thereby
enabling users to digitally record and replay the program on the
1735
user’s television set.
The district court entered judgment on the
jury award of $73,991,964 in damages for TiVo ($32,663,906 in lost
profits and $41,328,058 in reasonable royalties), and Echostar
1736
appealed.
Even though it reversed the verdict of infringement as
to two of the four claims on which the jury had found infringement,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the damages awarded by the district
court “[b]ecause the damages calculation at trial was not predicated
on the infringement of particular claims, and because we have
upheld the jury’s verdict that all of the accused devices infringe the
1737
software claims.”
The Federal Circuit also noted that the district
court’s injunction was stayed pending the appeal and, once the
appeal becomes final, the district court can make a determination of
additional damages that TiVo may have sustained while the stay of the
1738
permanent injunction has been in effect.
1.

Lost profits
In order for a patent owner to recover lost profits as opposed to a
reasonable royalty, the patent owner must “prove a causal relation
between the infringement and its loss of profits. The patent owner
must show that ‘but for’ the infringement, it would have made the
1739
infringer’s sales.”
1740
In American Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc.,
American Seating
filed an action against USSC alleging that two of USSC’s wheelchair
tie-down devices, the VPRo I and the VPRo II, infringed its patent for
1741
The
a wheelchair restraint system for use in mass transit vehicles.
jury returned a verdict including an award of lost profits from
convoyed sales of non-patented products to American Seating. The
district court granted in part USSC’s motion for remittitur by setting
1734. 516 F.3d 1290, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed Cir. 2008).
1735. Id. at 1294, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
1736. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
1737. Id. at 1312, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
1738. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
1739. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1740. 514 F.3d 1262, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1741. Id. at 1265–66, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
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aside a portion of the verdict related to convoyed sales, because “the
record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to American
Seating, was insufficient as a matter of law for the jury to find that the
patented tie-down system and unpatented passenger seats were part
1742
The district court reduced the original
of a single functional unit.”
1743
American
jury award of $2,326,129 in lost profits to $676,850.
Seating appealed the district court’s decision setting aside a portion
of the jury’s verdict and USSC cross-appealed the district court’s
confirmation of the “jury’s award of lost profit damages for sales of
1744
the non-infringing VPRo II.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
trial court’s conclusions that American Seating failed as a matter of
law to meet its burden of establishing a functional relationship
between passenger seats and the patented restraint system, and the
jury properly awarded damages for lost profits on USSC’s deliveries
of the VPRo II predicated upon offers to sell the infringing VPRo
1745
I.

The court also noted that “[b]ecause it is clear that no interrelated
or functional relationship inheres between the seats and the tie-down
restraint system on a passenger bus, the district court was correct that
the jury had no basis to conclude that lost profits on collateral sales of
1746
passenger seats were due American Seating.”
1747
In Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp.,
Cohesive
Technologies brought three related actions accusing Waters of
infringing its patents relating to high-performance liquid
chromatography (“HLPC”), a process for separating, identifying, and
1748
Following a bench
measuring compounds contained in a liquid.
trial, the district court concluded that Cohesive was not entitled to
lost profits as a result of infringement, because Waters had acceptable
1749
The Federal Circuit vacated the lower
noninfringing substitutes.
court’s ruling that Cohesive was not entitled to lost profits because it
was “unclear whether the other product available, standing alone,
1750
Specifically, the
would have been an acceptable substitute.”
Federal Circuit did not understand what the district court meant in
its differentiation between a “fully-acceptable substitute” and a
1742.
1743.
1744.
1745.
1746.
1747.
1748.
1749.
1750.

Id. at 1268–69, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id. at 1266, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
Id. at 1269–70, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687–88.
Id. at 1268, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
Id. at 1269, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
543 F.3d 1351, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1903 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1357–58, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905–06.
Id. at 1372, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
Id. at 1357, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
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1751

The court remanded for
“reasonably acceptable substitute.”
“reconsideration based upon its determination of (1) whether the
25 mm columns infringe under the correct claim construction; and
(2) whether the 2.1 x 20 mm columns are acceptable noninfringing
1752
substitutes.”
2.

Reasonable royalty
1753
Monsanto brought an infringement
In Monsanto Co. v. David,
action against David, a commercial farmer, for infringement of its
1754
Monsanto claimed
patents involving genes used in soybean seeds.
that David had planted soybean seeds with the patented genes in
1755
2003 that were improperly saved from the previous year’s harvest.
The district court entered judgment against David for willfully
infringing Monsanto’s patent and for breach of the technology
agreement by planting saved seed from the prior year’s harvest and
1756
awarded Monsanto reasonable royalty damages of $226,214.40.
1757
David appealed the district court’s judgment.
The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s reasonable royalty
calculation of $55.04 per infringing seed unit but vacated the district
1758
court’s calculation of seed density of 107.5 pounds per acre.
The
Federal Circuit found it significant that there was confusion
concerning the 120 pound per acre density estimate that David had
1759
Based on the transcript and
offered during his trial testimony.
David’s “extensive previous testimony,” which showed that David had
never estimated planting the Monsanto seed at more than seventy-five
pounds per acre, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 120 pound
density figure that David referenced was for conventional seed, not
1760
While noting the
seed utilizing Monsanto’s patented genes.
district court’s “difficult task of determining the total soybean acreage
planted by David in 2003 and the density of seed used in those fields”
in order to assess the number of infringing seed units planted by
David, the court nevertheless found that the district court’s
determination was “clearly erroneous” because it had based its

1751.
1752.
1753.
1754.
1755.
1756.
1757.
1758.
1759.
1760.

Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
Id. at 1373–74, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917–18.
516 F.3d 1009, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1963 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1011–12, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965–66.
Id. at 1012, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
Id. at 1013, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
Id. at 1019–20, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1971.
Id. at 1019, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1971.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970–71.
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1761

calculation on the use of an anomalous 120 pound density figure.
Thus, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling on this
issue and remanded for further fact-finding concerning the soybean
1762
density issue.
1763
In Amado v. Microsoft Corp., the district court awarded plaintiff
Amado a post-verdict royalty equivalent to $0.12 per infringing unit
for products sold during the stay of a permanent injunction against
1764
Microsoft.
The district court reached $0.12 by trebling the preverdict reasonable royalty of $0.04, reasoning that post-verdict sales
1765
should be considered willful infringement.
Reviewing the award
on appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that willfulness “is not the
inquiry when the infringement is permitted by a court-ordered
1766
The court vacated the district court’s award because it “did
stay.”
not expressly consider that Microsoft’s infringing sales took place
1767
The Federal
following the grant of an injunction that was stayed.”
Circuit remanded the matter for reconsideration because the court
was “unable to determine whether the district court’s award of $0.12
1768
was a reasonable exercise of its discretion.”
In addition, Microsoft argued that any damages awarded to Amado
1769
must be adjusted in light of Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., which
held “that liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) does not extend to the
installation of software onto a computer abroad when the copies of
that software are made abroad, because in such case the copies are
not ‘supplied’ from the United States within the meaning of that
1770
statute.”
Based on AT & T, Microsoft argued that “[a]ny damages
awarded to Amado should . . . be limited to products manufactured
1771
Though the Federal Circuit
and or sold in the United Sates.”
concluded that “Microsoft is entitled to assert the AT & T decision,”
the court was “unable to determine whether the infringing products
sold by Microsoft were provided in such a way as to not be ‘supplied
1772
from the United States’ as required to extinguish § 271(f) liability.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit remanded to the district court “to decide

1761.
1762.
1763.
1764.
1765.
1766.
1767.
1768.
1769.
1770.
1771.
1772.

Id. at 1018–19, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
Id. at 1019, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1971.
517 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
Id. at 1361, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1096.
Id. at 1362, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097.
550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007).
Amado, 517 F.3d at 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
Id. at 1364, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
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the applicability of AT & T” along with its reconsideration of the
1773
“proper disbursement of funds from escrow.”
3.

Costs
1774
In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. PDI Communications Systems, Inc.,
plaintiff Zenith brought an action against PDI for infringement of its
patents relating to televisions and wired remote controls used in
1775
Among its other summary judgment rulings, the
hospital rooms.
district court denied PDI’s motion for costs without further
1776
The Federal Circuit agreed
explanation and PDI cross-appealed.
with PDI that “Seventh Circuit law requires the district court to
1777
provide some explanation of its decision regarding costs.”
However, the court noted that because the court vacated and
remanded several of the district court’s summary judgment rulings, it
was “in no position to opine on whether PDI should ultimately be
1778
The
deemed the prevailing party for purposes of recovering costs.”
court held that PDI could move again for costs and that the district
court’s “conclusion on that issue should be accompanied by an
1779 1780
explanation in accordance with Krocka[ v. City of Chicago] .”
4.

Marking
1781
In Wine Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Railway Equipment Co.,
the Supreme Court held that “under the predecessor statute to the
notice provision of 35 U.S.C. § 287, a patentee who fails to mark his
patented article with the appropriate patent number could only
recover damages for infringement occurring after actual notice was
1782
1783
provided the infringer.”
In DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that the district court misapplied Wine Railway
because it failed to recognize “that a patentee may indeed recover
damages for infringement that continues after actual notice is
1784
provided.”

1773. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
1774. 522 F.3d 1348, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1775. Id. at 1351–52, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514–15.
1776. Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
1777. Id. at 1367, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1778. Id., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1779. 203 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2000).
1780. Zenith, 522 F.3d at 1367, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
1781. 297 U.S. 387, 28 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299 (1936).
1782. DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1687, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1783. 537 F.3d 1342, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1784. Id. at 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
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DSW brought an action against Shoe Pavilion for infringement of
its patents for a system of storing and displaying a large selection of
1785
The district court granted
footwear for customer self-service.
summary judgment for Shoe Pavilion, citing Wine Railway and
holding that “no damages for infringement are recoverable by a
plaintiff unless the infringing activity continues after notice is
1786
provided to the infringer.”
The district court excused post-notice
infringement because “Shoe Pavilion took reasonable steps and
1787
The Federal
timely removed all of the infringing shoe displays.”
Circuit reversed the district court’s holding, stating that the trial
court had “erred in concluding that Shoe Pavilion’s reasonable steps
and good faith efforts to bring its infringing activity to a timely end
1788
equated to an immediate cessation.”
The court held that the
“district misapplied the standard expressed by the Supreme Court in
1789
Wine Railway” and that “a patentee may indeed recover damages
for infringement that continues after actual notice is provided”
regardless of how diligently the infringer takes steps to stop
1790
The court reiterated that “the law offers an infringer
infringing.
no exception to liability for the time it takes to terminate infringing
1791
activities, no matter how expeditious and reasonable its efforts.”
IX. PENALTIES
A. Enhanced Damages for Willful Infringement
Patent infringement is a strict liability offense; therefore, the
nature of the offense is only relevant in determining whether
1792
enhanced damages are warranted.
The Patent Act does not
1793
provide any standard for the award of enhanced damages.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has held that an award of enhanced
1794
damages requires a showing of willful infringement.
In 2007, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its earlier
precedent and changed the standard for a finding of willful
infringement “from one of an affirmative duty of care to one of
1785. Id. at 1344, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688.
1786. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1787. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690.
1788. Id. at 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
1789. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
1790. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
1791. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
1792. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,
1868 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
1793. Id. at 1368 n.3, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868 n.3.
1794. Id. at 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
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1795

Thus, to support an award of enhanced
objective recklessness.”
damages, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
1796
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.
1797
In Minks v. Polaris Industries, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
whether a jury’s finding of willfulness in a trial that occurred before
1798
In re Seagate Technology, LLC
must be reversed in light of that
1799
In Minks, the owner of a
decision, and concluded that it did not.
patent directed to an electronic governor system for internal
combustion engines sued Polaris Industries, a manufacturer of all1800
terrain vehicles (“ATVs”), for infringement.
Approximately one
year before filing suit—and after the parties had exchanged several
communications regarding Minks’s patent rights—Minks sent a letter
informing Polaris of its belief that Polaris’s ATVs infringed Minks’s
1801
At the conclusion of the evidence at trial, the jury was
patent.
given a willfulness instruction that Polaris argued on appeal was plain
1802
error in light of Seagate, but to which Polaris did not object at trial.
1803
The
The jury found that Polaris willfully infringed Minks’s patent.
district court subsequently granted enhanced damages and attorney
1804
fees.
When a jury instruction is not objected to at trial, the appeals court
1805
will review the instruction only for “plain error.”
The Federal
Circuit in Minks applied the regional circuit’s plain error review
standard:
Under [the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit’s] plain error review, an appellate court must not correct an
error the defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there
is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.
If all three of those conditions are met, the court may exercise its
discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error

1795. Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1380, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102,
1114 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1796. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, , 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870.
1797. 546 F.3d 1364, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1798. 497 F.3d 1360, 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en
banc).
1799. Id. at 1379–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114–15.
1800. Id. at 1367–69, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104–06.
1801. Id. at 1369, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1802. Id. at 1379, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
1803. Id. at 1369, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1804. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. However, the district court subsequently
granted Polaris’s motion for a reduction in damages and reduced Minks’s original
award. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1805. Id. at 1379, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
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seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
1806
judicial proceedings.

Affirming the jury’s finding of willfulness, the Federal Circuit
concluded that it did not need to decide whether the instruction
given to the jury constituted plain error, because Polaris failed to
offer any argument or to cite any evidence to establish that any
alleged error affected its substantial rights or affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings—the third and
1807
fourth elements of the Eleventh Circuit’s plain error standard.
Specifically, Polaris made no argument that the jury would not have
found willfulness if it was instructed differently, arguing instead that
the jury’s willfulness finding “affected its substantial rights because it
resulted in the imposition of enhanced damages and attorney
1808
fees.”
The Federal Circuit also stated that it did not think Polaris
could have shown that the alleged error in the jury instruction
affected its substantial rights because the trial court’s order granting
enhanced damages stated that it was “fairly clear” that deliberate
1809
Based
copying had taken place and that “the case was not close.”
on that record, the Federal Circuit stated “it appears that error in the
jury instruction was not prejudicial because the jury may very well
1810
have arrived at the same result.”
The Federal Circuit also stated
that there had been no argument that the outcome of the case might
“seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
1811
judicial proceedings,” and affirmed the jury’s willfulness verdict.
B. Award of Attorney Fees
Section 285 of the Patent Act provides that “[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
1812
prevailing party.”
Under that section, the trial court must first
determine whether the particular case is “exceptional,” a
determination that must be based on clear and convincing
1813
If the court finds that it is, the trial court must then
evidence.
1806. Id. at 1379–80, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114 (quoting United States v.
LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 930 (11th Cir. 2006)).
1807. Id. at 1380–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114–15.
1808. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
1809. Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115 (quoting Minks v. Polaris Indus.,
Inc., No. 6:05-cv-1894-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 788418, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2007)).
1810. Id. at 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
1811. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115 (quoting United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d
914, 930 (11th Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original).
1812. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
1813. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1682, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006)).
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determine, as a matter of discretion, whether to award attorney
1814
However, “[i]n order to provide a basis for meaningful
fees.
review” of the decision to award attorney fees under section 285, the
court of appeals requires the trial court not only to make the ultimate
finding that the case is exceptional, “but also to articulate the more
particular factual findings from which the finding of ‘exceptional
1815
circumstances’ follows.”
1816
In Innovation Technologies, Inc. v. Splash! Medical Devices, LLC, the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded an award of attorney fees
under § 285 because the district court did not provide sufficient
1817
factual findings to allow for appellate review.
In that case, more
than one year after filing suit and following extensive discovery (but
1818
prior to a Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
hearing),
Innovation executed a covenant not to sue Splash on the patent at
1819
issue and moved to dismiss its infringement suit with prejudice.
Splash subsequently moved for attorney fees pursuant to § 285. The
district court granted the motion in a one-paragraph order stating in
relevant part:
This case qualifies as an “exceptional” case under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 justifying an award of attorney’s fees to Splash as the
prevailing party. Splash has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that Innovation knew or, on reasonable investigation,
should have known, that its claims of infringement were baseless.
It appears to me that the lawsuit was filed solely for the purpose of
1820
harassing a small competitor.

The Federal Circuit held that “[t]he three conclusory statements
quoted above—which merely stated that this is an exceptional case,
that Innovation knew or should have known that its claims of
infringement were ‘baseless,’ and that it ‘appear[ed]’ that the suit
was filed ‘solely’ to ‘harass’ a small competitor,” were inadequate to
1821
allow the Federal Circuit to perform its review function.
On remand, the district court was provided with latitude to select
the bases for its conclusion that the case was exceptional:
1814. See id. at 1329, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (noting the “limited
circumstance in which an award of attorney fees is appropriate”).
1815. Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582, 226
U.S.P.Q. 821, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Hughes v. Novi Am., Inc., 724 F.2d 122,
124, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 707, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1816. 528 F.3d 1348, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1817. Id. at 1351–52, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
1818. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
1819. Id. at 1350, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1820. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (quoting Order Granting Splash’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees, No. 07-1424 (C.A. Fed. Mar. 22, 2007)) (emphasis added).
1821. Id. at 1351, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
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Of course, the district court need not necessarily make findings
on all of [the points raised by the parties]. Findings on those issues
upon which the court bases its new determination of the
“exceptional case” issue are all that is required. The detail
necessary . . . is a matter largely within the district court’s
1822
discretion.

If the district court awards attorney fees based on its exceptional
case finding, it must also explain the reasons for the conclusion that
1823
such an award is warranted.
Over a dissenting opinion, the Federal Circuit held that the trial
court’s findings of inequitable conduct and litigation misconduct
could justify an exceptional case finding in Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania,
1824
Inc.
In a 2000 complaint, Nilssen accused Osram of infringing
twenty-six patents relating to fluorescent light bulbs and ballasts used
1825
in combination with fluorescent light bulbs.
Over the next five
years, Nilssen informally removed several of those patents from the
case while attempting to assert additional patents through a variety of
means, all without formally releasing Osram from infringement
1826
By the time of trial, Nilssen formally
liability on any of the patents.
1827
reduced the number of patents being asserted to eleven.
Following a bench trial on inequitable conduct, the district court
held that the asserted patents were unenforceable because Nilssen
had misclaimed small entity status and improperly paid small entity
maintenance fees, failed to disclose to the patent examiner litigation
related to the patent applications, misclaimed the priority of earlier
filing dates, withheld material prior art, and submitted misleading
1828
In a 2007 decision,
affidavits to the Patent and Trademark Office.
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s inequitable conduct
1829
ruling.
In addition, Nilssen engaged in litigation conduct, which the
district court found was relevant to the exceptional case finding.
Nilssen had refused to provide a witness for a deposition absent a
court instruction to do so, claiming that its own unverified
interrogatory responses had no legal effect at trial, claimed reliance
on tax counsel’s advice as a defense to inequitable conduct after
1822. Id. at 1352, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
1823. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
1824. 528 F.3d 1352, 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1825. Id. at 1354, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
1826. Id. at 1354–55, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
1827. Id. at 1355, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162–63.
1828. Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1829. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1235–36, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1811, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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having asserted attorney-client privilege over such advice, and had
1830
produced documents late.
On Osram’s post-trial motion for attorney fees, the district court
concluded that the case was exceptional and awarded Osram its
1831
attorney fees.
The district court identified three reasons for
finding exceptionality: “Nilssen’s inequitable conduct, the frivolous
1832
nature of the lawsuit, and [Nilssen’s] litigation misconduct.”
In reviewing the district court’s exceptional case determination,
the Federal Circuit first clarified that there is no per se rule of
exceptionality in cases involving inequitable conduct but, in
appropriate cases, a finding of inequitable conduct can constitute a
1833
The Court then rejected
basis for the award of attorney fees.
appellant Nilssen’s argument that the district court’s exceptional case
finding should be reversed because Nilssen’s inequitable conduct was
“benign,” stating “[i]f certain conduct has been held to be
inequitable, and we have affirmed the district court’s conclusion that
1834
it was here, it is hence per se not benign.”
The Court explained that the inequitable conduct determination
was not the sole basis for the district court’s award of attorney fees
and that the findings regarding Nilssen’s litigation misconduct also
1835
The Federal Circuit
supported the exceptional case finding.
declined to independently address Nilssen’s arguments that each
instance of litigation misconduct found by the district court was
either harmless oversight of a litigation formality or a permissibly
rough litigation tactic.
As an appellate court, we are ill-suited to weigh such evidence.
All of the instances described above are context-specific, and the
district court found that, taken in context, they amounted to
litigation misconduct . . . . [W]e are not left with the firm
conviction that a mistake was committed. Furthermore, it ill
behooves an appellate court to overrule a trial judge concerning
litigation misconduct when the litigation occurred in front of the
1836
trial judge, not the appellate court.

Finally, the Court stated that the abuse of discretion standard of
review was central to its decision to affirm the district court’s grant of
1837
attorney fees.
1830.
1831.
1832.
1833.
1834.
1835.
1836.
1837.

Nilssen, 528 F.3d at 1355–56, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id. at 1356, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id. at 1358, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65.
Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1360, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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Dissenting, Judge Newman stated that the majority’s decision
“promotes unexceptional trial procedures and non-culpable
prosecution errors into an ‘exceptional case’ of such severity as to
1838
First citing the “American
warrant the award of attorney fees.”
Rule” that “one should not be penalized for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit,” her opinion reviewed in detail the Federal
Circuit’s 2007 decision upholding the finding of inequitable conduct
and argued that the findings in that opinion did not justify the
1839
Judge Newman also argued that the panel
majority’s conclusion.
majority’s analysis was a departure from Federal Circuit precedent
because the majority held that “the nature of the grounds on which
inequitable conduct [is] found is not relevant to the attorney fee
1840
determination.”
Her dissent concluded that the panel majority’s
holding “enlarges the scope of ‘exceptional case’ to include less than
egregious aspects of patent prosecution and litigation practice, with
1841
no evidence or charge of bad faith or prejudice.”
1842
In Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
Qualcomm’s litigation misconduct, standing alone, was sufficient to
1843
justify an award of attorney fees under § 285.
In response to
Qualcomm’s complaint of patent infringement alleging that
Broadcom products, which utilized the H.264 video compression
standard, infringed patents owned by Qualcomm, Broadcom raised a
defense that Qualcomm’s patents were unenforceable because
Qualcomm failed to disclose the patents to a Joint Video Team
(“JVT”) standards-setting organization during discussions leading to
1844
the adoption of the H.264 video compression standard.
Throughout discovery and the trial, Qualcomm represented that it
did not participate in the JVT during the development of the relevant
standard and, therefore, had no duty to disclose its patents to that
1845
During cross-examination on one of the last days of the
body.
1838. Id. at 1361, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
1839. See id. at 1361–63, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167–68 (quoting Summit Valley
Indus., Inc. v. Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 724 (1982))
(stating that the majority had truncated its explanation of the underlying facts).
1840. Id. at 1364, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
1841. Id. at 1365, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
1842. 548 F.3d 1004, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For discussion of
this case’s implications regarding breach of duty to a standards setting organization,
see supra notes 1551–1556.
1843. See id. at 1027, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337–38 (concluding that Broadcom
should receive attorney fees related to the exceptional case determination).
1844. See id. at 1008–09, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323–24 (summarizing the district
court’s conclusion that Qualcomm’s patent was unenforceable because of its
inequitable conduct).
1845. Id. at 1009, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
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infringement trial, however, a Qualcomm witness acknowledged that
she possessed emails relating to the JVT that Qualcomm previously
1846
Ultimately, it was revealed that Qualcomm
claimed did not exist.
possessed over 200,000 pages of emails and electronic documents
demonstrating that Qualcomm had participated in the JVT from as
1847
The district court later concluded that
early as January 2002.
Qualcomm “knowingly attempted in trial to continue the
1848
concealment of evidence.”
It also determined, based on the lateproduced evidence, that Qualcomm engaged in a “carefully
orchestrated plan . . . to achieve its goal of holding hostage the entire
industry desiring to practice the H.264 standard” by concealing from
the JVT the existence of the asserted patents, and held numerous
1849
Qualcomm patents unenforceable.
Following trial, the district court granted Broadcom’s motion for
attorney fees, basing its exceptional case determination both on
Qualcomm’s “bad faith participation” in the JVT and Qualcomm’s
“litigation misconduct . . . during discovery, motions practice, trial,
1850
and post-trial proceedings.”
On appeal, Qualcomm argued that the district court’s grant of
attorney fees should be vacated because it was based in part on
Qualcomm’s bad faith participation in the JVT and that “a patentee’s
bad faith business conduct toward an accused infringer prior to
litigation” should not be factored into an award of attorney fees
1851
The Federal Circuit held that the district court’s
under § 285.
findings regarding Qualcomm’s bad faith participation in the JVT
were not clearly erroneous, and that the district court’s litigation
misconduct findings were sufficient standing alone to support the
1852
exceptional case determination.
Accordingly, “in the
circumstances of the present case it was not error for the district
court to additionally consider the related JVT misconduct, which was
an important predicate to understanding and evaluating the
1853
litigation misconduct.”

1846. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
1847. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
1848. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 (quoting Order on Remedy for Finding of
Waiver, Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1245 (S.D. Cal.
2007) (Civ. No. 05-CV-1958-B(BLM))).
1849. Id. at 1009–10, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
1850. Id. at 1010, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324–25 (quoting Qualcomm Inc. v.
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-CV-1958, 2007 WL 2261799 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007)).
1851. Id. at 1026–27, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1852. Id. at 1027, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
1853. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
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1854

In Minks v. Polaris Industries, Inc., based on a jury’s finding of
willful infringement, the district court determined that the case was
1855
The
exceptional under § 285 and awarded Minks attorney fees.
district court determined that a “reasonable fee” was $234,663.00, but
awarded only half that amount on the basis that Minks’s damages
theory was “economic nonsense” and that the reduction was
warranted to offset “the great deal of time during trial [that] was
wasted by Plaintiff attempting to evade the basic laws of economics
1856
and common sense.”
On Minks’s appeal of the reduced attorney fees award, the Federal
1857
“[W]e detect no abuse of discretion in the award
Circuit affirmed.
of attorney fees. Even on appeal, Minks remains unable or unwilling
1858
to articulate a coherent damages theory.”
1859
Finally, in Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of an exceptional
case and award of $16,800,000 in attorney fees against generic drug
manufacturer defendants. The court found no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s finding that the totality of circumstances,
including the lack of a good faith basis for Paragraph IV ANDA
certifications and numerous instances of litigation misconduct,
1860
merited the award.
The district court’s award was supported in part by the fact that
defendants Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. and Genpharm, Inc. (collectively,
“Alphapharm”)
and
Mylan
Laboratories,
Inc.,
Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and UDL Laboratories, Inc. (collectively,
“Mylan”) had changed their invalidity arguments from those initially
1861
In particular,
presented in their Paragraph IV certification letters.
the district court found Alphapharm’s certification letter to be
“baseless” and Mylan’s to have been “filed in bad faith and with no
1862
On appeal, defendant-appellants were
reasonable basis . . . .”
joined in amicus curiae by the Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
in arguing that “ANDA filers should be allowed to litigate the best
available theories at trial,” regardless of whether the theories were

1854. 546 F.3d 1364, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1855. Id. at 1375, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110.
1856. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110 (quoting Order, Minks v. Polaris Indus.,
Inc., No. 6:05-cv-1894-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 1725211, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2007)).
1857. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110.
1858. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110.
1859. 549 F. 3d 1381, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1860. Id. at 1384, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220.
1861. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220.
1862. Id. at 1385, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221 (internal quotations omitted).
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1863

Amicus and the
initially included in the certification letters.
defendant-appellants argued that affirming the district court’s
decision would “have a chilling effect on future ANDA patent
1864
challenges.”
The Federal Circuit found this “chilling” argument unpersuasive.
The court noted that, in making a Paragraph IV certification, ANDA
filers are required by statute to “include a detailed statement of the
factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent
1865
The court did not find that the district court’s opinion
is invalid.”
had limited ANDA filers to only those theories of invalidity raised in
1866
certification letters.
The district court’s finding of an exceptional
case was supported by the specific circumstances of the case, namely
“baseless certification letters compounded with litigation
1867
misconduct.”
X. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
A. Administrative Law
Congress established the inter partes reexamination procedure in
1868
the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (“AIPA”).
Inter
partes reexamination allows third parties to have an expanded role in
the reexamination of issued patents by allowing the third party “to
participate in the reexamination by submitting written comments
addressing issues raised in the patent owner’s response to an office
action, appealing a decision in favor of patentability, and
1869
participating as a party to an appeal taken by the patent owner.”
The AIPA includes the following provision establishing its effective
date: “Subject to subsection (b), this subtitle and the amendments
made by this subtitle shall take effect on the date of the enactment of
this Act and shall apply to any patent that issues from an original
1870
application filed in the United States on or after that date.”
1871
In Cooper Technologies Co. v. Dudas, the Federal Circuit considered
1872
the meaning of the phrase “original application” in § 4608 of AIPA.
1863. Id. at 1386, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
1864. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222.
1865. Id. at 1390, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225 (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2006).
1866. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
1867. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225.
1868. Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4001–4808, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-552 to -591 (1999).
1869. Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1332, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705,
1706 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1870. § 4608, 113 Stat. at 1501A-572 (emphasis added).
1871. Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705.
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The Federal Circuit concluded that the PTO interpretation of
“original application” as encompassing “utility, plant and design
applications, including first filed applications, continuations,
divisionals, continuations-in-part, continued prosecution applications
and the national stage phase of international applications” is
1873
1874
reasonable and is entitled to Chevron deference.
In Cooper, third party Thomas & Betts Corporation requested an
inter partes reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,984,791 owned by
1875
Cooper responded that
appellant Cooper Technologies Company.
inter partes reexamination was not available because the original
application that resulted in the ‘791 patent was filed before
1876
The PTO
November 29, 1999, the effective date of the AIPA.
determined that the application resulting in the ‘791 patent, though
a continuation of an earlier application, was an “original application”
for the purposes of the AIPA and, thus, was subject to inter partes
1877
reexamination.
The reexamination went forward over Cooper’s
objection and the Patent Office issued an initial office action
1878
rejecting all claims of the patent as invalid.
1879
Cooper sued the Director of the PTO in U.S. district court.
The
district court found that the PTO’s interpretation was “fully
consistent with the term [original application]’s established meaning
1880
in patent law” and granted summary judgment in favor of the PTO.
The district court, however, declined to address the question of the
level of deference accorded to the PTO’s interpretation of “original

1872. Id. at 1335–37, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709–11.
1873. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984),
the Supreme Court set forth the legal analysis for determining whether to grant
deference to a government agency’s interpretation of its own statutory mandate.
Under Chevron, a reviewing court must first ask “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at
an end; the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” Id. at 843. If, however, “the statute in question is ambiguous and the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable,” Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005), “a court must defer to the agency’s
construction of a statute governing agency conduct.” Id.
1874. Cooper, 536 F.3d at 1331–32, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706 (quoting Rules to
Implement Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,756, 76,757
(Dec. 7, 2000)).
1875. Id. at 1334, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1876. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1877. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1878. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1879. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1880. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, No.
1:07-CV-853, 2007 WL 4233467, at *4, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465, 1468–69 (E.D. Va. Nov.
30, 2007)).
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application,” finding instead that the outcome would be the same
1881
regardless of the level of deference owed to the PTO.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the appropriate level of
1882
deference for the PTO’s interpretation of the AIPA.
The Federal
Circuit found that, because the PTO was merely clarifying or
explaining existing law, its reading of the term “original application”
was “interpretative” rather than “substantive” and, therefore, within
1883
Because the PTO was
the PTO’s authority under 35 U.S.C. § 2.
acting within its authority to administer statutory provisions relating
to the “conduct of proceedings in the Office,” the Court found that
the PTO’s interpretation was entitled to analysis under the Chevron
1884
Finding that Congress had not directly spoken on the
framework.
issue—that the PTO expressly interpreted “original application”
shortly after the AIPA was enacted and that Congress did not amend
the “original application” language when it amended the AIPA—the
Federal Circuit determined that the PTO’s interpretation of section
1885
4608 was permissible.
1886
In Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., the Federal Circuit
also considered the level of deference owed to a determination of the
1887
PTO.
In the lower court, Technology Licensing Corp. (“TLC”)
filed a complaint against Videotek, Inc. alleging infringement of two
1888
TLC patents.
A magistrate judge found that the asserted claim of
one patent was indefinite and of the other patent was valid but not
1889
Both parties appealed the magistrate’s ruling to the
infringed.
1890
Federal Circuit.
TLC separately filed a reissue application
1891
regarding one of the asserted patents, U.S. Patent No. 5,754,250.
After the oral argument but before the Federal Circuit issued its
opinion, the PTO reissued the ‘250 patent with the original claims
1892
unchanged.
The Court declined to consider the effect of the
1893
PTO’s grant of a reissue, finding instead that “judicial efficiency
1881. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1882. Id. at 1335, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1883. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710 (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1677, 1683 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1884. Id. at 1337, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A)
(2006)).
1885. Id. at 1340–43, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713–15.
1886. 545 F.3d 1316, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1887. Id. at 1330–31, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875–76.
1888. Id. at 1323, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
1889. Id. at 1323–24, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–72.
1890. Id. at 1325, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1891. Id. at 1330, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1892. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865.
1893. Id. at 1331, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
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and the policy of repose counsels against our re-weighing of the
evidence to add an additional deference-thumb to the scale, or, even
more disruptive, our asking the trial court to reopen the entire
invalidity question to reweigh the intangible worth of additional
1894
deference.”
1895
In In re Swanson, the Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the PTO’s
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences’ (the “Board”)
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 303(a), which permits the PTO to grant
a reexamination request only if it determines that “a substantial new
question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned
1896
is raised by the request.”
While the PTO’s “interpretation of
statutory provisions concerning ‘the conduct of proceedings in the
Office’” may be owed deference, the Board’s statutory interpretation
1897
is entitled to none.
B. PTO Procedures
In re Swanson also considered the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) for
the first time since a 2002 amendment specifying that “[t]he
existence of a substantial new question of patentability is not
precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was
1898
previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”
The Federal Circuit determined that, under amended § 303(a) as
revised, a “substantial new question of patentability” could exist even
1899
if a federal court had previously considered the question.
“[A]
‘substantial new question of patentability’ refers to a question which
1900
has never been considered by the PTO.”
In prior infringement litigation between Abbott Laboratories, an
exclusive licensee of Mr. Swanson’s patent, and Syntron Bioresearch,
Inc., the alleged infringer, both the district court and the Federal
Circuit had determined that a prior art reference known as “Deutsch”
1901
Despite the
did not anticipate asserted claims of a patent-in-suit.
rulings of the Article III courts, the Federal Circuit held that the
1894. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
1895. 540 F.3d 1368, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1896. Id. at 1374–75, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200–01 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 303(a)
(2006)).
1897. Id. at 1374 n.3, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206 n.3 (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(b)(2)(A) (2006)) (distinguishing Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 87
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
1898. Id. at 1376, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 303(a)
(2006)).
1899. Id. at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1900. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1901. Id. at 1373, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
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question of whether Deutsch was an anticipatory reference could still
raise a substantial new question of patentability sufficient to initiate a
1902
The Federal Circuit stated that a “court’s final
reexamination.
judgment and the examiner’s rejection are not duplicative—they are
differing proceedings with different evidentiary standards for
1903
In civil litigation, a challenger must prove invalidity by
validity.”
1904
clear and convincing evidence.
During patent examinations and
reexaminations, however, an applicant need only prove validity by a
1905
Thus, the fact that an Article III
preponderance of the evidence.
court had determined the validity of the asserted claims did not
preclude the PTO from coming to a contrary conclusion under its
1906
own, different evidentiary standards for determining validity.
Nor was the fact that the examiner had already considered the
Deutsch reference during the initial examination a bar to the PTO
1907
The initial
considering the reference again on re-examination.
examiner relied upon Deutsch only as a secondary reference in an
1908
obviousness rejection of a broader claim.
In light of the extremely limited purpose for which the examiner
considered Deutsch in the initial examination, the Board is correct
that the issue of whether Deutsch anticipates the method disclosed
in claims 22, 23, and 25 was a substantial new question of
1909
patentability, never before addressed by the PTO.
1910

In Burandt v. Dudas,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Director of the
PTO, where the Director’s decision to deny a patent holder’s request
for reinstatement of his patent after failure to pay the maintenance
fee was “neither arbitrary or capricious, nor an abuse of
1911
discretion.”
By operation of an assignment agreement, inventor
Burandt assigned the patent at issue to his employer, Investment
1912
Rarities, Inc. (“IRI”).
IRI failed to pay the first of three statutorily

1902. Id. at 1379, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1903. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1904. See id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (recalling that in an earlier court
proceeding, “Syntron had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that the ‘484 patent was invalid”).
1905. See id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (noting that in the examiner’s
proceedings, a preponderance of evidence supported invalidity).
1906. Id. at 1377–79, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203–04.
1907. See id. at 1381, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205 (agreeing with the Board that a
substantial new question of patentability had been raised under § 303(a)).
1908. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1909. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
1910. 528 F.3d 1329, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1911. Id. at 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139–40.
1912. Id. at 1330, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135.
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Consequently, the patent expired.
mandated maintenance fees.
Seven years later, Burandt, who had been suffering from a mental
1915
illness, contacted the PTO and learned that his patent had expired.
Burandt gained legal title to the expired patent and sought to
1916
reinstate it by sending a maintenance fee payment to the PTO.
1917
The PTO denied Mr. Burandt’s attempts to reinstate his patent.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Director
1918
of the PTO.
Section 41(c)(1) of 35 U.S.C. provides that “[t]he Director may
accept payment of any maintenance fee . . . at any time after the sixmonth grace period if the delay is shown to the satisfaction of the
1919
“[I]n determining whether a
Director to have been unavoidable.”
delay in paying a maintenance fee was unavoidable, one looks to
whether the party responsible for payment of the maintenance fee
1920
The
exercised the due care of a reasonably prudent person.”
district court noted that IRI was responsible for the payment of
maintenance fees and there was no evidence that IRI had exercised
1921
Reviewing the Director’s
due care in paying the maintenance fee.
action under an arbitrary and capricious standard, the Federal
1922
Circuit agreed.
Burandt’s mental illness and destitute financial
condition were irrelevant to the inquiry, because IRI, not Burandt,
was the legal owner of the patent at the time the maintenance fees
1923
were due.
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International Game
1924
Technology,
appellant Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd.
filed the national stage application of an international patent
1925
As a result, the PTO
cooperation treaty application one day late.
1926
notified Aristocrat that the application had been abandoned.
Aristocrat filed a petition to revive the application pursuant to

1913. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1914. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1915. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1916. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1917. Id. at 1331, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1918. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (citing Burandt v. Dudas, 496 F. Supp. 2d
643, 653 (E.D. Va. 2007)).
1919. 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1) (2006).
1920. Burandt, 528 F.3d at 1333, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137 (quoting Ray v.
Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 609, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1786, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
1921. Id. at 1331–32, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1922. Id. at 1332–33, 1336, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137, 1139.
1923. Id. at 1335, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1924. 543 F.3d 657, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1925. Id. at 659, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
1926. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
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1927

37 C.F.R. § 1.137(a), which the PTO granted because the delay in
1928
filing was “unintentional.”
Shortly after the revived application issued as U.S. Patent
1929
No. 7,056,215,
Aristocrat filed suit against International Game
Technology and IGT (collectively “IGT”) for infringement of the
1930
IGT asserted that the ‘215 patent was invalid because it
patent.
had been “improperly revived” by the PTO because the PTO required
Aristocrat to show only “unintentional delay” instead of
1931
“unavoidable” delay, which IGT asserted was the proper standard.
The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in IGT’s
1932
favor.
The Federal Circuit considered only the threshold issue of whether
“improper revival” of an abandoned patent application could be
asserted as an invalidity defense in a suit involving the infringement
1933
Overturning the district court’s holding, the
or validity of a patent.
Federal Circuit “conclude[d] that ‘improper revival’ is not a
cognizable defense in an action involving the validity or infringement
1934
Not only was “improper revival” not a recognized
of a patent.”
defense under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (which catalogues “defenses available
1935
in an action involving the validity or infringement of a patent”),
but the court noted that “[t]here is good reason not to permit
procedural irregularities during prosecution, such as the one at issue
here, to provide a basis for invalidity. Once a patent has issued, the
procedural minutiae of prosecution have little relevance to the metes
1936
and bounds of the patentee’s right to exclude.”
Although it declined to find patents invalid for “procedural
irregularit[ies]” in Aristocrat, the Federal Circuit stressed that any
irregularity during prosecution that involves inequitable conduct are
1937
“redressible under that framework.”
1938
In In re DBC, the Federal Circuit affirmed a final decision of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, rejecting as obvious
claims directed to a “nutraceutical composition” from the fruit of the
1927. 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(a) (2008).
1928. Aristocrat, 543 F.3d at 659–60, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
1929. Id. at 659, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
1930. Id. at 660, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458.
1931. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460 (quoting Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v.
Int’l Game Tech., 491 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924–29 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
1932. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460.
1933. Id. at 660–61, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
1934. Id. at 659, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
1935. Id. at 661–62, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461.
1936. Id. at 663, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
1937. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462–63.
1938. 545 F.3d 1373, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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1939

Appellant DBC raised for the first time, on
mangosteen tree.
appeal to the Federal Circuit, the issue of whether two members of
the panel that heard DBC’s appeal from the patent examiner’s
rejection had been appointed in violation of the Appointments
1940
1941
of the Constitution.
However, by not “rais[ing] its
Clause
objection to the manner of appointment to the Board itself,” DBC
1942
waived the issue.
A party must object to an agency before attacking
the agency action in court because “it gives [the] agency an
opportunity to correct its own mistakes” and “it promotes judicial
1943
efficiency.”
Nor did the Federal Circuit entertain the merits of the
constitutionality of the appointment of the administrative patent
judges under the Appointments Clause—an issue raised by Professor
John F. Duffy of the George Washington University Law School in a
1944
Duffy contended that legislation that
2007 law review article.
delegated the power to appoint administrative patent judges to the
Director of the PTO instead of the Secretary of Commerce was
unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,
because that power is reserved to “the President alone, in the Courts
1945
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
The court, however,
remarked that Professor Duffy’s article was “not an intervening
change in law or facts, nor was it based on any legal or factual
propositions that were not knowable to DBC when it was proceeding
1946
For that reason, there was nothing that
before the Board.”
1947
prevented DBC from raising the issue to the Board on its own.
Moreover, the court found there was no cause to rule on the merits
where DBC had not challenged the propriety or competence of the
administrative patent law judges and where Congress had already
passed remedial legislation re-delegating the power of appointment
1948
to the Secretary of the Treasury.
1949
Finally, the Federal Circuit in Hyatt v. Dudas,
addressed how
specific the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) must
1939. Id. at 1382–83, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
1940. Id. at 1377, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
1941. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
1942. 545 F.3d. at 1378, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127.
1943. Id. at 1378–79, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127–28 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006)).
1944. John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Constitutional?, 2007 PATENTLY-O
PAT. L.J. 21, 21, http://www.patentlyo.com/lawjournal/files/Duffy.BPAI.pdf.
1945. Duffy, supra note 1944, at 21 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
1946. In re DBC, 545 F.3d at 1380, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
1947. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
1948. Id. at 1380–81, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
1949. 551 F.3d 1307, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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be when addressing groups of claims in patent applications. In Hyatt,
the BPAI had been confronted with 2,400 claims in twelve related
1950
The PTO examiner had
applications from inventor Gilbert Hyatt.
rejected all of the claims, most commonly based on the written
1951
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1).
On appeal, the
BPAI did not review each claim independently, but simply reviewed
twenty-one of the claims that Hyatt had discussed in the “Summary of
1952
the Invention” sections of his briefs to the BPAI.
On the basis of
this review of twenty-one claims, the BPAI affirmed the examiner’s
1953
rejections of all claims.
The Federal Circuit held the BAPI’s
1954
method was erroneous and in violation of PTO Rule 1.192(c)(7).
That rule allows the BPAI, when addressing multiple claims, to select
and review just one representative claim for each “ground of
1955
rejection.”
The Federal Circuit, on the contrary, held that a
“ground of rejection” could not simply be “the statutory requirement
for patentability that a claim fails to meet” but had to be “the precise
1956
reason why the claim fails that requirement.”
Thus, the court held
that the BPAI could not consider as a group claims rejected for lack
of written description “unless the claims share a common limitation
1957
that lacks written description support.”
C. International Trade Commission
1.

Jurisdiction
1958
In Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the International
Trade Commission (“ITC”) ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to
investigate and resolve charges of infringement where the imported
drug, under development and subject to the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) safeharbor statute, had not been sold in the United States and was not
1959
the subject of an existing contract for sale.
Recognizing that “[t]he
Commission’s assignment is to prevent and remedy unfair acts flowing
from infringement,” the Federal Circuit reversed the ITC’s
1950. Id. at 1309, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
1951. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
1952. Id. Hyatt first sought review in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, with that court finding that the BPAI’s method to be
erroneous. Hyatt v. Dudas, Nos. 04-1802, 04-1138, 04-1139, and 05-0310, 2006 WL
2521242 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2006).
1953. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
1954. Hyatt, 551 F.3d at 1309, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
1955. Id. at 1311, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.192(c)(7)).
1956. Id. at 1312, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1957. Id. at 1313, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469.
1958. 519 F.3d 1343, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1959. Id. at 1345, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
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1960

The ITC’s jurisdiction is “properly invoked”
determination.
“[w]hen it has been shown that infringing acts are reasonably likely to
1961
occur.”
2.

Scope of authority
Upon finding a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337, the ITC has the
authority to issue two types of exclusion orders: a limited exclusion
order (“LEO”), directed to products imported by a respondent, or a
general exclusion order (“GEO”), directed to all infringing articles,
1962
regardless of whether the importer is a party to the investigation.
The ITC has long used LEOs to exclude not only a respondent’s
infringing article, but also any downstream product (whether or not
manufactured or imported by that respondent) that incorporates the
1963
infringing article.
1964
In Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission,
complainant Broadcom Corporation sought an LEO against
infringing baseband processor chips manufactured by Qualcomm
Corporation, the only named respondent in this investigation, as well
as cellular telephones, PDAs and other wireless communications
1965
devices that contained the infringing chips.
After having found a
violation of § 1337 in the liability phase of the investigation, the ITC
1966
Companies
addressed the appropriate remedy in a separate phase.
with a stake in the outcome of the investigation, including
downstream manufacturers of infringing products, like cell phone
manufacturers and wireless service providers, intervened to argue
1967
against an exclusion order that extended to downstream products.
Following hearings on the appropriate remedy, the ITC issued an
LEO excluding
[h]andheld wireless communications devices, including cellular
telephone handsets and PDAs, containing Qualcomm baseband
processor chips or chipsets that are programmed to enable the
1960. Id. at 1352–53, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194–95 (emphasis added).
1961. Id. at 1352, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194.
1962. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006).
1963. See, e.g., Elec. Connectors, USITC Pub. 2981, Inv. No. 337-TA-374 (July 1996)
(issuing a limited exclusion order to prohibit the unlicensed importation of
infringing products); Microsphere Adhesives, USITC Pub. 2949, Inv. No. 337-TA-366
(Jan. 1996) (ruling that a limited exclusion order should cover downstream products
that contain infringing components in order to ensure proper relief); Aramid Fiber,
USITC Pub. 1824, Inv. No. 337-TA-194 (Mar. 1984) (stating that a protective order
should be issued in order to avoid serious harm to a party).
1964. 545 F.3d 1340, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1965. Id. at 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059–60.
1966. Id. at 1346, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1967. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.
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power saving features covered by claims 1, 4, 8, 9, or 11 of U.S.
Patent No. 6,714,983, wherein the chips or chipsets are
manufactured abroad by or on behalf of Qualcomm
1968
Incorporated.

The Federal Circuit determined that the ITC had exceeded its
statutory authority by issuing an LEO that excludes from the United
States downstream products of manufacturers that were not named as
1969
respondents in the investigation.
According to the Federal Circuit,
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), the statute from which the ITC derives its
authority to exclude articles that infringe on a valid U.S. patent,
“permits LEOs to exclude only the violating products of named
1970
respondents.”
Section 1337(d) provides the following:
(d) Exclusion of articles from entry
(1) If the Commission determines, as a result of an
investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this
section, it shall direct the articles concerned, imported by any
person violating the provision of this section, be excluded
from entry into the United States . . .
(2) The authority of the Commission to order an exclusion
from entry of articles shall be limited to persons determined
by the Commission to be violating this section unless the
Commission determines that—
(A) a general exclusion from entry of articles is necessary
to prevent circumvention of an exclusion order limited to
products of named person; or
(B) there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is
1971
difficult to identify the source of infringing products.

Analyzing § 1337(d) under the Supreme Court’s familiar Chevron
1972
framework, the Federal Circuit determined that the statute “speaks
1973
unambiguously to the precise question at issue in this case.”
In
order to give meaning to each of the statute’s clauses, LEOs must be
limited to “named respondents that the Commission finds in

1968. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060–61 (quoting Baseband Processor Chips,
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (June 2007)).
1969. Id. at 1345, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.
1970. Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (emphasis added).
1971. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006).
1972. See supra note 1873 (summarizing the test for whether to grant deference to
an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory mandate).
1973. Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
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1974

Doing otherwise would render
violation of section 337.”
1975
superfluous the sections of the statute concerning GEOs.
The Federal Circuit rejected the Commission and Broadcom’s
argument that so limiting the scope of the remedy under a LEO
would allow “unnamed, difficult-to-identify importers of infringing
1976
A party fearing circumvention of
articles” to escape enforcement.
an LEO can seek a GEO, as long as the party is able to meet the
1977
heightened requirements of § 1337(d)(2)(A) or (B).
The Federal
Circuit noted that Broadcom’s “strategic decision” to name only
chipmaker Qualcomm as a respondent, even though Broadcom knew
the identities of the handset manufacturers who incorporated those
chips, put the company in a difficult position to argue about the
1978
danger of unknown infringers circumventing an LEO.
Broadcom
did not seek a GEO, so it was not entitled to the exclusion of
“downstream products” of those who are not “persons determined . . .
1979
to be violating [Section 337].”

1974. Id. at 1356, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
1975. See id. (discussing the distinct circumstances in which LEOs and GEOs should
be applied).
1976. Id. at 1357, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1977. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1978. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1979. Id. at 1357–58, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.

